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Alan Turing’s Electronic Nightmare:
The Struggle to Build the ACE  
Computer
J. Michael Beaver
 “Everything faded into mist. The past was erased, 
the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.”1
Alan Turing’s role in the creation of the modern computer is 
peculiar because his work during the Second World War was 
shrouded in secrecy and his association with the Hungarian-
American computing pioneer John von Neumann muddied 
his pioneering work immediately after the war. Turing’s 
post-war Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) project at the 
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in London was one of 
his more significant contributions to the development of the 
modern computer. However, the story of the ACE computer 
seems to be particularly lost in popular history. For instance, 
the Encyclopedia Britannica entry for “computer” features an 
omission of Turing’s ACE project, though it discusses Turing’s 
other work.2 Turing’s ACE project did not see a considerable 
amount of success until after his untimely death. John von 
Neumann’s work on computer design is best known for 
the eponymous “von Neumann architecture,” and he saw 
1  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Part I, Chapter 7.
2  Paul A. Freiberger, David Hemmendinger, William Morton Pottenger, and Michael R. 
Swaine, “Computer,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified July 5, 2012, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/130429/computer. 
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considerable success in his lifetime. Turing’s ACE featured 
a novel design that rivaled von Neumann’s design, but its 
story has been partially lost in history. If Turing’s ACE had 
the same successful influence as von Neumann’s design, 
there would exist the “Turing architecture” and the “von 
Neumann architecture”; however, there is only the latter.3 The 
commercial and practical failure of Turing’s ACE computing 
project can be attributed to the confluence of several counter-
productive influences. Conflicting goals, poor relationships, 
and exceedingly poor administration ultimately led to the 
failure of Turing’s ACE project.
 After the Second World War, Britain needed 
desperately to reassert its presence on the international 
stage. The shift to a Labour government in 1945 spawned an 
interest to exploit the new field of computational research 
as one method to reassert Britain’s dominance. Sir Charles 
G. Darwin, director of the NPL and grandson of naturalist 
Charles Darwin, sought to participate in this initiative 
by establishing a national computer project at the NPL. 
Darwin charged John R. Womersley, supervisor of the NPL 
3  This is not to say that Turing has not had lasting impacts on computer science as a 
discipline. He contributed the founding theories of artificial intelligence, programming, 
and architectural design. We are concerned with the development of a practical modern 
computing machine, not one of his theoretical projects.
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Mathematics Division, with the construction of the machine.4 
Womersley’s proposed national computer was a machine 
that could solve all of Britain’s computational needs for the 
future.5 On the international stage, as David Leavitt reports, 
the United States was quickly surpassing Britain in the field of 
computational research, which pressured the NPL to engage 
in serious computational research.6 The increase in pressure 
provided Womersley with initiative to start the research 
program as soon as possible. 
 As part of his national computer initiative, Womersley 
recruited Alan Turing in 1945.7 Womersley was aware of 
Turing’s 1936 paper “On Computable Numbers, With an 
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” which would 
become the genesis of the Turing Machine. Womersley’s 
ingenious idea was to have Turing design and construct the 
new national computer: the Automatic Computing Engine.8 
However, there was a conflict of interests as Darwin and 
Womersley were interested in a machine that could service 
4  John Hendry, Innovating for Failure: Government Policy and the Early British Computer 
Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989), 34. Up until 1945, most computing machines 
were complex electromechanical contraptions conceived to perform one specialized task 
exceptionally well. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC), designed 
by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly, is a notable example. The ENIAC featured a complex, 
convoluted design, and it was frustrating to operate. After von Neumann joined the ENIAC 
team as an adviser, he produced the “First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC,” which proposed 
the “von Neumann architecture,” as it is known today. For more information, see William 
Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1990), 34-9.
5  Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 306.
6  David Leavitt, The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 199.
7  Simon Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” in Alan Turing and His Contemporaries: Building 
the World’s First Computers, ed. Simon Lavington (Swindon, UK: BCS, 2012), 11-2.
8  Ibid. Turing was fond of remarking that Womersley’s greatest contribution to the ACE 
project was its name. Womersley’s idea, the word “engine” was a “deliberate reference to 
Charles Babbage’s unfinished” 1837 Analytical Engine. For more information, see Hodges, 
317 and Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 13.
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the entire country and solve its mathematical problems.9 
Turing, on the other hand, saw the ACE as an opportunity 
to realize his 1936 concept of a Universal Turing Machine.10 
Nevertheless, Turing drafted a design for the machine, and his 
proposal was finished at the end of 1945. The NPL’s Executive 
Committee approved the project, and construction officially 
began on August 18, 1947.11
 Darwin and Womersley’s desire for a glorified 
calculator to solve the country’s numerical problems was 
not entirely consistent with Turing’s view.12 While Turing 
understood the importance of national numerical work,13 
he saw the ACE as an opportunity to do so much more. 
During his wartime codebreaking work at Bletchley Park, 
Turing worked with non-numerical logic problems, and he 
understood the significance of such problems.14 Turing’s 
vision surpassed the short-term goal of number crunching; 
his ultimate goal was a machine that was universal, or general 
in purpose. The ACE, Turing hoped, would be able to handle 
any problem, numerical or non-numerical.15 What is more, 
9  Simon Lavington, Early British Computers: The Story of Vintage Computers and the People Who 
Built Them (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 23-4.
10  Hodges, 318.
11  It is worth noting that development on the ACE had begun in late 1945 and persisted 
throughout 1946. The actual ACE—or, rather, the Pilot ACE—began on this date. See also 
Hendry, 34 and Hodges, 367.
12  Lavington, Early British Computers, 23-4.
13  Turing apparently entertained the idea of nationalized computer stations. In fact, in a 
lecture to the London Mathematical Society on February 20, 1947, he mused that a distant 
computer could be operated by use of a special telephone line. Perhaps this was Turing’s 
naïve conception of a primitive computer network. He optimistically concluded that the cost 
would be no more than a few hundred pounds. See also A. M. Turing, “Lecture to L.M.S. Feb. 
20 1947.” Lecture to the London Mathematical Society, London, UK, February 20, 1947.
14  Hodges, 365.
15  Teresa Numerico, “From Turing machine to ‘electronic brain,’” in Alan Turing’s Automatic 
Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, ed. B. Jack 
Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181.
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Turing saw the ACE as an opportunity to capitalize on his 
computer-brain metaphor: a computing machine can emulate 
the human brain.16 The ACE would embody the philosophy 
of the Universal Turing Machine: a machine that could be 
programmed to perform the tasks of any other machine.17 
If the ACE could be programmed to perform any task, then 
it could theoretically be programmed to mimic a sort of 
primitive artificial intelligence, which was Turing’s goal.
 John von Neumann’s “First Draft of a Report on the 
EDVAC”18 served as the initial inspiration for Turing’s ACE 
proposal. Von Neumann’s EDVAC Report was a high-level 
abstract amalgamation of the various ideas that resulted from 
various conversations with his colleagues.19 In principle, the 
EDVAC Report was a conceptual framework from which a 
group could consult while building a machine. John Hendry, 
Fellow of Girton College, University of Cambridge, notes 
most British researchers were “content to follow the well-
disseminated and authoritative work of von Neumann, 
[which was] encapsulated in the EDVAC report.”20 Womersley 
obtained a copy of it and gave it to Turing,who accepted 
the legitimacy of von Neumann’s work, but was “keen” to 
implement his own ideas about computing machines.21 
 While Turing’s ACE design drew upon the EDVAC 
16  Hodges, 293-4.
17  William Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1990), 176.
18  Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer, or EDVAC.
19  Jon Agar, Turing and the Universal Machine: The Making of the Modern Computer 
(Cambridge, UK: Icon, 2001),115-6.
20  Hendry, 34.
21  Hodges, 306.
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Report, his actual proposal was a much more detailed 
realization of the abstract EDVAC machine.22 Turing specified 
that his ACE proposal should be read in conjunction with 
von Neumann’s EDVAC Report.23 The proposal had been 
described as the first complete, detailed description of 
electronic stored-program digital computer.24 Indeed, Turing’s 
ACE proposal was the first detailed plan for constructing a 
Universal Turing Machine.25 However, it is intriguing that 
Turing’s ACE proposal draws more upon von Neumann’s 
work than his own; the ACE proposal is much more heavily 
influenced by the EDVAC Report than Turing’s own 1936 
paper.26 It is worth noting that von Neumann’s EDVAC 
Report makes implicit, indirect use of Turing Machines, 
though he does not make explicit references to Turing’s 1936 
paper.27 Although von Neumann indirectly used Turing’s 
ideas, his EDVAC design differed greatly from Turing’s ACE 
design.
 Presumably Womersley wanted Turing to build an 
EDVAC-type machine but give it a twist to make it distinctly 
British. Turing’s design was a radical departure from von 
22  Numerico, 181.
23  Hodges, 318.
24  B. E. Carpenter and R. W. Doran, “The Other Turing Machine,” in The Computer Journal 
20, no. 3 (1977), 269.
25  B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, “What Turing Did after He Invented the 
Universal Turing Machine,” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9, no. 4 (2000): 491.
26  Martin Campbell-Kelly, “The ACE and the shaping of British computing,” in Alan 
Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern 
Computer, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 156-7.
27  Leavitt, 201. Von Neumann’s EDVAC Report only made explicit reference to a biophysics 
article by McCulloch and Pitts. In their article, McCulloch and Pitts used Turing Machines 
to describe neural nets. For further discussion, see B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, 
“Turing and the computer,” in Alan Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine: The Master 
Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 113.
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Neumann’s original design. As a logician, Turing took great 
pains to improve on the EDVAC’s logical structure. Turing’s 
priorities were a “simple as possible” hardware system 
and a large, fast memory for storage.28 For example, in the 
EDVAC design, arithmetical operations, such as addition 
and multiplication, were accomplished using adder and 
multiplier hardware units. In the EDVAC design, the central 
accumulator performed all arithmetic; however, shoving 
large amounts of data down one avenue could present 
a formidable bottleneck for programs. Turing countered 
this by distributing arithmetical operations across several 
memory locations in an “ingenious way.”29 The larger adder 
and multiplier units, while included in the ACE design, 
were broken into smaller logical units. These improvements 
allowed Turing to economize on the hardware to allow more 
program instructions. For Turing, user convenience was not a 
top priority; in fact, he believed that user convenience could 
be achieved by thought and planning, not by more machine 
hardware.30 The ACE machine was all about speed and 
efficiency.
 As for software execution, the EDVAC and ACE 
designs were completely opposite. Von Neumann enforced 
strict serial execution of program instructions, yet Turing 
allowed for programs to modify their own instructions.31 
Turing’s ACE design also incorporated a unique concept: 
28  Hodges, 320.
29  Ibid., 323.
30  Ibid., 320.
31  Ibid., 324-6.
12 Articles 
optimum coding.32 Simply put, optimum coding “enabled 
more computing to the pound-sterling, as it were,” but this 
greater efficiency came at the cost of difficult, complex, and 
often frustrating programming.33 However, optimum coding 
allowed users to achieve up to four times greater speed over 
conventional contemporary machines.34 Despite making 
extensive use of von Neumann’s notation and figures,35 
Turing’s design distinctly improved upon von Neumann’s 
framework. In fact, Turing completed his ACE proposal in just 
three months, a much shorter time than that of von Neumann 
and his colleagues. By the end of 1945, Turing had a complete 
design from which to work.36 Enthusiasm aside, Turing’s 
personality and work ethic may have influenced the great 
speed with which he completed his ACE proposal. 
 Since his days at Sherborne School, Turing was 
known for his “self-contained” and “solitary” working 
style, “chaotic” mind and difficulty expressing himself, 
and potential for becoming a brilliant mathematician.37 He 
carried these traits with him to King’s College Cambridge. 
For instance, Turing worked completely in solitude when 
developing his 1936 paper. In fact, he was so engrossed 
in his work he was not aware that an American, Alonzo 
32  David M. Yates, Turing’s Legacy: A History of Computing at the National Physical Laboratory 
1945-1995 (London: National Museum of Science and Industry, 1997), 33-4. It is worth noting 
that Turing did not use the term “optimum coding.”
33  Campbell-Kelly, 160.
34  Lavington, Early British Computers, 115-6.
35  Hodges, 328-9.
36  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 12.
37  Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Summer Term, 1926.”; 
Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Lent Term, 1928.”; Sherborne 
School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Michaelmas Term, 1927.”
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Church of Princeton, had published his solution to the 
Entscheidungsproblem just months before Turing finished his 
paper.38 Turing also carried his solitary habits into his work 
at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. For example, 
Turing managed “to break into five days’ worth of Enigma 
material” completely independently of the main codebreaking 
efforts; however, the material was mostly trivial pre-war 
intelligence and of little consequence.39 Evidence suggests 
that Turing was driven to solve problems that his colleagues 
ignored; indeed, he took on new projects so he could have 
them to himself.40 This indicates that Turing was strongly self-
driven and self-motivated. 
 Working with Turing could be challenging, particularly 
due to his personality. His colleagues at Bletchley Park found 
him to be an incapable administrator because he was more 
focused on his codebreaking work and private research 
projects.41 Turing was quite a disorganized administrator, 
and he eventually lost his administrative role in Hut 8 at 
Bletchley Park.42 He also had a bad habit of micromanaging 
his colleagues, which often resulted in mutual annoyance.43 
Turing’s initial supervisor, the Cambridge classicist and code 
breaker Dillwyn Knox, found it difficult to manage Turing.44 
Knox remarked that Turing was “very difficult to anchor 
38  Yates, 15.
39  Sinclair McKay, The Secret Life of Bletchley Park: The History of the Wartime Codebreaking 
Centre and the Men and Women Who Were There (London: Aurum, 2010), 47.
40  Ibid., 134.
41  Christopher Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization 
Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 210.
42  McKay, 191. See also Grey, 210.
43  Hodges, 376.
44  McKay, 54-5.
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down,” but his authority was just enough to keep Turing 
at least partially under control.45 Turing was notoriously 
rambunctious, his codebreaking work at Bletchley Park was 
essential to the Allies’ success in the Second World War.
 Turing was also well known for his eccentric behavior, 
such as chaining his coffee mug to a radiator to discourage 
theft. Also, Turing tended to fall into silences for extended 
periods and to stare off into the distance, often staring past 
the people to whom he was engaged in conversation.46 
Conversations with Turing were often hampered by his 
characteristic “hesitating stammer”47 and his unusually high 
voice, which could make his speech difficult to comprehend. 
Turing also had the bad habit of dressing like a hapless 
tramp.48 Indeed, most of Turing’s colleagues at Bletchley 
Park considered him to be a worried “weirdo.”49 What 
is more, Turing became accustomed to a certain level of 
wartime priority. He and a few colleagues wrote directly to 
Winston Churchill to appeal for much-needed supplies and 
personnel. Surprisingly, Churchill granted the request and 
gave high priority to the Bletchley Park staff.50 Ultimately, the 
idiosyncrasies of Turing’s character would contribute to the 
downfall of his ACE project.
 Turing’s ACE project stalled and nearly failed due to 
a combination of inadequate organizational structure, poor 
45  Ibid.
46  Marion Hill, Bletchley Park People: Churchill’s Geese That Never Cackled (Phoenix Mill, UK: 
Sutton Publishing, 2004): 68-9.
47  McKay, 17.
48  Hill, 68.
49  McKay, 17.
50  Hodges, 376.
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administration, and a lack of resources. From the outset, 
the National Physical Laboratory very much adhered to the 
bureaucratic standards expected of government institutions. 
It was composed of a rigid management structure and a strict 
division of labor; however, the NPL lacked a reputation for 
innovation.51 The ACE was a chance to turn that reputation 
around. Under Darwin, Womersley led and directed the 
daily research operations of the Mathematics Division and 
the ACE project. Indeed, Turing would begrudgingly refer 
to Womersley as “my boss.”52 Turing was accustomed to the 
managerial structure of Bletchley Park, and Womersley’s 
managerial style was incongruent with that structure. 
Whereas Turing was interested in solving problems and 
developing computers, Womersley was concerned with 
bureaucracy and results.
 The NPL’s very literal division of labor proved 
detrimental to the progress of the development of Turing’s 
ACE computer. As part of its organizational structure, 
the NPL was divided into different Divisions, such as the 
Mathematics Division or the Radio Division. The construction 
of a computer was a mathematical and logical task in theory 
and design, but the actual device had to be constructed 
by engineers. Turing was allowed his own small team 
of mathematicians and engineers.53 However, the NPL’s 
organizational structure “drew a firm line between brain 
51  Ibid., 339.
52  Ibid., 317.
53  Yates, 24.
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and hand;”54 hence, ignorance of the developments of each 
Division would develop.55 Steady progress would have been 
difficult to maintain at the NPL without a fluid, cohesive 
organizational structure. This would become especially 
evident later when Darwin established the Electronics Section 
as part of the Radio Division.56 The Electronics Section became 
the primary roadblock in the development of the ACE. 
 Turing originally proposed the establishment of an 
in-house electronics section in February 1947 to alleviate the 
pressure on the Mathematics Division.57 After a trip between 
1946 and 1947 to survey the numerous American computer 
projects, Turing expressed his concern that the NPL’s 
organizational structure was inadequate. As Turing remarked 
in a letter,
One point concerning the form of organisation struck  
me very strongly. The engineering work was in every 
case being done in the same building with the more 
mathematical work. I am convinced that this is the 
right approach. It is not possible for the two parts of 
the organisation to keep in sufficiently close touch 
otherwise. They are too deeply interdependent. We 
are frequently finding that we are held up due to 
ignorance of some point which could be cleared up 
by the engineers, and the Post Office find similar 
difficulty; a telephone conversation is seldom effective 
because we cannot use diagrams.58 
54  Hodges, 339.
55  Ibid., 356.
56  Ibid., 366.
57  B. Jack Copeland, “The Origins and Development of the ACE Project,” in Alan Turing’s 
Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, 
ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69-70.
58  Hodges, 356.
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Turing sought to establish a more cohesive work environment. 
In effect, Turing was betraying his own work ethic; his 
characteristic style was that of a self-driven loner. However, 
a more cohesive unit would establish a sense of stability 
and concentrated effort. In fact, in the same letter, Turing 
explained that the sheer number of American computer 
projects was counterproductive because it stretched thin 
the available resources. In contrast, Turing believed that 
a concentrated effort on one machine in Britain—namely, 
the ACE at the NPL—would prove more fruitful than 
the American efforts. Turing also realized, however, that 
the British effort was “puny” in comparison to the larger 
American projects.59 By 1947, Turing’s ACE project entered 
its second year, and the NPL had little to show for it. Hence, 
progress needed to be stimulated quickly; a cohesive 
organizational structure would expedite this process.
 Darwin established the Electronics Section of the 
Radio Division in summer 1947, and Horace A. Thomas was 
appointed as its supervisor.60 The new Electronics Section 
took several months to install due to poor administration, 
whereas it could have been installed in a matter of weeks. 
Unlike Turing and the ACE group, Thomas was primarily 
interested in the industrial applications of electronics, not 
computing machines.61 For some reason, however, Darwin 
decided that all engineers, including the ACE engineers, 
should fall under the purview of Thomas’s Electronics 
59  Ibid.
60  Ibid., 366.
61  Copeland, 66.
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Section.62 Turing lost his control of his engineers and Thomas 
almost singlehandedly stalled all development. Indeed, the 
ignorant engineers of Thomas’s section replaced the capable 
engineers of the ACE group. Thomas also petitioned Darwin 
to “curtail the construction work in the ACE Section.”63 
Worse yet, after several months of stonewall administration, 
Thomas left the NPL for Unilever Ltd, which led Womersley 
to remark that development was “probably as far advanced 
[as] 18 months ago.”64 While Thomas’s Electronics Section 
was an unfortunate detour on the road to building the ACE, 
the concept of an Electronics Section was not inherently bad. 
Turing recognized the potential benefit of and argued for an 
in-house electronics section,65 but Darwin’s implementation of 
the section was poorly administered. The establishment of the 
Electronics Section should have benefited the ACE project, but 
the relationship between the Mathematics Division and the 
Electronics Section was not as prosperous as desired.
 Evidence suggests that the NPL leadership and 
Turing were often at odds with one another, especially 
when Turing’s authority began to be undermined. In 1947, 
American Harry D. Huskey joined the NPL to spend a one-
year sabbatical working on the ACE project.66 By the time of 
Huskey’s arrival, Turing had completed Version VII of his 
revised ACE design, and progress on the project was at a near 
62  Hendry, 35.
63  Ibid., 69-70.
64  Ibid.
65  Ibid.
66  Hendry, 34-5.
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standstill.67 Huskey proposed to construct a miniature, pilot 
model of the ACE based on Version V of Turing’s design; the 
pilot model was known as the “Test Assembly.” Importantly, 
Huskey revised and made significant changes to Turing’s 
design by stripping Turing’s design of its logical components; 
Huskey believed the machine merely needed to perform 
numerical calculations.68 While this view was consistent with 
Darwin and Womersley’s goals, it was totally incongruous 
with Turing’s vision. Interestingly, B. Jack Copeland 
speculates that a machine such as the Test Assembly, 
“given better management at the NPL,” could have been 
completed in 1948.69 However, Thomas’s Electronics Section 
was established shortly after Huskey introduced his Test 
Assembly. Although Womersley had urged for cooperation 
between Thomas and the ACE group, Thomas’s stonewalling 
of the ACE project nearly killed Huskey’s Test Assembly 
project.70 The Test Assembly could not be completed by 1948 
due to departmental infighting.
 Understandably, Turing did not appreciate Huskey’s 
Test Assembly side project, but he did not actively protest 
it. Turing simply could not understand why anyone would 
want to waste time on a pilot model version of the ACE. 
Indeed, as Teresa Numerico notes, Turing was simply unable 
“to perceive its urgency and strategic importance.”71 For 
67  Copeland, 57.
68  Hodges, 365.
69  Copeland, 69-70.
70  Ibid., 69.
71  Numerico, 187.
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Turing, the ultimate goal was the “grand ACE installation”;72 
on the other hand, the NPL management wanted a proof-of-
concept machine to attract investors and partners.73 While 
Turing never publicly expressed his disdain for the “Test 
Assembly,” Huskey’s side project was a blatant undermining 
of his authority. Huskey took control of the ACE group, and 
all focus was concentrated on the Test Assembly side project.74 
The effort to construct the ACE was further divided as 
valuable resources were diverted to the Test Assembly project. 
In fact, the splintering of Huskey’s group from the main ACE 
group ran counter to Turing’s wish for a cohesive working 
unit, as he outlined in his aforementioned letter. Furthermore, 
Thomas’s Electronics Section policies ensured the limited 
progress of Huskey’s Test Assembly machine. In fact, Thomas 
persuaded Darwin to cease operations on the side project;75 
in response, Huskey remarked, “Morale in the Mathematics 
Division collapsed.”76 Thomas had effectively demoralized 
the ACE personnel. After his departure, Huskey’s Test 
Assembly evolved into the Pilot ACE, which also deviated 
from Turing’s original design.
 As a sign of the deteriorating social atmosphere at 
the NPL, Turing and Womersley exhibited rather passive 
aggressive behavior toward one another. Turing perceived 
Womersley as the epitome of “bogus,”77 and Womersley 
72  Hodges, 365.
73  Numerico, 187.
74  Ibid.
75  Hodges, 372.
76  Copeland, 64.
77  Hodges, 317.
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probably saw Turing as an overly eccentric genius. Womersley 
and Turing purposely avoided contact with another. Andrew 
Hodges recounts in his biography of Turing:
Womersley’s gifts of management: a mastery of 
name-dropping, a genial enthusiasm, a pleasant office 
manner to important visitors, a diplomatic sense of 
what to report, were not skills that Alan Turing ranked 
highly; not just because he lacked them himself, but 
because he still could not understand why anyone 
should need weapons other than rational argument. 
Before long, Alan [Turing] was openly rude to 
Womersley in the office, saying ‘What do you want?’ 
and turning his back if Womersley dared to intrude 
upon some discussion. . . . Conversely, Womersley 
would show visitors round Cromer House, pointing at 
the Turing office from afar with exaggerated awe, and 
saying ‘Ah, that’s Turing, we mustn’t disturb him,’ as of 
some rare zoological exhibit.78 
Turing and Womersley’s managerial styles were utterly 
incompatible. On one hand, Womersley was a stereotypical 
“yes-man” administrator with hardly a mind of his own.79 On 
the other hand, Turing lacked all managerial qualities because 
he did not desire to be a manager.80 The mutual juvenility in 
which Womersley and Turing acted toward one another is 
of interest; however, juvenility is hardly a professional trait, 
and it would not be expected from someone of Womersley’s 
status and position. Then again, the same may be said for 
Turing, though he had a history of disregarding conventional 
standards and expectations. Furthermore, conflicts between 
Turing and Womersley could have scarcely benefited morale.
78  Ibid.
79  Ibid.
80  Ibid., 376.
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 The ACE project lacked the camaraderie to which 
Turing grew accustomed at Bletchley Park.81 If Womersley 
and Turing were at odds with one another on a regular basis, 
the friction and tension would have negatively impacted 
morale. Conflicts in management ran counter to Turing’s wish 
for a cohesive working unit, so it is perplexing that he would 
act compromisingly. Perhaps the frustration of slow progress 
was putting an end to his resolve. As may be inferred from 
Hodges’s anecdote, visitors may have assumed negative 
impressions of the NPL based on Womersley and Turing’s 
actions. These negative impressions further complicated the 
production of the ACE, especially considering these visitors 
were financiers or potential contractors.
 The NPL desperately required financial support, but it 
would be difficult to obtain. Turing’s original ACE proposal 
featured a rather optimistic projected budget of £11,200,82 but 
Womersley recommended increasing the projected cost to 
about £50,000 or £60,000 to make it more realistic.83 However, 
by late 1946, the ACE project was estimated to cost up to 
£125,000.84 The NPL needed the help of the Treasury to fund 
the ACE project.85 Darwin and Womersley proposed a small 
“pilot” machine project, the Pilot ACE, to the Treasury and 
Ministry of Supply. As Hodges reports, the Treasury granted 
£10,000 for the “small-machine,” but this was just an initial 
81  Ibid., 343.
82  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 12.
83  Yates, 22-3.
84  “Britain to Make a Radio Brain: ‘Ace’ Superior to U.S. Model,” The Daily Telegraph, 
November 7, 1946.
85  Hodges, 337.
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installment. The hope was that a more substantial sum of up 
to £100,000 would be made available for a larger, full-scale 
machine. The Treasury made no guarantees of this larger 
amount.86 In a sense, the Treasury’s small investment was 
an attempt to insure itself in case Turing’s project failed. 
However, the lack of a guarantee for the full amount put 
unnecessary strain on the NPL administration.
 It is worth noting that Max Newman’s Manchester 
University computer project87 was able to avoid the financial 
woes the NPL faced. In 1946, Newman applied to the Royal 
Society for funding. Interestingly, Darwin was a member 
of the Royal Society committee that reviewed Newman’s 
application. Naturally, he attempted to reject the application 
“on the grounds that the ACE was to serve the needs of the 
country.”88 Darwin was overruled, and Newman was granted 
£35,000, a much larger grant than the NPL received from the 
Treasury.89 Newman’s Manchester project would produce the 
Manchester “Baby,” which became the first stored-program 
computer to run a program on June 21, 1948.90 By then, the 
NPL’s Pilot ACE had yet to be built; Darwin’s dream of a 
national computer at the NPL was effectively crushed by 
Newman’s Manchester project.91 
 Ultimately, the ACE project was meant to produce a 
86  Ibid.
87  Max Newman established a computer laboratory at Manchester in late 1945. Newman 
was the first reader of Turing’s 1936 paper, and he understood its significance. Newman also 
worked with Turing at Bletchley Park. For more information, see Lavington, Early British 
Computers, 23-4. See also Hodges 341.
88  Hodges, 341-2.
89  Ibid.
90  Yates, 35.
91  Hodges, 366.
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real, working machine. The NPL lacked engineers capable of 
appreciating Turing’s design92 and the space to accommodate 
the construction of a large computing machine.93 Thus, 
outside contractors were needed to supply manpower and 
materials for construction of the ACE. The NPL made at least 
three efforts to obtain contracts with outside organizations. 
The first attempt was a concerted effort to forge a contract 
with the Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill. Engineers 
at the Post Office had made great strides in mercury delay line 
storage technology during the Second World War. Turing’s 
ACE design called for the use of electroacoustic mercury 
delay lines as its storage medium.94 Unfortunately, the Post 
Office’s Dollis Hill facilities were hopelessly inadequate 
for construction of the ACE.95 The Post Office also had an 
extensive backlog of projects of its own to complete, let alone 
a new project from the NPL.96 The NPL was unable to secure a 
contract with the Post Office, but it persisted in trying to farm 
out contracts to other organizations.97
 After the Post Office contract foundered, the NPL 
tried to establish a contract with the Telecommunications 
Research Establishment (TRE) at Malvern. The TRE was 
attractive even more so than the Post Office because it had 
the experienced engineers that the NPL group desperately 
needed, particularly F. C. Williams. At the TRE, Williams 
92  Ibid., 338.
93  Hendry, 34.
94  Ibid.
95  Numerico, 181.
96  Hodges, 340.
97  Copeland, 61.
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was experimenting with applications of cathode ray tubes.98 
Turing saw cathode ray tubes as a possible alternative to 
mercury delay lines for the ACE’s storage medium, but this 
suggestion was not well received.99 The NPL simply could 
not afford another major delay. Moreover, most of the able 
technicians the TRE could spare had been transferred to 
the Department of Atomic Energy. Also, attempts to recruit 
Williams soured because he was more interested in building 
his computer, rather than the NPL’s computer, Newman 
recruited Williams to join the Manchester computer project. 
The TRE could only offer a small staff to be directed under 
Williams at Manchester;100 thus, the TRE’s attractiveness 
waned. Unfortunately for Turing and the NPL, the TRE 
contract foundered.101
 After the failures with the Post Office and the TRE, 
Darwin eventually turned to the English Electric Company 
in late 1948.102 Sir George Nelson was the Chairman of 
English Electric; also, he was a member of the NPL Executive 
Committee.103 Despite being rather incestuous, the partnership 
was a much-needed break. English Electric loaned NPL a 
small staff of engineers, which finally built the Pilot ACE 
machine from January 1949 until completion in May 1950.104 
Unlike its governmental contemporaries, however, English 
Electric was only interested in the Pilot ACE for the purpose 
98  Yates, 24.
99  Hodges, 340.
100  Ibid., 349-50.
101  Copeland, 61.
102  Ibid., 74-5.
103  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 17.
104  Hendry, 35.
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of commercial production.105
 Even after the NPL’s Pilot ACE was completed in 
1950, English Electric still did not have a concrete design 
for a commercial version. Indeed, as John Hendry notes, 
English Electric was uninterested in “the commercial 
exploitation of computers.”106 English Electric’s attitude is 
perplexing because the company’s sole purpose in aiding 
the NPL was to commercially exploit the Pilot ACE design. 
However, for some reason, the company did not want to 
commercialize computers. Nevertheless, English Electric’s 
efforts to commercialize the Pilot ACE were too late to make 
a significant difference in the world of commercialized 
computers.
 English Electric waited until the autumn of 1954, a few 
months after Turing’s untimely death, to begin developing 
a “fully engineered version of the Pilot ACE to be called the 
DEUCE;” English Electric had no intentions at this point of 
marketing the DEUCE.107 Eventually, between 1955 and 1957, 
English Electric began manufacturing the DEUCE, but the 
company still made no active efforts to market the machine.108 
By the time the DEUCE was made commercially available 
in 1955,109 it was already on the verge of obsolescence. For 
instance, the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 
(AWRE) ordered a DEUCE machine, but, by early 1956, the 
105  Ibid., 43.
106  Ibid., 69.
107  Ibid., 105.
108  Ibid., 119.
109  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19.
Articles 27 
DEUCE was unable to keep up with the AWRE’s demands.110 
In the end, English Electric only produced 33 DEUCE units, of 
which 12 units remained with the company.111 Although over 
half of the manufactured DEUCE units were sold, the DEUCE 
was woefully inadequate for practical operation and research, 
and was a veritable flop.
 The situation at the NPL continued to worsen, 
culminating in Turing’s resignation on May 28, 1948112 and 
Darwin’s resignation in 1949.113 Darwin and Womersley grew 
tired of Turing as progress on the ACE project stagnated. 
Indeed, conditions were so poor that Darwin and Womersley 
suggested that Turing should “go off for a spell” to 
Cambridge, with the understanding that Turing would return 
to the NPL.114 Turing agreed to take the sabbatical, but he 
would return to neither the ACE project nor the NPL. During 
his sabbatical, Turing came back under the influence of his old 
colleague Max Newman. At Newman’s behest, Turing joined 
the Manchester computer project,115 but was too late to make 
any substantial contributions to the project before the “Baby” 
ran its first programs in June 1948.116 Although Turing had no 
legal obligation to return to the NPL, Darwin was frustrated 
with him for joining a “rival” computer project.117 While 
work on the ACE continued in Turing’s absence, it was as 
110  Hendry, 120.
111  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19.
112  Ibid., 17.
113  Hodges, 407.
114  Ibid., 367.
115  Agar, 121.
116  Ibid., 113.
117  There was not necessarily a competitive rivalry between the British computer projects. 
Rather, the competition was with the American projects. See Hodges, 342.
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painfully slow as when Turing was present. In fact, when Jim 
Wilkinson—an ACE engineer—visited Turing in Cambridge, 
he brought news of “cuts, crises, and an ever-narrowing 
vision” at the NPL.118 Wilkinson’s account is strong evidence 
that Turing may not have been the only reason for the ACE 
project’s slow progress, as Darwin and Womersley may have 
suspected. Nevertheless, the Pilot ACE machine survived to 
completion and ran its first program on May 10, 1950.119 
 However, by 1950, the Pilot ACE was no longer 
Turing’s machine.120 The Pilot ACE was more Huskey’s 
machine since it evolved from the Test Assembly. After 
its successful 1950 demonstrations, the Pilot ACE was 
transformed into the English Electric DEUCE, which saw an 
extremely limited commercial success.121 Finally, in 1957, a 
full-scale version of the ACE was completed,122 and it was a 
much more complete realization of Turing’s dream to build a 
Universal Turing Machine.123 Turing’s ACE project at the NPL 
was a veritable disaster; indeed, he would rarely speak of it 
after he resigned.124
 Turing had left the NPL for Manchester before the Pilot 
ACE—or the full ACE, for that matter—reached completion. 
The Pilot ACE machine of 1950 was derived from Turing’s 
118  Hodges, 372.
119  Lavington, Early British Computers, 29.
120 Hodges, 368.
121  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19. The DEUCE was an inferior machine compared 
to its American counterparts. For example, the IBM 704 was whole orders of magnitude 
superior to the DEUCE. For a more extensive comparison, see Hendry, 120.
122  Lavington, Early British Computers, 46.
123  Ibid., 116.
124  Hodges, 376-7.
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designs, but it strayed from his philosophy and goal.125 The 
full ACE machine was finally completed in 1957, at which 
time A. M. Uttley of the NPL remarked, “Today Turing’s 
dream has come true.”126 However, by 1957, it was too little 
too late. The ACE design, relatively revolutionary in 1945 
and 1946, was on the verge of obsolescence in 1957. It could 
be concluded, perhaps, that the nightmarish process of 
constructing the ACE had little benefit, except for serving as 
a step toward Turing’s later advances in computer science, 
particularly in artificial intelligence at Manchester.127
 While Turing and von Neumann may have been 
working independently on different computing projects, 
they were hardly without mutual influence. Indeed, von 
Neumann’s EDVAC Report heavily influenced Turing’s 
ACE proposal, and von Neumann relied heavily upon the 
theoretical Turing machine. However, von Neumann’s 
abstract EDVAC design has garnered a considerable influence 
in computer science. Turing was much less fortunate in 
that his ACE machine fell almost completely into obscurity. 
While both men may be considered “fathers” of the modern 
computer, both men did not come about their titles in 
the same way. Both men took different approaches to the 
125  Ibid., 368.
126  Lavington, Early British Computers, 116.
127  Although Turing’s short time at the NPL was marked by unnecessary frustration, he 
made great strides in theoretical computer science. For instance, Turing explored the question 
of artificial intelligence in his NPL report, “Intelligent Machinery.” For more on “Intelligent 
Machinery,” see Hodges, 377. In his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” 
in Mind, Turing expounded on his ideas of artificial intelligence and introduced the basic 
form of what has become known as the Turing Test for machine intelligence. For more on the 
Turing Test, see Charles Petzold, The Annotated Turing: A Guided Tour through Alan Turing’s 
Historic Paper on Computability and the Turing Machine (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, 
2008), 346.
30 Articles 
same problem, encountered different situations, but von 
Neumann’s abstract EDVAC design boasts a much more 
successful legacy than Turing’s real ACE machine. 
 As per its original initiative, Britain successfully 
exploited the new field of computing research. However, 
that successful exploitation came in the form of Newman’s 
Manchester computer project. While Britain again shared the 
international stage with United States, it was not Turing’s 
doing. Indeed, Turing’s ACE was constructed too late to 
significantly influence computer architecture design. Turing’s 
ACE ultimately failed to meet its original purpose of being 
the national computer of Britain. Thus, it would appear that 
Turing and his colleagues wasted much of their time and 
energy for an impractical and unmarketable computer.
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Symbols of the French Revolution: 
Colors of Cockades, Fabric and 
Their Importance in Politics of 1789
Constance Wallace
In any culture, fabric and color are very important in 
representing the identity of an individual or group. Examples 
of this can be seen in the woven material of the Scottish clans 
and their tartans, or in the case of those who participated in 
the Revolution of 1789 in France, the cockades and colors of 
white, blue, and red. But where did the cultural obsession 
first arise in relation to fabric and color? Each culture finds 
something tangible in material artifacts for emphasizing 
individual taste or affiliation with a particular class. In the 
case of those who participated in the French Revolution, a 
choice of color was imbued with political symbolism. How 
did fabric and color become so important to the politics of 
people, or a country? Why did the small pieces of the tri-
colored cockade carry so much importance to the identity of 
the French people during the Revolution? By analyzing the 
emergence of the cockade in fashion, this essay shall examine 
the importance of these emblems in the French Revolution of 
1789 and reasons why these everyday things became so vital 
by analyzing the styles, textures, and use of color in fabric 
before, during, and after the Revolution.
 The transformation of these materials is understood 
in the confines of how fabric and color are used within 
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society. Designed, textured and dyed, fabric in its woven 
form can be either coarse or delicate. Fabric itself signifies 
class separation and even political distinction by the method 
of its manufacturing or construction, and by its value and 
refinement. In the golden years at Versailles during the reign 
of King Louis XIV and King Louis XV, the clothing worn 
by the royal family, and those nobles who were privileged 
enough to be housed at the great palace, embodied the 
decadence with which they enveloped themselves in. 
Beautiful silks, elaborate laces and ribbons, colorful feathers, 
and bows were all used by those of privilege. It was not until 
the eve of the Revolution in 1789 that the superb fashion of 
the courtiers under King Louis XIV and XV faded away and 
was replaced with something simpler: a style of clothing 
which tied itself to the values of what the Revolution upheld. 
The fabric of clothing then transformed and became more of a 
symbolic statement than a fashion statement. 
 The people of France needed to step away from the 
old relics of the monarchy and, along with the discarded 
government principles of the absolute monarchy, redefine 
themselves.  The extravagant styles of the King and his nobles 
were also discredited, as the citizens of France viewed fashion 
as an outlet for the monarchy to institute repression.  Why 
was this change so important to them?  Perhaps the answer 
can best be explained in the words of author and historian, 
Leora Auslander: “Clothing and furniture are commodities 
with great symbolic potential; both were, in fact, used by the 
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crown and court in the ancien régime to augment their power.”1 
Changing the fashion of the country alongside the politics 
was a way for the revolutionaries to completely reinvent the 
French people. It was also a way for them to dissolve the 
visual emblems of the ancien régime, so that they may reinvent 
themselves with styles that enhanced their principles and 
beliefs. In this case, fabric was utilized to do this.
 In order to understand this transition, one must first 
recognize the importance of clothing to the French people. It 
was always understood that fashion was directly linked to the 
status and importance of individuals within the division of 
the three estates. Auslander points out that clothing style from 
the medieval to the early modern period was in great length 
used to indicate the wearer’s social and political affiliation.2 
Not only was fabric used as a weapon of power, the distinct 
dress of the three estates was strictly adhered to because it 
also allowed the nobles and the clergy a way of identifying 
those who did not belong to their Estate.  
 Attempting to restrict the Third Estate within their 
class, those of the first two Estates hoped to limit them from 
dressing in certain fabrics and accessories enjoyed by the 
wealthy.  According to Colin Jones in Paris: The Biography 
of a City, there was already a fashion revolution occurring 
within the three Estates before the Revolution, as typical 
clothing worn by each Estate was now being picked up in 
second hand clothing stores. Nobility wore the garb of the 
1  Leora Auslander, “Regeneration through the Everyday? Clothing, Architecture and 
Furniture in Revolutionary Paris,” Art History 28 (2005), 229.
2  Ibid., 231.
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peasant and chambermaids adopted the forms of dress which 
included “silk stockings, light colourful dresses, jewels and 
trinkets.”3 Disconcerting to many nobles, this interchange 
of fashion before the revolution perhaps played a hand in 
the decision to incorporate a distinct separation impressed 
upon the three estates during their first initial meeting at 
the eve of the Revolution. The “deputies of Third Estate, the 
peasant classes, were to wear somber black, while the nobles 
wore gold braiding, white hose, lace cravats, and gracious 
white plumes in their hats.”4 This dictation in dress offended 
those in the Third Estate, as they saw this restriction of the 
nobles a symbolic way of making sure they were continually 
repressed, and denied even the pleasure to dress up. It was 
unfair to them, and it was at this time that fashion took a 
detour.  
 Pictures and portraits as primary sources can be a way 
to visually see how fabric in clothing was used as a separating 
instrument of the classes. According to Peter Burke in his 
book Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence, 
visual sources are important as non-verbal traces of the past; 
the images “record acts of eyewitnessing.”5 Burke further 
reflects upon the use of images as primary resources by 
asserting that these images reveal the material culture which 
incorporates details that the contemporaries “would have 
3  Colin Jones, Paris: The Biography of a City (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 194-95.
4  Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 75.
5  Peter Burke, Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 95. 
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taken for the granted and … failed to mention in the texts.”6 
Many portraits of those at Versailles before 1789 display 
the over use of expense fabrics, adorned with layers and 
layers of lace and bows and topped with colorful feathers 
or jewels. When analyzing the images of the Revolution and 
those afterwards, there existed within these primary sources 
a noticeable change. Elaborate gowns were now gone and 
replaced with simple styles, fabric colors were muted in 
tone, made of cottons and linens, and most new fashions did 
not include the lace, jewels, metals or fancy feathers which 
adorned the gowns and dress of the elite prior to 1789.7
 Embodying ideas of the Revolution itself, the clothing 
of the French people became “invested with political 
significance,” and was recreated and stripped of the symbols 
of the oppressive nature of the noble dress.8 What now 
transpired was a simpler form of attire that was considered 
a sign of patriotism. Dressing in the rich fabrics and precious 
metals created labels of counter-revolutionary to be attached 
to anyone who wore something of the nobles’ elaborate styles. 
“Graceful white muslin vied with brocaded silks, natural hair 
and straw hats” appeared on women.9 Political men were 
dressing down, and their outfits may only have had a tricolor 
scarf or cockade to embellish them. Even with the simplest 
of things, a policy of excess was viewed with contempt. A 
6  Ibid., 99-100.
7  Please see “Portrait of Madame Tallien” (1806) painted by Jean-Bernaard Duvivier at the 
Brooklyn Museum’s web page. http://archive.org/details/brooklynmuseum-o4885-portrait-
of-madame-tallien. 
8  Hunt, 75.
9  Jennifer M. Jones, “Repackaging Rousseau: Femininity and Fashion in Old Regime 
France,” in French Historical Studies 18, no. 4 (Fall 1994), 945-46.
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clear example of this would be the cockades, the new badge 
of the Revolution, which were to be made of wool and not 
of silk, most hand-woven, knitted or simply sewn. The more 
expensive fabric cockade, which could distinguish the wearer 
with social hierarchy instead of equality because it showed 
off wealth and prestige, would be considered out of taste.10 
Simplicity was now the fashion la mode, and all clothing was 
to be adjusted to remove any material means, which would 
stimulate a fear of inequality.
 What took place within this fashion revolution was 
that the dress of the common man was brought forward as 
a reference point for all classes. No longer did individuals 
look to the court of Versailles as a focal point for what was 
in style. Magazines of that time stated that fashion was pour 
toutes les classes and clothing switched from being a tool for 
class distinction to a symbolic force of the Revolution.11  This 
symbol was seen in the dress of the Sans-Culotte.12
Many men eventually adopted the attire of le bon sans 
Culotte, especially after 1792. Seen as a form of dress which 
could exhibit a social equality, politicians also began to 
wear “the short jacket, long trousers, and even the clogs of 
the sans-culottes.” 13 While simple clothing was adopted as 
the new badge of good revolutionary comrades, there were 
10  Hunt, 75.
11  Jones, “Repackaging Rousseau,” 951.
12  Please see the etching entitled “The Good Sans-Cullote,” which is part of the primary 
sources on the “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution” web site 
of George Mason University. “Male and Female sans-culottes were supposed to embody 
frugality, thrift, hard work, and above all, honest devotion - whether to pets, the nation, or 
fellow comrades.” Source: mfr 88.180. http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/73/
13  Hunt, 75.
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individuals who were against the unadorned fashion of the 
peasantry. David, a famous painter of the time, believed 
that the clothing of such militant factions would not do the 
Revolution any good, and instead of dressing down to the 
worn-out, threadbare le bon sans Culotte, a “suitable high-
minded fashion” was more appropriate.14 His approach 
concentrated on the bourgeois element of his upbringing and 
the need to uphold a small division of classes.  
 Hoping to inspire his countrymen, David took such 
great pains to illustrate an appropriate replacement for the 
simple dress of the sans-culotte which was held in such high 
regard by the revolutionaries. David drew upon his desire to 
see a more civil costume for those in the new government. 
Not wanting to completely throw out the search for suitable 
clothing to depict the ideas of the Revolution, David believed 
that there should “appropriate revolutionary costume” which 
incorporates “all the ambiguities of revolutionary politics.”15 
What he envisioned was a style of clothing for the officials, 
which would mark them from the other individuals of 
society.16 
 David’s dream for a civil dress died with the death 
of Robespierre and the collapse of the Terror. Legislation 
was already put in place concerning the wearing of the 
tricolored cockade on the clothing of citizens, and more 
recommendations were in the midst of the politicians to 
14  Ibid, 76.
15  Ibid. 
16  Please see the etching “Study for the Costume of a Civil Official,” which is David’s 
rendering of a government worker, rather than an aristocrat, Minneapolis Institute of Art web 
site, Accession #65.43.1. http://artsmia.org/viewer/detail.php?v=12&id=9326.
38 Articles 
adopt ways to “demonstrate one’s adherence to the nation 
through one’s clothing.”17 In 1795, abbé Grégoire, the first 
priest to take the oath under the new Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy, suggested that wearing uniforms for civil office 
would only enhance the dignity of the office itself and remind 
those who held the office of their duty.18 As the Convention 
came to an end in October, it passed a law concerning the 
clothing for these officials. Even in this particular act, the 
style of simplicity was adopted and most all officials were to 
wear the same type of clothing: “a ‘French’ coat of ‘national 
blue,’ a tricolor belt, a scarlet cloak a la grecque, and velvet 
hat with tricolor aigrette.”19 Fashion was now established 
for those holding political office and by making the officials 
wear almost the same outfit, with the same type of fabric, the 
Revolution was laying a foundation for a different identity 
than that of the three estates, as the civil costumes were 
undemanding and conforming.  
 Men were not left alone in searching for a fashion 
identity during the Revolution either.  Simplicity and restraint 
played a major role in establishing a new underpinning 
for the revolutionary female.  Once again, clothing took 
inspiration from the peasant class.20 According to the 
Magasin des modes nouvelles and Journal de la mode, magazines 
published in France during this period, the Revolution and 
17  Auslander, 230.
18  Ibid, 231. 
19  Hunt, 79.
20  Please see the etching “Madame Sans-Culotte,” part of the primary sources on the 
“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution” web site of George Mason 
University. Source: Museum of the French Revolution 88.17. http://chnm.gmu.edu/
revolution/d/73/
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women were linked, as both were “in a state of continual 
flux,” and, as the writers of the magazines pointed out, 
women found their ideal environment in the chaos of the 
Revolution.21 Just as the revolutionary government changed 
ever so frequently, so too did the fashion of the women and 
the use of fabric and color. Yet, the fashion a la mode of the 
Revolution was not the exquisite fabric of taffeta or silk, 
heavily burdened with lace, jewels and feathers, instead the 
simplicity of Madam sans Culotte was used as a starting point 
for reinventing a revolutionary dress for women. 
 The simple cotton straight lines, the petite bonnet 
and little use of color were deemed a respectable attribute to 
clothing styles.  Although the “colors, the form of clothing, 
bonnets, and hats” changed, most modifications contained 
this new identity of plainness and unpretentiousness, and 
were a symbol of being a true revolutionary.22 The sans-
culotte appeared to embody the true nature of hard work 
and dedication, whether male or female, and this symbolic 
viewpoint is what the fabric of the Revolution tried to 
capture. 
 In analyzing text from Karin Baumgartner’s article 
“Through the Eyes of Fashion” as she talks about Caroline de 
la Motte Fouqué’s publication, Geschichte der Moden, vom Jahre 
1785 bis 1829: als Beytrag zur Geschichte der Zeit, there is one 
sentence which could sum precisely why and how fabric and 
color changed so dramatically during the French Revolution. 
21  Jones, “Repackaging Rousseau,” 961.
22  Ibid.
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Under the ancien régime, clothes did not symbolize 
individual identity, but rather affiliation with a certain 
group or rank. It was the possession of courtly attire, 
not individual character, that made the aristocrat.23
The French Revolution was about systemically removing 
everything that was a symbol of the monarchy. Changing the 
fashion of the time was the best way the French people could 
embody their desires to reinvent themselves and they did this 
through the use of fabric and color.  
 In the folds of small bit of colorful ribbon, the 
revolutionaries sought to bring together a new culture and 
a political platform. Cockades, which before 1789 were the 
sole emblems and badges of the military, became the binding 
element of the revolutionary movement. After the storming 
of the Bastille, these colorful emblems became a powerful tool 
in mobilizing the peoples of France towards political change. 
Cockades developed into a badge which gave its wearer a 
sense of belonging, and clout, allowing its owner to feel like 
a part of revolutionary uniformity, when before there was 
only a system in which inequality and separation were the 
norm. These pieces of fabric were a symbol chosen because 
the material showed no distinction to class, or dress, it was 
the same to all. La cocarde nationale became the sole ingredient 
which brought the French people together, both sexes, all 
classes, making each wearer equal to the other, replacing 
the distinct costumes and dress of the three estates, and 
23  Karin Baumgartner, “Through the Eyes of Fashion: Political Aspects of Fashion in 
Caroline de la Motte Fouque’s Geschichte der Moden, vom Jahre 1785 bis 1829: als Beytrag zur 
Geschichte der Zeit,” in The Germanic Review (2001), 219.
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converting the revolutionaries under its color to a new sense 
of political autonomy.
 Scholars such as Pierre Nora in his works Les Lieux 
de Mémoire and Leora Auslander in her book Taste and Power 
emphasize the significance of material items in French 
culture for establishing their identity. Auslander states in her 
introduction: “The everyday is sensual, bodily, emotional, 
and intellectual. There is no escape from the everyday, no 
position outside of it, for either the subjects of history or its 
writers.”24 A simple piece of fabric, used in everyday life, 
was transformed by creative hands into a cockade. Before 
the Revolution, this emblem was only an ordinary clothing 
accessory for the military, and did not hold any meaning 
except that of adornment or status within the ranks of the 
soldiers. Yet once it was captured by the everyday citizen as 
a means of identifying an allegiance to a cause, the cockade 
transformed, becoming equivalent to voice and an intellectual 
body of presence. It held an emotional link to a platform and 
stance of change and no one escaped its touch.   
 From the beginning, these cockades stood apart as 
a badge that represented the formation of a new system of 
collective belonging. They were symbols chosen by the people 
to mark their preference towards their political choices, and 
are a perfect example of reinvention, as their use in dress and 
clothing became vital to revolutionaries. The citizens of France 
utilized the small pieces of fabric as they strove to bond 
24  Leora Auslander, Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 3. 
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themselves under a new government. After effectively taking 
apart the ancien régime and its emblems, they wanted to do 
away with the old system of the monarchy and the cockades 
were a new symbol which afforded them a characteristic 
feature uniquely their own.
 During the Revolution, four distinct colors of cockades 
surfaced; the green, the tri-color, the black and the white. 
What did these colors mean to those involved? Why were 
they chosen? Exploring the use of the cockades opens a 
new window into the diverging flow of the Revolution, as 
those who wanted to be out from under the constraints of 
the required dress of the Estates General and class division, 
turned to forcing these new emblems and colors upon those 
partaking in the movement, mimicking the “ancien régime” 
and their laws for costumes. More than ever, during this 
period, a war began in which wearing certain colors was 
considered anti-Revolutionary, and seeing a particular color 
could incite a crowd into instant disruption and chaos. Was 
the Revolution really one about equality and freedom, or 
was this Revolution entirely different? For the politics of the 
cockade, wearing a particular color of cockade became law 
during the Revolution, forcing its wearer to its will. This was 
seemingly a paradox for those who initiated this law, as they 
were the same revolutionaries seeking to distant themselves 
from required conformity.
 The Revolution began its reinvention with the ousting 
of the distinctive three Estates and the costumes associated 
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with each. Rejecting the dress of the third Estate, because 
the function of its costumes was to fix people’s identity, the 
revolutionaries wanted to do away with the subjection to the 
authority of the monarchy by way of fabric and clothing.25 
Recognizing that a new era was approaching; the Revolution 
itself paved way for the French people to abolish the 
apparatus of the “ancien régime,” the extravagant dress of the 
court and the clergy, and to claim “a new generation of signs, 
badges and costumes” of their own.26
 The era of cockades was introduced by an episode 
which took place after the storming of the Bastille, concerning 
the death of Flesselles, a provost who worked under the 
governor de Launay. Flesselles was shot by an unknown 
person from the mob of civilians which gathered there. His 
death was the result of a rumor that he wrote a letter to de 
Launay, the Governor in charge of the Bastille, in which 
he stated: “Hold out, while I amuse the Parisians with 
cockades.”27 It would be an understatement to say that this 
particular phrase is not a summation of the chaotic events 
what transpired afterwards concerning the adoption of the 
cockade as an important new symbol of the new French 
government. The events at the Bastille in July 1789 were a 
momentous and symbolic political act, as the prison itself 
represented an oppressive and dark place to the people of 
France. Its downfall predictably affected the masses and 
25  Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 59.
26  Ibid.
27  M.A. Thiers, The History of the French Revolution (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1848), 
69-70.
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also impacted the fashion of the people of Paris.28 Flesselles’ 
remark to de Launay somehow foretold the course the 
cockade would take, as its importance took a darker turn, 
in which the colors of cockades determined if you lived or 
died, a non-amusing theatrical production which lasted many 
years. 
 When Camille Desmoulins introduced the first color 
of the Revolution, as he rallied those to a call to arms at the 
storming of the Bastille, the civilians who gathered around 
him followed his example of putting a green leaf in their 
caps and calling it a cockade as they marched forward in 
their attack.29 Ribbon cockades, up to the time of the French 
Revolution, were associated with military headdresses, and 
the ornaments themselves held connotations of choosing 
sides or displaying allegiance to one group or another.30 
Desmoulins chose the leaf because it was a ready symbol 
that allowed individuals to declare themselves “a soldier for 
the patrie.”31 Those who participated in this occasion did not 
know that they put in place, upon their hats, an emblem that 
would create a great political and social conflict.32 
   Various tales surround the color green as associated 
with the leaf used by those at the Bastille. Why was this color 
chosen? Camille Desmoulins, in a letter to his father dated 16 
July 1789, describing the charge on the Bastille, said, « Prenons 
28  Nicola J. Shilliam, “’Cocardes Nationales and Bonnets Rouges’: Symbolic Headdresses of 
the French Revolution,” in Journal of the Museum of Fine Arts 5 (1993),109-113.
29  Camille Desmoulins, Oeuvres de Camille Desmoulins: Député a la Convention National (New 
York, AMS Press, 1972), Volume 2, 22. Reprinted from the edition of 1838, Paris.
30  Shilliam, 110.
31  Wrigley, 98-104.
32  Hunt, 58.
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tous des cocardes vertes, couleur de l’espérance »; “let us all take 
up green cockades, the color of hope.”33 Further accounts 
and retelling of the event, such as reported in the Revolutions 
de Paris, indicate that the “adoption of green cockades” was 
“a sign of solidarity and popular mobilization.”34 Whether 
it was a symbol for hope or solidarity, the people, hearing 
Desmoulins’ great speech at the Bastille, saw the color 
and emblem presented to them in the form of a green leaf 
mesmerizing. Here was a new national identity that all of 
them could rally under, and as one great body, attack the 
grotesque symbol of the monarchy, the Bastille, which stood 
for suppression and limitation.  
 Green cockades did not last though, as reinvention 
took hold once again. Pierre-Nicolas Chantreau, a French 
historian of that time, explained to others why green needed 
to be abandoned. He said it caused “political conflict,” as the 
color echoed submission, as green was tied to the uniforms 
of the Prince de Lambesc’s troops who attacked a group 
of civilians in the Tuileries gardens.35 It was also argued 
that because green was the color of the livery of the Count 
Artois, the King’s younger brother, the people would not 
wear something so closely associated with the monarchy.  
According to the Duke of Dorset, the red and white were 
substituted for the green.36 While the Duke contends that red 
and white were chosen because they were of the colors of the 
33  Desmoulins, 22.
34  Wrigley, 98.
35  Ibid, 100.
36  Hunt, 57.
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Duke of Orleans, most historical texts point to the fact that red 
and blue were chosen because they were the colors of Paris.37 
In Camille Desmoulins’ letter to his father, he describes the 
march of the National Assembly towards the Hôtel de Ville 
and stated that they marched under the color of the flag, red 
and blue, red for the blood willingly spilled and blue for the 
constitution, and each deputy sported a cockade of the same 
colors. «Ils marchèrent sous les drapeaux des gardes-françaises, … 
les drapeaux de la nation, de la liberté…. Le rouge, pour montrer 
qu’on était prêt a verser son sang ; et le bleu, pour une constitution 
céleste. Les députés avoient aussi la cocarde. »38
 The narration of the cockade goes further as it 
transformed into the full fledged national symbol, when Jean 
Sylvain Bailly, the mayor of Paris, presented the king with a 
tri-color cockade of blue, red and white, at the Hôtel de Ville 17 
July 1789, upon Louis XVI’s entry into the city.39 The merging 
of the red and blue, the new colors associated with the 
Revolution, with the colors of the House of Bourbon, white, 
was an attempt at making a symbolic treaty for the sake of 
the French people and the monarchy. Lafayette wanted the 
merging of the red, blue and white to signify that an “accord” 
was reached with the King and all was well, and he supported 
the reforms.40 The king’s life rested upon his acceptance of 
the cockade from the mayor, as the crowds looked on in 
anticipation. The gracious act of taking the new colors and 
37  Shilliam, 110.
38  Desmoulins, 27.
39  Wrigley, 99.
40  Shilliam, 111.
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placing them upon his hat meant that the king accepted also 
the request for reforms for his people.  
  The cocarde nationale, or cocarde tricolore, was life giving 
from that point forward. Its simple form created joy in the 
people as they viewed it as a sign of change. The red, blue, 
and white, bound together, unified them with a new national 
sense of belonging. Citizens became extremely patriotic, 
obsessively. Any other color cockade was deemed anti-
revolutionary, and those who were a part of the Revolution 
wanted to make sure the corcarde nationale was an everyday 
accessory, put on as part of everyday clothing, with as much 
fever and zeal as could be mustered.
 Yet, there were those who viewed this new symbol 
with distaste. They refused to be seen with it on. Opposed 
to the upheaval the cocarde nationale embodied, they took 
to wearing black as a symbol of mourning.41 Black became 
a color of the anti-revolutionaries. It indicated political 
allegiance opposite the red, blue, and white. Those wearing 
the black cockade were often taunted, beaten, or even killed. 
Seen as an emblem and color which was pro-monarchy, 
those who wore black cockades became thought of as a force 
which would make the corcarde nationale irrelevant. Even as 
the émigrés returned under assumed names, they identified 
themselves by the wearing of a black velvet cape.   
 The extent of dispute over the colored cockades can be 
understood more clearly by events which happened during 
the march of the women on Versailles October 5, 1789. As 
41  Auslander, 229.
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these patriotic women were in route to the king and queen, 
they grew very suspicious of anyone wearing a black cockade, 
because they did not want to be blocked from their objective 
by those who anti-revolutionary. One witness, after he was 
forcibly made to march with them, reported to the authorities:
Past Viroflay they met a number of individuals on 
horseback who appeared to be bourgeois and wore 
black cockades in their hats. The women stopped them 
and made as if to commit violence against them, saying 
that they must die as punishment for having insulted, 
and for insulting, the national cockade; one they struck 
and pulled off his horse, tearing off his black cockade, 
which one of the women handed to him [the witness].42
This episode conveys the fierceness in which the citizens felt 
towards their new symbol, and in protecting it, opened the 
doors for further violence, as the simple everyday cockade 
stirred the flames of civil war.
 There is not a doubt that the women believed 
they were defending the revolutionary movement itself 
by protecting the tri-color cockade. While their march to 
Versailles intertwined itself with the concern on the lack of 
food and bread for their families, they were also mobilized 
because of a rumor, and the supposed insult paid to the 
corcarde nationale. In his history of the French Revolution, 
Thomas Carlyle described the occasion which ignited the 
women. He gives details of a great party held at Versailles 
days before the march on October 5, 1789.  As the queen 
entered the room “her looks full of sorrow, yet of gratitude 
42  Shilliam, 112.
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and daring, with the hope of France upon her mother-
bosom,” a song was struck up by the band, the words “O 
Richard, O mon Roi, l’univers l’abandonne,” instilling a sense of 
“loyal valor” and as “white Bourbon Cockades, handed them 
from fair fingers,” are given to the young men in attendance, 
they pledge to the health of the queen and trample underfoot 
the cocarde nationale.43 This story reaches those in Paris, and 
those women who found their cupboards bare were not 
tolerant of the monarchy’s display of extravagance, or the 
fact that their beloved revolutionary symbol was treated with 
so much disrespect. The march to Versailles was to demand 
answers for both the lack of food and the insult to the tri-color 
cockade. On their way there, any cockade which was not the 
tri-color was “ruthlessly plucked off” and thrown away.44 No 
exception was made. Many within the movement itself saw 
the trouble the colorful cockades instigated. In fact an article 
appeared in Moniteur regarding the march on Versailles by the 
women, and a warning to the public concerning the influence 
the colorful badges created, and what terrible implications 
would arise from its use. “Cockades of a single colour will be 
the signal for a civil war if they are allowed to multiply,” it 
warned.45 No one paid heed to this dire message and war of 
the corcarde nationale drew its second act.  
 During 1790 friction developed as other colors of 
the cockade were attacked. Suggestion was made that even 
43  Thomas Carlyle Rhys, History of the French Revolution (London: J.M. Dent & Sons LTD., 
1944), 198-200.
44  Ibid.
45  Wrigley, 101.
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French military cockades, such as the cocarde rouge, awarded 
after twenty years of service, be replaced with the tri-color. 
Men of the military reacted unfavorably, stressing that the 
cocarde nationale “was nothing more than a ‘standard of revolt 
in the name of liberty,’” and refused to adhere to the request.46 
Other colors of cockades were worn within the city limits, 
those of neighboring countries. These colors were also looked 
upon unfavorably.   
 Disputes continued to escalate, especially with the 
women of Paris. There were many reports of women who 
on occasions battled in the streets because they found other 
women not wearing the colorful symbol. The new emblem, 
from the viewpoint of the upper class women, was seen 
as a badge which only prostitutes wore, and unless the 
Convention decreed for them to wear it, would not add the 
ribbon accessory to their clothes or hat.47 Further violence 
over the inclusion of the cocarde nationale erupted after 
some insinuated that anti-revolutionary agents, who were 
supposedly ordered to create anarchy, perpetuated this female 
discord.
 As the Revolution progressed, the French became 
uniquely pre-occupied with their new symbol and colors. 
The cocarde nationale replaced all other forms of patriotism, 
and its use in everyday life grew to such political importance 
that laws were considered for its compulsory wearing by 
men. Ringing similar to a time when those of the three 
46  Ibid, 102.
47  Shilliam, 112.
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estates required certain dress, the cockade took a new form of 
denotation. Any other color cockade was deemed to endorse 
“signs of rebellion” and citizens caught with anything other 
than the cocarde nationale were to be arrested and given a 
command to denounce their colors, or be punished with 
death.48 The rally around the tri-color cockade influenced 
politics further, by creating a backlash among the female 
citizens, and the predicted civil war ensued.
 In April, 1793, the Convention mandated that the 
tri-color cockade be worn by all men and women were, of 
course, excluded from this declaration. While it was not law 
for the female citizens, there were some militant women who 
believed it should be mandatory for them also, and when 
confronted by other women who did not wear the cocarde 
nationale, insults and accusations flew. Violence erupted 
between the two bickering factions, as to whether or not it 
was proper for females to wear the colors of the Revolution, 
or, as insinuated by many women, the cockade should be left 
out of their attire all together because modest women did not 
attach it to their wardrobe.      
 The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women 
petitioned the National Convention at the beginning of 
September 1793, urging them to “pass a decree punishing 
‘the shrews who mistreated female citizens’” who wore 
the national cockade.49 The society, acting on the fears of 
civil war, thought it best to force all women to wear the tri-
48  Wrigley, 104.
49  Dominique Godineau, The Women of Paris and their French Revolution (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 159-160.
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color symbol, so that all women would be adored with the 
“sign of liberty.”50 This petition was backed by episodes of 
altercations in the streets between loyal female citizens and 
those not wearing the cockade. Clashing on September 13 
with “fishwives,” who refused to participate in the wearing 
of the amusing cockade, caused the street brawling to be 
multiplied. The women of the fish market were hostile to the 
accessory, saying “only whores and female Jacobins wear 
cockades” and women “should be concerned only with their 
households and not with current events.”51 The police backed 
the society’s proposal in hopes that this would eliminate the 
tussling in the streets. Finally on September 21, 1793, an order 
was directed to all women that the cocarde nationale was to be 
worn with their clothing. If they were found without it, severe 
punishments would be administered, and for those who 
persisted in the displays of violence towards other women, 
the offender could receive ten years of imprisonment.
   Seen as a political win for the women who wished 
to be acknowledged as equals to men in the political sphere 
of cockades, the law itself seemed to create a reverse effect 
and only caused more bickering.52 Although the regulation 
directed everyone to wear it, it did not specify how it should 
50  Ibid, 159.
51  Ibid, 160.
52  Shilliam, 113.
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be worn, and women’s focus went from inclusion to clothing, 
to where it should be place or how fancy it should be, a small 
detail it would seem, but gave rise to fuel already heightened 
emotions. Flesselles’ words certainly echoed true in the streets 
of Paris, as the public was further entertained with women 
and their war of the cockades.
 The cockade does not find its conclusion here. Its 
legacy is felt through the many years after the National 
Convention and into the history of France, evolving into an 
artifact that represented the people’s identity, even through 
the First World War. The Revolutionaries, while trying to 
eliminate the restrictive fashion of the three Estates, created 
for themselves their own restriction with an austere piece of 
fabric, the cockade. A simple yet profound piece of woven 
material, which collected to its colors the fierce revolutionary 
people of 1789, was the greatest artifact of the French 
Revolution, for not only did it assist its wearer in establishing 
a new sense of political freedom, but it also did not adhere to 
any elements of the old regime. 
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The Union of the Parliaments and 
Scottish Public Opinion
Michael Self
George Lockhart of Carnwath famously said, “The first of 
May 1707, a day never to be forgot by Scotland; a day in 
which the Scots were stripped of what their predecessors 
had gallantly maintained for many hundred years…the 
independency and sovereignty of the Kingdom.”1  At the 
turn of the 18th Century, the Kingdom of Scotland was 
nearly bankrupt.  Many different things contributed to this, 
including a failed attempt to create a colony in the Americas 
and lack of trade with the English, and made the union with 
England that occurred in May 1707 necessary. Despite this 
necessity, the majority of Scots were against the union. Why 
would most Scots oppose such a union when it was such an 
obviously needed measure for the Scottish Government to 
take? Some were opposed to the union with England because 
they feared that their religious beliefs would be threatened 
because of the differences between their two churches. 
Others were afraid of the potential loss of the sovereignty 
of their nation which many of their ancestors died trying to 
defend from countless English invasions over the last several 
centuries.
 The Treaty of Union officially united the Kingdoms 
of Scotland and England into one Kingdom of Great Britain 
and officially created the Union Flag which combined the 
1  Godfrey W. Iredell, The Lyon Enchained: A Study of the 1707 Act of Union (Glasgow: William 
MacLellan, 1960), 10.
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Crosses of St. Andrew and St. George. The Treaty settled 
the succession issue, proclaiming Sophia of the House of 
Hannover to be Queen Anne’s successor. It also effectively 
dissolved both the Scottish and English parliaments and 
created a new parliament of Great Britain; it also gave 
everyone on both sides of the border equal standing and 
access to trade.2
 In 1695, the Scottish decided to take their economic 
fortunes into their own hands and founded the Company 
of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies better known 
as the Scottish Darien Company. It was established by an 
act of Parliament and had a monopoly to trade with Africa, 
Asia, and America; as well as, the establishment of powers 
to make treaties, plant colonies, and raise capital in Scotland 
and England.3  Originally the Scottish Darien Company was 
to be a joint confederation involving Scottish, English, Dutch, 
and Hanseatic interests. It was reduced to a Scottish venture 
after King William withdrew his support. William was furious 
that the act that passed through one of his parliaments was 
so potentially damaging to the English commercial interests. 
However, English Parliamentary pressure applied in the 
interest of the East India Company forced any English 
investors to withdraw.4
  The major goal of the Scottish Darien Company was 
2  Lords Commissioners for the Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, The 
Articles of the Union as they pass’d with amendments in the Parliament of Scotland, and ratify’d by 
the touch of the Royal Scepter at Edinburgh, January 16. 1707. By James, Duke of Queensberry, Her 
Majesty’s High Commissioner for that Kingdom (London: Andrew Bell, 1707).
3  When used without an identifier, Parliament refers to the Scottish parliament.
4  Jeffery Stephen, Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007),  16-17.
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to establish a trading colony on the Isthmus of Darien.  Three 
expeditions were sent to do just that.  As good as it might 
have looked on paper, it was a colossal failure. In two years 
the Company lost almost its entire fleet and two thousand 
lives and £200,000 sterling, a large percentage of the wealth 
of Scotland.5 The Darien colony was intended to revive 
Scotland’s economic fortunes by providing the opportunity 
for economic growth, prosperity and modernization, as well 
as the chance to break free of their economic dependence 
upon England. Its failure meant that considerable national 
investment had been lost which exacerbated the current 
economic plight that they were trying to help and confirmed 
Scotland’s dependence upon the English markets both 
domestic and colonial.6
 Union of the two kingdoms was, by the majority of 
the government, seen as the most suitable solution to the 
succession issue, the problems highlighted by the Darien 
scheme, and the economic problems that followed it.  
Negotiations began in October 1702, only to be concluded 
without an agreement on 3 February 1703 because the 
Scottish insistence on compensation for Darien proved to be 
a major stumbling block. The elections in the autumn of 1702 
changed the political balance of parliament. The Cavalier 
Party, consisting mainly of Jacobites and Episcopalians, was 
strengthened at the expense of both the Court and Country 
parties, making future union attempts more problematic.7
5  Iredell 12-14.
6  Stephen, 16-17.
7  Ibid.
Articles 57 
 The Scots, before and after Darien, ascribed their 
poverty primarily to England’s refusal to allow them any 
share in her trade with the American colonies and the East. 
By 1703, after a new Scottish parliament had taken their 
seats, they were so furious that passed through parliament 
an act to separate the Scottish crown again unless they were 
granted equal access to the sources of England’s prosperity.8 
The retaliatory act to this “Act of Security” was passed by the 
English parliament in March 1705 and was called “An Act 
for the effectual securing the Kingdom of England from the 
apparent dangers which may arise from several Acts passed 
by the Parliament of Scotland.” The Alien Act, as it came to 
be known told the Scots that if they had not accepted the 
House of Hanover as successors to Anne by Christmas 1705, 
the union would be suspended and all Scots setting foot 
in England would be treated as aliens unless they became 
naturalized Englishmen or joined the armed forces; no 
Scottish cattle, horses, linen, or coal would be allowed into 
England; no English wool would be exported to Scotland; and 
the navy would stop all trade between Scotland and France.9
 While the Alien Act was being debated in England, 
tempers in Scotland rose perilously high.  “Invade England 
Now” became the cry for Scots who knew what was in 
prospect for them. The Scottish Act of Security provided the 
arming of a national militia. As a result Presbyterians were 
consorting with Jacobite Catholics and Episcopalians and 
8  Charles Hendry Dand, The Mighty Affair: How Scotland Lost Her Parliament (Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1972),  vii.
9  Ibid., 78.
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agreeing to forget their religious differences in a common 
determination “to have out with the English whatever 
grievance they had against life on the less fortunate side of 
the border.”10 The Scots were prepared to go to war because 
they were scared of what would happen to their religious 
independence from England. This was a big deal to Scottish 
Presbyterians because they viewed themselves as being the 
true Protestant religion. They believed they had become 
more reformed than any other church, especially the Church 
of England. This is evidenced by an address to Parliament 
by a “considerable body of people in the South and Western 
Shires” where they wrote, “We Incorporate with a Nation 
deeply Guilty of many National Abominations, who have 
openly Broke and Burnt their Covenant in the Year 1643. Are 
Sworn to the Maintenance of Abjured Prelacy, have their 
Public and Established Worship horridly Corrupted with 
Superstition and Idolatry; And their Doctrine dreadfully 
Leavened with Socinanism and Arminianism. Besides the most 
Gross and Deeply Lamentable Profaneness that abounds 
amongst them.”11
 In the General Commission of the Church of Scotland’s 
first address, they demanded that the security of the Church 
be a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty.  
By doing this the commission was sending the Duke of 
Queensberry a clear warning that it would resist any union 
10  Ibid., 78-79.
11  To His Grace, Her Majesties High Commissioner and Honourable Estates of Parliament, the 
Humble Address of a Considerable Body of People in the South and Western Shires, (Edinburgh, 
1706). Spelling corrected when possible; all other grammatical anomalies retained.
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in which such an article and essential condition was absent. 
Their address raised no objections to an incorporating union, 
but it was a criticism of the treaty as it stood. The treaty made 
no provision for the security of the Church, and consequently 
posed an unacceptable threat to the Church. Only the removal 
of that threat could make it acceptable.12
 The position of the Church of Scotland, or the 
Kirk, was one of the greatest concerns to the unionists 
and it was feared that unless the religious question was 
handled carefully there was the immediate prospect of 
a breach between the church and state that would prove 
detrimental to the treaty.  It was reported that instructions 
from London urged the government to “take all possible 
means to satisfy the ministers.”13 The General Assembly was 
not the only group in the Kirk to address the parliament. 
Three presbyteries also wrote to their own addresses to the 
government; these were Lanark, Dunblane, and Hamilton. 
However, this was only three of the sixty-eight presbyteries 
addressed parliament which amounted to about five percent 
of the total. All three emphasized their approval of the work 
of the commission as expressing their covenanted principles. 
They acknowledged that in light of the addresses from the 
commission, it might have been unnecessary for them to 
petition parliament. The presbyteries stated in their addresses 
that they considered the union to contrary to their known 
principles and covenants and they could not enter into the 
12  Stephen, 46-47.
13  Ibid., 47.
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union without being guilty before God and incurring the 
guilt of national perjury.  In addition to the addresses by the 
presbyteries, a small number of local parishes, mostly in the 
three afore mentioned presbyteries, also authored addresses 
to parliament.14 While the Kirk itself was not preaching 
against union some of the ministers were.  According to the 
Earl of Mar, ministers preaching up the danger to the Kirk 
were the principal cause of the increased hostility to the 
union. Daniel Defoe, the famed author, also blamed ministers 
for the hostility to the union among the people. Mar insisted 
that not only were the ministers across the country preaching 
against the union, some were calling their people to arms.15
 One of the most powerful arguments employed 
against union was that Scotland had been preserved by 
the providence of God for nearly two thousand years, 
during which time other nations greater than Scotland had 
disappeared and their memory rendered extinct.  According 
to these addresses, no other nation had undergone such a 
comprehensive reformation as Scotland.  Such blessings 
were surely evidence that Scotland had a special place in the 
purposes of God, and to give away their sovereignty and 
independence would be to resist that purpose and slight 
God’s blessings.16 This is almost exactly what is said the 
address by “a considerable body of people in the South and 
Western Shires.”17
14  Ibid., 109-10.
15  Ibid., 148-49.
16  Ibid., 115.
17  South and Western Shires.
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 Fear of losing their religious identity was not the only 
reason the Scots feared the union.  They also feared that they 
would lose their national sovereignty which was in many 
ways linked with their national church, and sometimes it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two because of the lack 
of a separation of church and state. The Scots seemed to 
equate loss of sovereignty with a loss of their distinct cultural 
identity. The Scots also did not under any circumstances want 
to be governed by the English; they felt they had fought too 
many wars to maintain their independence from the English 
for that to happen.
 In 1603, James VI of Scotland succeeded Elizabeth I 
to the throne of the Kingdom of England.  Many Scots were 
pleased and excited that their “Jamie” was going to be king 
of England. They viewed it as a proper turning of the tables 
on the English for all of their bloody attempts to impose 
their kings on Scotland. The Scots were relieved that this was 
apparently to happen without more conflict and bloodshed 
and tried, with difficulty, to comprehend that the threat of 
English invasion might finally be over.18 The Union of the 
Crowns was the first union between the two nations that 
were historically bitter enemies; however the two kingdoms 
remained independent from one another.
 In fact, nothing in either kingdom was constitutionally 
changed by the Union of the Crowns at all.  Both Scotland 
and England retained their own separate Privy Councils, 
parliaments, courts, churches, and taxation. Neither Scots 
18  Dand, 2.
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nor English obtained any rights or privileges in each other’s 
countries other than those posts or honors that might be given 
to them by the king. Trade in both countries continued to be 
protected against the other and it was a punishable offence 
for a Scot to try to trade with an English colony. Scots could, 
however, trade with France or any other country England 
might go to war with.19
 James did try to create a closer union between the two 
nations. In his first address to the English parliament, James 
said, “What God hath conjoined let no man separate. I am 
the Husband and all the whole Isle is my lawful wife. I am 
the Head and it is my Body. I am a Christian King under the 
Gospel, should be a Polygamist and Husband to two Wives; 
that I, being the Head, should have a divided and monstrous 
Body… And as God hath made Scotland the one half of this 
Isle to enjoy my birth and the first and most imperfect half 
of my life, and you here to enjoy the perfect and the last half 
thereof, so can I not think that any would be so injurious to 
me as to cut asunder the one half of me from the other.” 20 He 
proposed that he should be styled King of Great Britain and 
Ireland, there should be a flag combining the crosses of St. 
George and St. Andrew, trade should be free between the two 
countries, and all his subjects should enjoy equal citizenship 
rights on both sides of the border. The English parliament 
would have agreed on the first two, but James failed to 
persuade the English to agree to any Scottish share in their 
19  Ibid., 15-16.
20  Ibid.
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much more profitable trade so the attempt at union failed.21
 King William made one final attempt to begin 
negotiations in an address to the English parliament on 28 
February 1702, just days before his death, and Queen Anne 
maintained his initiative. After William’s death, elections 
for a new parliament in Scotland should have occurred, but 
James Douglas, 2nd Duke of Queensberry, persuaded Anne 
to reconvene the current parliament which had sat since the 
Glorious Revolution. Opposition led by James Douglas, 4th 
Duke of Hamilton, protested that this parliament was illegal 
and withdrew. Their walk-out helped force a general election, 
but, in the meantime, Queensberry took the opportunity 
to pass acts ratifying the Queen’s succession, securing the 
Church of Scotland and Presbyterian church government, and 
nominating commissioners to negotiate a union.22
 Union was, by the majority of the government, 
seen as the most suitable solution to the succession issue, 
the problems highlighted by the Darien scheme, and the 
economic problems that followed it. Negotiations began in 
October 1702, only to be concluded without an agreement 
on 3 February 1703. The Scottish insistence on compensation 
for Darien proved to be a major stumbling block. Then the 
elections in the autumn of 1702 changed the political balance 
of parliament. The Cavalier Party, consisting mainly of 
Jacobites and Episcopalians, was strengthened at the expense 
of both the Court and Country parties, making future union 
21  Ibid.
22  Stephen, 16-17.
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attempts more problematic.23 
 With Britannia teetering on the brink of war, progress 
was finally made on a union between the two kingdoms. 
In late 1705, delegations from both the Scottish and English 
parliaments met in London to compose a treaty of union. By 
late 1706, the acts were being debated in both parliaments. 
Nearly the entire Scottish parliament was present for these 
debates which consisted of over three hundred lords, 
barons, and burgesses. An average attendance in excess 
of two hundred appears even more remarkable when it is 
noted that of the peerage not attending there was someone 
else corresponding for the absence of at least seventy.24 As 
undemocratic -- in the modern sense-- as the Parliament 
might have been, it is not unreasonable to consider that the 
Parliament gave a fairly reasonable picture of the amount of 
Unionists and anti-Unionists in the country, if the Highlands 
were disregarded.25
 During the debates on the articles of the Treaty of 
Union, there was ample evidence of opposition to the union 
outside of Parliament, which, according to George Lockhart 
of Carnwath, was being “crammed down Scotland’s throat.” 
Riots occurred in Glasgow and Edinburgh with the mob up to 
the doors of the Parliament House until guards were brought 
from Edinburgh Castle.  The Articles were even burnt at the 
market-cross of Dumfries. 26 The Earl of Mar claimed that he, 
23  Ibid.
24  Iredell, 18-19.
25  Ibid., 41.
26  Ibid., 40-41.
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the Duke of Argyll and the Earls of Lothian and Loudon, all 
supporters of the union, expected an attack at any minute 
while at Loudon’s lodgings in Edinburgh. In contrast, the 
Dukes of Hamilton and Atholl, both against union, were 
cheered all the way to their lodgings.27 During the first half of 
1707, there was so much unrest that the possibility of a Rising 
was investigated by the Irish adventurer, Colonel Nathanial 
Hooke, who was acting directly for the French.28  
 Inside Parliament, things were just as heated as what 
was happening outside.  Many eloquent speeches were 
read by different members of Parliament. Most notable of 
these was the Lord Belhaven’s speech to Parliament on the 
second of November 1706 where he said, “…But above all, 
my Lord, I think I see our ancient mother CALEDONIA, like 
Caesar sitting in the midst of our senate, ruefully looking 
about, covering herself with her royal garment, attending 
the fatal blow, and breathing out her last, with a Et tu quoque 
mi fili Squadrone…” 29 A country farmer who wrote a letter 
to his laird who was a member of parliament also uses this 
same type of logic as the group from the South and Western 
Shires.30 However, he focuses more on the losing sovereignty 
and cultural identity, focusing less on religion. The farmer 
spends most of the letter speaking about how the union is 
27  Stephens, 139.
28  Iredell, 56.
29  John Hamilton, 2nd Baron Belhaven,  The Lord Belhaven’s speech in the Scotch Parliament, 
the second of November, on the subject-matter of an union betwixt the two kingdoms of Scotland and 
England (Edinburgh: 1706)  Translation: “And you, too, my son Squadrone.” The Squadrone 
was a faction in the Scottish Parliament that was generally against Union but end up voting 
in favor of the Union.
30  A laird is a member of the Scottish gentry that ranks just below baron.
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detrimental to Scotland because everything will have to 
change. He says, “It’s sad you’re going to put down our 
Parliaments, and make us on more a Kingdom, and give us 
up to beat the English reverence, to be ruled and guided in 
all things by them…”31 The farmer believed that since the 
English wronged the Scots in the past that it is very likely 
that this will happen again. The farmer does mention the 
Kirk, which is hard to separate from the cultural identity of 
Scotland, and begins to say that it would be a sin against God 
to enter into the union. He also said that he wished God may 
guide parliament and give them the grace and wit to be both 
a “true-hearted Scotsman and honest Presbyterians” and that 
he speaks for many of the people in the area.32
 It seems that despite the need to do something, which 
was apparent to a large number of Scots, they were still 
fearful of a union with England because they feared they 
would lose all of their national sovereignty and identity and 
their religious identity, neither of which can be completely 
removed from the other. Such public outcry from the Scottish 
people makes it surprising that a rebellion did not happen in 
Scotland in 1707 although the feelings about union probably 
did contribute to the Jacobite Rising of 1715. Since the Acts 
of Union went into effect on 1 May 1707, Scots have been 
pushing for independence from England with varying 
degrees of support, though never higher than those first 
31  The farmer wrote in the Scots language which is similar to English and could be 
considered a dialect rather than a separate language; words translated to modern English, 
style kept as close as possible to the original.
32  A Copy of a Letter from a Country Farmer to His Laird, a Member of Parliament, (1706).
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few years. Scotland may yet become independent nation, 
however, the day the Scottish parliament passed the Acts of 
Union was, as the Earl of Seafield put it, “the end of ane auld 
sang.”33




The Florence Gazette and the Case 
for Secession in Florence and     
Lauderdale County
Kevin Bailey
In January 1861, Alabama became the fourth state to leave 
the Union in the wake of Abraham Lincoln’s election to 
the presidency of the United States of America. The state 
would soon be joined by other slaveholding Southern states 
to form the Confederate States of America. However, the 
sentiment for disunion and the establishment of the new 
Southern Confederacy was not universally accepted by many 
Southerners. Though dissatisfied with result of the election 
of 1860 and apprehensive about the path of the nation, the 
Southerners against secession retained faith that the rule of 
law and the Constitution would be sufficient to carry them 
through what they saw as the perils of a free-soil president, 
fanatical abolitionists, and the inept and corrupt politicians 
who had led the country so far down the perceived path to 
ruin. 
 North Alabama was particularly apprehensive at 
the prospects of secession, both for practical and political 
reasons. Northern Alabamians viewed secession as a plot 
by political elites and slaveholding planters in the southern 
half of the states, to retain and bolster their political and 
economic strength by establishing a more formidable state 
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government in the wake of the state’s secession.1 Practically, 
if the state seceded from the Union and war was to break 
out, the fighting would enter North Alabama, and control of 
the Tennessee River would be a primary objective for Union 
forces.
  Making the case for secession in Northwest Alabama 
was the Florence Gazette who, surprisingly, supported John C. 
Breckenridge for President in 1860. The Gazette became the 
focal point for disunion sentiment in Lauderdale County by 
publishing secessionists’ articles and excitedly reporting on 
the departure of each state from the Union in the twilight of 
1861. The Gazette featured what was considered a partisan 
position at the start of 1860, a radical opposition to the anti-
slavery forces of the North so strident that talk of secession 
by Southern states was openly advocated in its pages even 
before Lincoln’s election. What is important to note about 
the Gazette’s secession campaign is the careful way in which 
it was conducted. North Alabama was not as dependent 
on large scale agriculture as the southern half of Alabama, 
and not necessarily as devoted to slavery the central pillar 
of Southern nationalism in slavery. Only eleven percent of 
white males in Lauderdale County owned slaves.2 Therefore 
editors made certain to frame the argument for disunion 
around states’ rights and only publishing the most outlandish 
remarks of the radical abolitionists and Republicans.
1  See Melvin Durward Long, Alabama in the Formation of the Confederacy (Ann Arbor: 
University Microfilms International, 1959).
2  Margaret M. Storey, Loyalty and Loss - Alabama’s Unionists in the Civil War and Reconstruction 
(Baton Rouge: Louisianna State University Press, 2004), 257.
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  There are three distinct phases of The Gazette’s case 
for southern nationalism from mid-1860 to January 1861. 
The first phase consisted of the campaign of 1860 during 
which the Gazette championed John C. Breckenridge over 
Stephen Douglas and John Bell, attacked Republicanism, 
and denounced abolitionism. The Gazette urged the people 
of Lauderdale County to vote for pro-slavery Democrats in 
order to stave off threats of Northern aggression, and railed 
against abolitionists who they believed controlled the free-soil 
Republican Party. The second phase began in the wake of the 
election of 1860. The Gazette published an article in November 
of 1860 summarizing Southern Democrat’s exasperation with 
the American republic. As the paper read, “the argument is 
exhausted all hope of relief in the Union through the agency 
of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional 
amendment, is extinguished and we trust the South will 
not be deceived by appearances, pretenses, or guarantees.”3 
The paper speculated wildly on the motives behind the new 
“black Republican” government in Washington, lambasting 
the Republicans and abolitionist they believed were driving 
the wedge between North and South. The final phase consists 
of active campaigning for Alabama’s secession—a phase in 
which the rhetoric is completely unguarded. The paper ran 
excited reports on successful secession conventions from 
South Carolina to Mississippi, and urged its readers to vote 
for a slate of secessionist representatives for Alabama’s own 
convention. 
3   “To Our Constituents” Florence Gazette, December 26, 1860.
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The Election of 1860 and the Florence Gazette
The election of 1860 began in the spring with a slate 
of Democratic and Republican candidates seeking the 
nomination for President of their respective parties. The 
Gazette began its coverage of the momentous election on 
March 14, by throwing its support behind Robert M. Hunter, 
a senator from Virginia for the Democratic nomination for 
President.4 The same issue chided the “Union-Savers” as 
being disloyal to the state and dismissed them as malcontents. 
The Gazette went on to praise the state government and a 
point was made that the State had, through acts of legislation, 
“provided for the military education of two poor young men 
from every County of the state,” and “appropriated money 
to clean out the Colbert shoals, in the Tennessee river, just 
below Florence.”5 The article illustrates the Gazette’s consistent 
support of the government in Montgomery, an opinion which 
was not widely held in the northern half of the state. In its 
effort to bolster support for state, the Gazette republished 
articles from Montgomery newspapers, like the Montgomery 
Mail6 and the Montgomery Weekly Advertiser.7 Both papers 
uncritically published the exploits of Alabama’s premier 
proponent of Southern nationalism, William Lowndes Yancey.
 State politics aside, the Gazette attacked strengthening 
4   “For President Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia,” Florence Gazette, March 7, 1860.
5  “Covered Herself with Glory,” Florence Gazette, March 14, 1860.
6  Examples are “Thoughts for the Times” from the Montgomery Mail published in the 
Florence Gazette on December 26, 1860. Another example is “The Election of Lincoln is 
sufficient cause for Secession” from the Montgomery Mail in Florence Gazette on September 19, 
1860.
7  “Mr. Yancey in Missouri, Maine, North Carolina and Virginia,” Montgomery Advertiser, 
quoted in Florence Gazette, September 19, 1860.
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free-soil Republicans in the North, and published an article 
detailing William Seward’s opinion on the slavery issuewhich 
the Gazette characterized as displaying “a cunning hate for 
the slaveholders.”8 The paper rebuked Seward’s insistence 
that the laws of Southern states only sought to protect 
the slaveholder, not the slaves. The paper denounced this 
accusation as a lie perpetuated by abolitionists and pointed 
to a section from the Code of Alabama which states that it is a 
crime punishable by a fine of 25 dollars to commit or prevent 
an act of cruelty upon a slave.9
 By the summer of 1860, it became clear that upcoming 
election would be a referendum on slavery. The Gazette 
published articles such as, “Douglas and Seward on 
Slavery” and “The Republican Bible,” a salacious example 
of abolitionist rhetoric that featured such alarming language 
as “SLAVEHOLDERS ARE MORE CRIMINAL THAN 
COMMON MURDERS” and “WE ARE DETERMINED TO 
ABOLISH SLAVERY AT ALL HAZARDS—IN DEFIANCE 
OF ALL OPPOSITION OF WHAT EVER NATURE WHICH 
IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SLAVEOCRATS TO BRING AGAINST 
US.” 10 J.L.M. Curry’s eloquent and emphatic speech, “Slavery 
in the Territories,” was carried in the Gazette as a two part 
piece in April.  In the April 11 edition was an editorial further 
underlining the importance of the westward expansion of 
slavery. In this edition, the Gazette’s editors make it clear 
8  “The Presidency” Montgomery Mail, quoted in Florence Gazette, September 19, 1860.
9  Alabama State Legislature, “Excerpt from Code of Alabama, Section 3297, Alabama’s 1852 
Slave Code.” Alabama Department of Archives and History. 1852. http://www.archives.
alabama.gov/cornerstone/slavecode1852/page09.html (accessed April 22, 2013).
10  “The Republican Bible,” Florence Gazette, October 3, 1860.
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that the Supreme Court in the Dredd Scott case had fully 
reinforced the premise of states’ rights and that “it is an ‘out 
and out’ decision in the favor of slaveholders.”11 A month 
later, editors John Kennedy and S.A.M. Wood decried that 
the constitutional rights of the citizens are in danger lest the 
people stand firm with their state against the onslaught of the 
other sections of the nation against the besieged South.12
 While the Gazette defended the peculiar institution 
in its pages, the political infighting that would mark the 
election of 1860 had already begun. It was not an escalation 
of the ongoing intra-Democratic battle between Breckenridge 
and Douglas, but instead intra-regional sparring among the 
supporters Breckinridge, the presumptive nominee of the 
South, and John Bell, a Tennessee moderate representing the 
Constitutional Union Party. Bell had been appalled at the 
growing sectional strife in the Senate and led a third party 
movement wholly designed to throw the election to the 
House of Representatives. Bell’s supporters hoped that since 
he was the least offensive of all the partisans that he would be 
made president.
 The Gazette’s publishers, staunch supporters of 
Breckenridge, took issue with Bell as a rival for the Southern 
vote. The Gazette ran a piece denying that Breckenridge 
supported disunion, and attacked Bell by presenting evidence 
in quotations from speeches that supported a policy of 
secession and disunion. The editors published such salacious 
11  “Judge Douglas and the Dred Scott Decision” Montgomery Advertiser, quoted in Florence 
Gazette, April 11, 1860.
12   Ibid.
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quotes as “I say give me separation, give me disunion, give 
me anything in preference to a Union sustained only by 
power, by Constitutional ties without reciprocal trust and 
confidence.”13 The ire heaped on Bell, however, provided 
only a temporary reprieve for Stephen Douglas. The Gazette 
derisively called his plan for popular sovereignty “squatter 
democracy,” and published a plethora of speeches and 
columns from across the South condemning Douglas for his 
appeasement of abolitionists and challenge to Breckenridge. 
An article published in the October 31 edition of the Gazette 
proclaimed “Shame on Douglas” in its headline, and lambasts 
Douglas for perpetuating the split in the Democratic vote—
even in the face of Republican majorities having been elected 
in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana—and pining for unity in 
the Democratic field. The Gazette wrote,
Bell men, Douglas men, and Breckenridge men, 
all were weighed down by these heavy abolition 
majorities in the North, and turned from their suicidal 
strife at home, to that arch enemy of the South and 
the Constitution; the black Republican party... we all 
desired that this unfortunate campaign in the South 
[should] be concluded without further bitterness.14
Furthermore the article accuses him of slandering the South 
during his campaign speeches in Memphis and Huntsville 
and concluded by urging readers to “rise in your majesty, next 
Tuesday and rebuke this invader.”15
13  “Who is for Disunion? Breckinridge and Bell Side by Side,” Florence Gazette, September 
19, 1860.
14  “Shame on Douglas,” Florence Gazette, October 31, 1860.
15  Ibid.
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 Despite the ardent campaign for Breckenridge and 
the warnings of the Gazette, its’ readers did not throw their 
support behind the Southern Democratic candidate. As 
a result, Lauderdale County voted for Douglas but only 
by a scant eighty-four votes. The results of the election 
demonstrated that in more populated portions of the county 
and the larger towns, Douglas performed best winning 
Florence, Taylor’s Springs, Lexington, Stutts, and Bluff 
Creek for a total of 790 votes. Breckenridge took Rogersville, 
Rawhide, Oakland, Mitchells, and Spains to garner 706 votes; 
and Bell took Blackburns and Waterloo for a total of 444 
votes.16
Resistance
In September of 1860, the Gazette published an article from the 
Huntsville Democrat entitled “All for Secession.” Merchants 
from Huntsville, returning fresh from a trip to the North, 
insisted that if Lincoln was to be elected president that the 
South should take a course of secession and resistance.17 
Well before the election, Southern partisans determined 
that slavery and Southern culture could be easier preserved 
outside of the Union than within it. Now with the election 
of 1860 complete and Lincoln winning without the support 
of any Southern state, discussion turned to the prospects of 
a hostile Northern government and its implications for the 
South.
16 “Election Returns,” Florence Gazette, November 2, 1860.
17  “All for Secession,” Florence Gazette, October 3, 1860.
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 A week after the election, the Gazette published an 
article written by J.B. Campbell, a member of the Charleston 
Bar, outlining the general opinion of dejected Southern 
Democrats. “It is painfully true,” he wrote, “that the black 
Republican party have decided the establishment of a hostile 
government over the South—the weaker section and we 
have not the power to prevent it.”18 Campbell’s argument 
set the tone for the campaign of resistance to the new federal 
government across the region. Another correspondence 
republished from the Tuscaloosa Observer between two 
secessionist ministers, enumerated the grievances of the 
South,
For many years our section has indirectly borne the 
burdens of the general Government… a party of 
the North, avowedly bent on the destruction of our 
property—and with it our industry and our homes. … I 
cannot doubt that it is the right and duty of the people 
of the slaveholding states to withdraw from this Union; 
and to form a government of their own, united to their 
wants.19
In a stirring declaration of intent, the Gazette discarded any 
pretense of objectivity in an editorial entitled “Our Position.” 
The paper described the rivalry between the sections as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the continuation of the Union,
The election of a President, of any party, is in itself a 
matter of but temporary importance, and affords, as we 
18  “Our Federal Government changed, and Practically Dismembered,” Florence Gazette, 
November 14, 1860.
19  “Letters from Dr. Manly and Dr. Garland,” Tuscaloosa Observer, quoted in Florence Gazette, 
December 5, 1860.
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have often said, no valid ground for the dissolution of 
the Government; but the fact once clearly established, 
that henceforth and forever the North and the South 
would be arrayed as hostile sections in a contest which 
could end only by the subjugation of one or the other, 
and in which the weaker would rapidly become still 
weaker and the stronger gain strength—this fact 
once clearly established, as it has been by the last 
Presidential election, proves that the Union between 
those two sections has practically ceased to exist, 
and that its mere forms are but as the chain binding 
together deadly enemies sharing a common doom.20
Though the editors assured the readers that every effort 
at reconciliation should be made, and a new Southern 
government should be established should a compromise fail. 
They called upon the people of Alabama to make “known 
that the powers granted under the federal Constitution, 
being derived from the people of the United States, shall be 
resumed by them, the same having been perverted to our 
injury and, oppression,” and that “Alabama shall declare 
herself a free and independent State.”21 Furthermore they 
insisted a convention should be called to create a Union 
among Southern states to create a nation that Alabama should 
join and then seek recognition from the other nations of the 
world, should the people permit it.22
 In this open campaigning inaugurated the last phase 
of rallying Lauderdale County to the cause of secession, 
the editors of the Gazette sought to unite the three political 
factions that had contested the election. In impassioned 




articles such as, “A sober appeal to men of all parties”, the 
Gazette urged its readers to put aside the partisan infighting 
that had given the reins of power over to Lincoln and the 
“black Republicans,” and to “select as delegates the most 
ablest, the wisest, the best, the truest men that can be found.”23 
The men elected to serve in Alabama’s secession convention 
were “to provide the means necessary to protect us against 
any attempt at coercion from the Lincoln administration,” and 
the editors urged their readers to elect men of wisdom and 
statesmanship to represent them.24 The paper also worked to 
correct some popular misconceptions about the convention. 
Rumors had spread that the convention was elected “for no 
other purpose … than simply to declare Alabama out of the 
Union and then adjourn.”25 The article assured the public 
that the purpose of the convention was to decide whether to 
declare Alabama’s secession. Additionally, to assuage fears 
of a coup by influential members of the Alabama legislature 
retained by oath in the newly established independent state 
government, all the public officials would be elected by the 
people of the state.26 As discontent over the result of the 
election and fear of a hostile government in Washington 
grew, the fractured political arms of Lauderdale County 
began to mend and coalesce around advocating secession at 
the state convention to be held in January.  The state Senator 
from Lauderdale County, Robert Patton, declared at a public 
23  “A Sober Appeal to men of all Parties,” Florence Gazette, December 5, 1860. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid.
26  “The Powers and Functions of the Convention,” Florence Gazette, December 5, 1860. 
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meeting that “it is the right of any state to secede, from 
the confederacy, whenever in her own judgment a step is 
demanded by honor, interests, and safety of her people.”27 
An article in the same issue laid out the justification for 
secession as a right given to the people in the Declaration 
of Independence, “Call it what you may, secession, or 
revolution, the right, peaceably, to alter, or abolish a form of 
government exists.”28 
 However, the Gazette published an essay that urged 
Alabamians to reject secession and warned secessionists to 
consider the consequences of declaring a rebellion against the 
government for independence. The paper read,
Are you prepared to precipitate your state into 
rebellion and civil war against the best government 
ever framed by the wisdom of man, and in its 
destruction destroy the hopes of all lovers of liberty 
throughout the world? Secession will entail on you a 
load of debt and exorbitant Taxes for the support of 
our Army and Navy, and splendid Government such 
as the pride and extravagance of our Aristocracy will 
require.29 
However impassioned or reasonable, opposition to secession 
was quickly brushed aside after the Gazette reported “South 
Carolina out of the Union” and published a series of articles 
written for the Montgomery Mail further exhorting the virtues 
of secession and calling on citizens to be loyal to their state 
27  “Bell Douglas and Breckenridge parties coming rapidly together,” Florence Gazette, 
December 12, 1860. 
28  “SECESSION,” Florence Gazette, December 12, 1860. 
29  “A Letter From A Citizen,” Florence Gazette, December 12, 1860. 
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rather than the nation.30 On January 11, 1860, the Alabama 
Secession Convention declared the state to be an independent 
republic by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-nine. In a letter by 
Robert Patton—who had earlier advocated for secession 
as a principle—sent to the Huntsville Democrat; the senator 
lamented,
Our will has been overruled by this decided majority, 
and now to withhold our acquiescence and take a 
position adverse to the Convention, could but distract 
the public mind, and ultimately result in civil discord 
and disaffection among the people of our beloved state. 
Above all things let us be united as one man in our 
future action. … Let us feel that we are right, and trust 
in the interposition of a kind Providence.31 
With Alabama now an independent republic and soon to be a 
member of the Confederate States of America, the Gazette had 
lost its battle but won the war. 
 Just as Lauderdale County had voted for Douglas 
rather than Breckenridge, the representatives to the secession 
convention had voted against secession.32 Although Florence 
reluctantly left the Union along with the state, the people 
of Lauderdale County believed a fractious and aristocratic 
Southern government would be preferable to what they 
perceived as a belligerent abolitionist Republican regime in 
Washington. Speaking to Georgians and the entire South, the 
Gazette reprinted a speech from Georgia Governor Joseph E. 
30  “Thoughts for the Times,” Florence Gazette, December 26, 1860. 
31  “Letter From Robert M. Patton to the Huntsville Democrat,” Florence Gazette, January 16, 
1861.   
32  Donald Bradford Dodd, Unionism in Confederate Alabama (Ann Arbor: Universiry 
Microfilms Inc., 1969), 113.
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Brown, in which he declared, “We are no longer a divided 
people. We are one in sentiment in interest and in feeling, 
and will enlist under one banner for the South.”33  Jeremy 
Clemens—speaking for pro-Union southerners who feared for 
the safety of their homes, their friends, and their families—
put the situation into more sober and consigned terms, “The 
majority is against us—we must go with the State, or create 
civil disturbances of the most dreadful character at home. Tell 
them too not be deceived about the possibility of a peaceful 
solution of our difficulties. We shall have war, and that soon. 
… Let our citizens therefore begin the work of preparation.”34 
Secession had come for North Alabama with or without the 
support of its citizens, and the region would be embattled 
time and time again in the great struggle over the future of 
the country.
33  “Good Feeling in Georgia,” Columbus Times, quoted in Florence Gazette, January 30, 1861. 
34  “Letter from Jeremy Clemens to W.B. Figures, Esq.,” Florence Gazette, January 16, 1861.
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Militaristic Nationalism and     
Pseudo-Religion: 
A Material Culture Analysis of a 
1911 Ulysses S. Grant Tobacco Card
Gracjan Kraszewski
Material culture, the study of man-made objects, allows 
scholars to construct a more complete and thorough 
understanding of the past.1 However, documents only go so 
far. They are often biased, their human authors intentionally 
exaggerating points while simultaneously omitting 
crucial evidence. The rawness of objects helps historians 
remedy such problems. While objects, like documents, 
are human products built within cultural constructs and 
loaded with meaning, material goods stand apart. They 
can be intrinsically analyzed, producing historical cohesion 
and nuance. It must be noted that objects do not always 
challenge documents; at times they reinforce the written 
record, showing, ubiquitously, how deeply entrenched some 
historical claims are. 
 This essay focuses on a Ulysses S. Grant 1911 Royal 
Bengals Little Cigars tobacco card.2 The card, tiny enough to 
forgetfully lose in a coat pocket, brims with deeper meaning 
1  Henry Glassie, Pattern in the Material Folk Culture of the Eastern United States (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 2. 
2  Ulysses S. Grant Tobacco Card, Royal Bengals Little Cigars, “Heroes of History” Series, 
1911. Card on file at the Ulysses S. Grant Presidential Library, Ulysses S. Grant Association, 
Mississippi State University Libraries, Starkville, MS. Henceforth, the card, textual and 
material, will not be footnoted. 
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about Grant’s era and the object’s time of production. Dual 
temporal analysis is a singular strength of material culture. 
A scholar can learn about an object’s time of production as 
well as the object’s historical person/theme. Grant’s card 
is a “lived reburial;” restoration of reputation, according to 
Michael Kammen, is the prime reason behind the reburial 
of a person.3 Grant’s tobacco card, conspicuous and mass 
produced, easy to buy and hold onto, is a lived reburial for 
two reasons. Primarily, Grant is portrayed only favorably; 
any signs of war weariness or the effects of alcohol are absent. 
Grant looks good, powerful and vital. The second reason 
is that by the time of the card’s production in 1911, actual 
Civil War memories had disappeared. Tobacco cards, and 
other paraphernalia, replaced real memory within public 
imagination. The tobacco card presents a resplendent Grant; 
since card purchasers didn’t actually experience the Civil War, 
or have any recollection of the real man, his reputation carries 
on without blemish. His lived reburial is a whitewashed 
one, forsaking realism in favor of lionization, presenting and 
passing along a shored up version of the truth. 
 The card presents Grant as a conquering military 
hero, the victor in a nationalistic war that brings peace 
and unity to America. Bernard L. Herman has shown how 
souvenirs serve as a conversation piece, a touchstone for first 
encounters or simply something to discuss.4 So it was with 
3  Michael Kammen, Digging up the Dead: A History of Notable American Reburials (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 7. 
4  Bernard L. Herman, Town House: Architecture and Material Life in the Early American City, 
1780-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 259. 
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the Grant card. The accessibility of the tobacco card meant 
that ordinary Americans had constant contact with Grant’s 
military hero legend; emphasizing American militarism and a 
culture of nationalistic imperialism. The Grant card created, to 
paraphrase Benedict Anderson, an “imagined community” of 
Americans willingly bound by the portrait’s fictitious claims 
of unity. The card was meant to call Americans to a glorious—
if not fully veritable—recollection of the past and inspiring 
citizens of the then present to take up Grant’s mantle of noble 
conquest and national achievement; which they did, largely, 
as evidenced by interventions in Hawaii, the Caribbean, 
the Pacific, and in Central America, i.e. construction of the 
Panama Canal.5 
 The wide accessibility of the card proved fertile ground 
for the budding of a “secular faith;” a pseudo-religious 
attachment to Grant in the vein of a hero’s cult.6 In this way 
it was not enough to view the card as representative of 
America’s glorious past, to affirm Grant’s central role in that 
story, or to feel kinship with the multitude of Americans who 
saw and possessed the object. The card’s saint like replica of 
Grant compelled Americans to view him, and their history, 
on a higher plane; a dynamic narrative demanding action, 
a missionary impulse to take Grant’s brand of American 
exceptionalism to the world. As Walter McDougall has 
argued, Americans did just that:  post-Civil War unity 
5  See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
6  Kammen, Digging up the Dead, 31. See also Michael Burleigh, Earth Powers: The Clash of 
Religion and Politics in Europe, from the French Revolution to the Great War (New York: Harper, 
2006); Michael Burleigh, Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to 
the War on Terror (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008). 
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spread Winthrop’s “city on a hill” globally via imperialism, 
the (failed) League of Nations, United Nations, Cold War 
containment, and the global meliorism inherent in the Korean 
and Vietnamese Wars.7
 Militaristic nationalism is the primary theme of 
the Grant tobacco card. On the front, he is pictured in full 
uniform, the caption at the top reading “GEN U.S. Grant.” 
The card’s back text, a miniature biography, goes into great 
detail illuminating Grant’s military accomplishments. Little 
is mentioned of his presidency and even less, nothing in fact, 
about the Reconstruction Era. The sole line dedicated to his 
time in Washington reads “Was president of the United States 
from 1869 to 1877.” Militaristic nationalism is a product of 
both the post-Civil War era as well as America’s turn of the 
century imperialism. Strength, martial vigor, and unity were 
paramount to the American image in both the 1860s and the 
1910s.8 A slew of historians have written on the Civil War’s 
direct impact upon creating rampant American nationalism 
and recent scholarship has confirmed this belief. Susan-Mary 
Grant, writing in 2000, claimed that only after the Civil War 
did America become an ideologically/identifiably unified 
country.9 Louis Menand, writing in 2002, concurred with an 
argument made by historian Carl Degler in the 1970s that the 
Civil War substituted the nation for previous sectionalism, 
7  See Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the 
World Since 1776 (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998).
8  One can justifiably argue that these themes have been present, conspicuously so, 
throughout the duration of American history; common to all Americans since the Revolution. 
9  Susan-Mary Grant, North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the 
Antebellum Era (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 172. 
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eliminating the possibility of a return to factionalism.10 And 
Stephen Mihm, in his 2009 book A Nation of Counterfeiters, 
extends nationalism to economics, arguing that the Civil War 
enabled “country and currency” to move forward united as 
one.11
 The above scholarship’s reasoning leads to this 
conclusion: righteous war brings peace which then brings the 
nation. Grant, therefore, in his role as the Federal Commander 
who defeated the Confederacy, is the embodiment of this 
belief. The card portrays his accomplishment as singular; 
the man who waged the good war to bring about peace that 
formed the American nation. But while peace and nation are 
heralded, Grant’s military uniform reminds the beholder that 
both come at a price, one settled on a battlefield. 
 Post-Civil War militaristic nationalism works in 
tandem with American imperialism because the same themes 
of physical virility, and unified American righteousness, 
run through both. It is no wonder that turn of the century 
America, having annexed Hawaii, won vast international 
territories in the Spanish-American War, and begun to probe 
“Open Door” economics in China, would produce a tobacco 
card of Grant highlighting his masculine, conqueror-like 
qualities; connective themes between the 1860s and 1910s 
and, as Gail Bederman has shown, particular points of 
10  Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 67. See 
also Stanley Coben and Lorman Ratner, eds. The Development of American Culture (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 106-70. 
11  Stephen Mihm, Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United 
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 308. 
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emphasis in an hyper-masculine American culture.12 After 
giving a detailed description of the card, from basic size 
and texture facets to textual and pictorial analysis, larger 
implications will be discussed; why the card is so militarily 
nationalistic and how this fit perfectly with the masculine 
culture of 1911. The card also creates an imagined American 
kinship, or secular faith, around a simultaneously blanched 
and camouflaged version of the past, and raises further 
questions about how the American culture of militaristic 
nationalism drove American exceptionalism policies into the 
twentieth century and beyond. Seemingly cold and lifeless 
objects have a vitality of their own, even those objects as 
diminutive as a tobacco card.
 Tobacco cards are a nineteenth century product, 
a time when Americans, according to material culture 
scholars Ken Ames and David Jaffee, partook of an “artificial 
culture, obsessed with appearances and material goods.”13 
The cards debuted in the 1870s and 1880s featuring, in 
addition to military men, athletes, movie stars and other 
cultural luminaries.14 They were easy to attain because in 
an affordable—a few dollars—cigar box, a set could include 
upwards of fifty cards.15 The London Cigarette Company 
explains that the cards featured people that would appeal to 
12  See Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the 
United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
13  Ken Ames, Death in the Dining Room and other Tales of Victorian Culture (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1992), 236, 23. See also David Jaffee, A New Nation of Goods: The 
Material Culture of Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), ix. 
14  “Allen and Ginter’s Champions”, sourced from: http://web.archive.org/
web/20060405192229/http://www.wclynx.com/burntofferings/adsallen_and_ginter.html. 
15  “Card History-London Cigarette Card Company,” sourced from: http://www.
londoncigcard.co.uk/cardhistory.php.
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male interests in order to drive a male dominated market.16 
Although ephemeral construction made up the majority of 
cards, some included a silk print pressed onto the cardboard 
backing.17 Regardless of material, century old cards can still 
be found in good condition today thanks to owner diligence. 
In 2007, the famous T-206 1909 Honus Wagner card fetched 
$2.35 million only to be turned around later in the year for 
a $2.8 million profit.18 The Grant tobacco card’s militaristic 
nationalism was widely disseminated and accepted due to its 
affordability, accessibility, and popular interest. 
 The card is 3.5 inches tall and 2.25 inches wide. It is 
razor thin, pliable, and coarse in texture; one can run a finger 
along the smooth glossy sides, and then flip the card over 
to feel cardboard like roughness. The workmanship is very 
thorough, magnificent when one considers an entire detailed 
Grant portrait has been sized down onto a 3.5-2.25 inch 
canvass. 
 On the front, a slim white border lines the outside of 
the card. Grant is in his blue military uniform—gold buttons 
and a white collar, centered against an orange, sunset-like 
background. Grant’s face is serious, but he does not appear 
to be tired. His grey beard is perfectly trimmed, his grey hair 
combed, and confident assurance radiates from his face. Three 
objects, placed over Grant’s chest, complete the picture. A red 
16  Ibid. 
17  “Tobacco Card Collection,” 1861. UNCW Archives and Special Collections Online Database. 
By Lana Donaldson Taylor and Deborah A. Edwards, sourced from: http://randall3.uncw.
edu/ascod/?p=collections/findingaid&id=437&q=. 
18  “Card History-London Cigarette Company,” sourced from: http://www.londoncigcard.
co.uk/cardhistory.php.
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and gold handled sword, its point not visible, lies on top of 
a white scroll inscribed with “Let us have peace U.S. Grant” 
in fine, black script; the scroll is on top of a red berry laden 
green laurel. At the top of the card, in capital letters, “GEN. 
U.S. GRANT” is written. 
 The back of the card is manila in color, a coffee 
hue. The back contains Grant’s biography and company 
information. The script is black. At the top, it reads 
“GENERAL GRANT”. Below that, Grant’s biographical 
information is provided in one paragraph. It reads: 
Ulysses Simpson (originally Hiram Ulysses) Grant was born 
a poor boy at Point Pleasant, Ohio, April 27, 1822, and was 
graduated at West Point in 1843, afterward serving through the 
Mexican War. He left the army in 1854. When living at Galena, 
Ill., he was made a colonel, June 17, 1861, and brigadier general 
on August 7, and after capturing Fort Donelson, February 16, 
1862, was made major general of volunteers. Won the battles of 
Shiloh, Iuka, Fort Gibson, etc., and after winning at Vicksburg 
was made major general in the regular army. Gained the battle of 
Chattanooga, and was then made lieutenant general and given 
command of all the American armies in March, 1864. Received 
the surrender of Lee, then was given the title of general. Was 
president of the United States from 1869 to 1877. He died at 
Mount McGregor, near Saratoga, N.Y. July 23, 1885. 
Beneath the biographical information there is a big, 
cursive letter “M”. Underneath the “M” is, in small script, 







Their Quality, Convenience, Size
and Price Satisfy Cigar Smokers.
The London Cigarette Company’s website claims that “this 
[the turn of the century] was before the days of cinema, 
radio or TV… newspapers carried few illustrations. … For 
most smokers … the cards … were their window on the 
world, serving to educate.”19 This paper agrees with this 
statement. The Grant tobacco card was an educational tool; 
a widely accessible propaganda piece easily proliferated 
amongst common society. Having provided textual and 
pictorial description, it is time to investigate how the Grant 
card embodies a masculine militaristic nationalism; and how 
this theme, in the vein of a lived reburial and hero’s cult, 
facilitated a whitewashed secular faith that glorified a martial 
past in order to drive imperialistic efforts and set the tone 
for twentieth century American exceptionalism and global 
interventionism. 
 Militaristic nationalism is omnipresent. Most obviously, 
Grant is dressed in his military uniform. The man was also 
president of the United States; a more important title, it can 
be argued. Yet Grant as the hero of the Civil War makes up 
his most enduring legacy. Grant historiography confirms the 
19  “Card History-London Cigarette Company”, sourced from: http://www.londoncigcard.
co.uk/cardhistory.php. 
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militaristic preoccupation of scholars; a point highlighted by 
Robin Neillands in the introduction of his 2004 book Grant: 
The Man Who Won the Civil War.20 Richard Goldhurst, writing 
thirty years before Neillands, called Grant the “General who 
won the war”.21 Goldhurst claimed that Grant’s war record—
more than any other factor—made him “the most famous 
man in America” until his death.22 Bruce Catton said Grant 
was “among the few who had seen the path clearly during 
the war…a great general”.23 Neillands argues that Grant and 
the Civil war are inseparable, it “made him” and while he 
“failed in many things” during his life he was a “very great 
general.”24 
 The biography on the back of the card confirms, if 
not exaggerates, infatuation with Grant’s militarism. As 
previously mentioned in the paper, only one line is dedicated 
to his time in office, just before the line announcing his death. 
Grant’s militarism is so exalted that more space—three lines 
total—is given to his Mexican war service, his leaving the 
army, and his time in Galena, Illinois than the one total given 
to his presidency and Reconstruction; the latter of which gets 
no mention at all. 
 Grant personage, his well-manicured appearance and 
confident look, shows the make-up of militaristic nationalism. 
Even more telling are the objects placed over his body: the 
20  Robin Neillands, Grant: The Man Who Won the Civil War (New York: Cold Spring Press, 
2004), 15. 
21  Richard Goldhurst, Many are the Hearts: The agony and triumph of Ulysses S. Grant (New 
York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1975), xix. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (New York: Book of the Month Club, 1994), 492. 
24  Neillands, 17. 
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laurel, the sword, and the scroll. The laurel paints Grant as 
the conquering hero, the individual who, more than anyone 
else is responsible for Union victory. The sword demonstrates 
the means by which Grant has accomplished victory. It is 
important that the sword is on top of the other objects because 
the symbolism serves to say that first Grant had to pick up the 
sword, use it well and subdue his enemies before recognition, 
the laurel, was his. 
 The scroll, in between the sword and laurel, embodies 
the essence of militaristic nationalism and secular faith.  It is 
crucial that the words read “let us have peace”, and nothing 
more. For someone to say “let us have peace” implies the 
individualistic agency to actually bring this about. The laurel, 
the scroll, and the sword work in tandem to promote Grant’s 
militaristic achievements. Grant deserves the laurel because 
he is the conquering hero, the man who defeated the South. 
He defeated them with the sword.  Victory would not come 
easy, if at all, had Grant not taken up his duty to preserve 
the nation. When success was attained, Grant desired peace. 
Grant has the power to do this, the card implies; the power 
to say “let us have peace” and have it because he already 
demonstrated the battlefield ability to win the war. 
 These three objects, set over pristine portrait of Grant, 
sum up the whole heart of American militaristic nationalism. 
It is about masculine assertiveness, about picking up your 
sword and wining the fight. He who does this deserves the 
recognition, the laurel elevating individual achievement, the 
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pedestal set high. But what makes militaristic nationalism so 
American, the card implies, is that peace is the fundamental 
goal. At the fight’s conclusion, no matter how bitter, a true 
American hero like Grant will desire only peace. 
The sword and laurel’s relationship to the scroll well 
illustrates the transition of militarism into nationalism. 
The first two objects are strictly militaristic—a weapon 
and a wreath denoting success; but what makes a nation is 
reconciliation and that, according to historian David Blight, is 
the Reconstruction Era’s lasting legacy, albeit tainted by white 
supremacy.25 Grant is credited, in the card’s representation, 
with engendering a productive, pro-nation reconciliation. Just 
as he, individually, won the war and deserves the credit, he 
merits even more respect for only saying “let us have peace” 
at war’s conclusion. That is the essence of the card; Grant 
representing all the “right” American values of masculine 
martiality and individualistic military genius while tempering 
these with a commitment to peace and unity. Americans who 
beheld the card see the conspicuous militarism of Grant yet 
are called to remember that “true Americans” only use force 
for higher means. The military root of American nationalism 
is always for peace, a hard won peace that unified Americans 
to spread their Grant-like values to the world. 
 The secular faith is the means by which Americans 
could spread their militaristic and nationalistic values to 
the world. The theme of secular faith has a long history in 
25  See David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).
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America. Hans Kohn argued that nationalism is always a 
secular faith, substituting national holidays for religious 
feast days, reciting anthems instead of prayers, and giving 
borderline adulation to national heroes usually reserved 
for God.26 Long before Grant, John Winthrop was claiming 
America as a place apart, a “city on a hill,” providentially 
fashioned to be an example to all nations. American 
attachment to exceptionalist rhetoric is congenital. It is not 
sufficient to include Grant in the pantheon of American 
legends based exclusively on military merit. He has to possess 
something extra, a commitment to higher goals. 
 “Let us have peace,” the words written on the scroll, 
is precisely that something extra. Grant’s unquestioned 
commitment to peace, to unification, rounds him out as 
the true American hero. With this, he can now rightly be 
honored as an American model, someone to emulate in skill 
and character. A secular faith cannot operate if the followers 
believe a leader’s righteousness is not genuine. Grant’s 
commitment to peace, highlighted on the tobacco card, made 
the connection between his military greatness and his moral 
fiber. The men and women of 1911, only a little more than 
a decade removed from the vast land gains of the Spanish 
American War, the annexation of Hawaii, and American 
involvement in China, could look at Grant’s card and take 
comfort; American militaristic nationalism, now taking 
imperial forms, was good at heart. Sure, it was intense, at 
times maybe brutish. Behind all the masculine martiality was 
26  See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1961).
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a commitment to benevolence. 
 Grant’s physical appearance also contributes to the 
seamless flow of militarism into nationalism within a secular 
faith justifying imperialism. Simply put, Grant looks good. 
There is no war weariness in his face; nor are there any moles, 
wrinkles, or signs of aging. Even though his grey hair betrays 
his age, he looks young at heart; still vital, capable of giving 
the people of 1911 an encore of his Civil War performance. 
 The militaristic nationalism of the Grant card reached 
many people due to the wide purchase of cigars and 
cigarettes. It is important to mention how people might have 
compared the card to other objects. Saints’ cards, or Catholic 
prayer cards, and sports figure cards lend themselves well to 
comparison. Sports figure cards share much in common with 
the message of the Grant tobacco card. They portray their 
subject as a hero; only in a favorable light and as a means 
of inspiration. The masculine predominance of baseball 
tobacco cards resonates with the Grant card. In both cases, 
people who have the cards are supposed to see masculine 
virility unrefined, physical champions of the battlefield or the 
playing field, true American heroes who embody courage, 
skill, and success. 
 Good examples of baseball cards similar to Grant’s 
tobacco card would be the previously mentioned Honus 
Wagner 1909 T 206. The Wagner card bears many similarities 
to the Grant tobacco card. Both men are in full dress, the 
uniforms spotlessly clean; anomalous for soldiers and 
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sportsmen. Grant and Wagner each wear a confident look on 
their face, almost triumphant, and their hair is well combed 
and free of blemish. While Wagner’s front jersey reads 
“Pittsburgh,” it is clear he is an ambassador for all of baseball, 
a sporting gentleman, who, like the Grant card implies, has 
the baseball talent—a corollary to Grant’s military skill—to 
win on the field without relinquishing his composure and 
purpose. 
 Baseball tobacco cards were unfaithful to the rigors 
of baseball. Like the Grant card that obscures the strains of 
military life, sports cards exude a message of confidence, of 
purpose and triumph, which overrides realism. The many 
people who opened cigar boxes to find Grant, Wagner, and 
other assorted—Babe Ruth or Ty Cobb—cards received the 
same message: these men were heroes, physical men who 
won their fame on fields, possessed of gentlemanly ideals 
worthy of emulation. However, unlike Wagner, Grant’s 
connection to the more serious business of war meant that 
the martial greatness he represented impacted, even subtly, 
American conceptions of a glorious past and exceptionalist 
future. 
 Comparing Catholic prayer cards to the Grant tobacco 
card lends understanding to how Grant became, in some 
ways, a symbol of American nationalistic secular faith. 
Prayer cards and tobacco cards are not the same thing. This 
point cannot be overstated. Devout Catholics use devotional 
cards in petitionary fashion, praying for a specific saint’s 
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intercession with God; St. Christopher for safe travels, St. 
Blaise for maladies of the throat, Sts. Lucy and Harvey for 
eye troubles. No one literally prayed for Grant’s intercession; 
however, it displays how Grant was perceived in this secular 
religion. 
 The similarity, then, between the Grant card and 
prayer cards is not spiritual but visual. Catholics who have 
a favorite saint, keeping his or her prayer card close at hand, 
develop a type of friendship with that person. The same effect 
can be said of the Grant card. People who saved the card 
as a souvenir, or boys who traded them like baseball cards, 
developed a fondness for Grant out of constant visibility; 
whether the Grant card was on a house mantle, used as a 
bookmark, or tucked into a jacket, its presence was constant, 
a quantity increased by the wide consumption of tobacco and 
easy access to the cards. 
 There is similarity in message between some Catholic 
prayer cards and the Grant card. The best example is 
Blessed Emperor Karl of Austria. In various portrayals, 
Blessed Karl, the last Hapsburg Emperor, is in full military 
dress similar to Grant. His uniform is replete with medals, 
his hair and mustache well-trimmed, and his demeanor 
calm and confident. Like Grant, the man who said “let us 
have peace,” Blessed Karl is primarily remembered for his 
desire for a peaceful end to the Great War. The message is 
the same: a confident and able military man committed to 
peace. But were saints cards are supposed to point beholders 
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towards God, the Grant tobacco card directs attention to 
American nationalism; not a religious faith, but rather a 
pseudo-religious secular faith, connecting people to a proud 
militaristic tradition and giving cause for the continuation of 
that tradition into the future. 
 The usefulness of material culture lies within the 
field’s unpacking vast meaning and depth from seemingly 
innocuous objects, here Grant’s tobacco card. The card, like all 
objects, is not just a card. Rather, it served as a lived reburial 
for Grant, removing blemishes to honor him as a singular 
military hero within America’s militaristic, nationalistic 
tradition. The wide accessibility of tobacco cards, and their 
similarity to both athletic and religious cards, ensured that 
Grant’s militaristic nationalism was widely disseminated and 
helped build a foundation of American expectionalism that 
honored the past while aiming to inspire the future. 
 As many historians have shown, Walter McDougall 
among the most recent that the militaristic and nationalistic 
values embodied in the Grant card, the overt expression 
of American exceptionalism, defined the United States’ 
twentieth century outlook.27 This approach to the world 
began with Theodore Roosevelt’s turn of the century 
imperialistic ventures, continued via Woodrow Wilson’s 
27  For viewpoints both pro and con on militaristic and nationalistic American 
exceptionalism during the twentieth century, please see McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader 
State; William Appleton Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2009); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s 
Response to War and Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); Lloyd Ambrosius, 
Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s 
Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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League of Nations charter and the founding of the United 
Nations, drove Cold War policy and has continued in recent, 
twenty-first century Middle Eastern excursions. American 
nationalistic and martial exceptionalism, writ small, can be 
read into the tiny, 3.5 by 2.25 inch, 1911 Grant tobacco card. 
Only material culture analysis, the willingness to go beyond 
documentary analysis, can find these connections. Whether a 
scholar is analyzing a tobacco card, cloth spinning, folk art or 
foodways, material culture allows the historian to go beyond 
documentary evidence. In this untapped and uncharted 
ground beyond the written record, often lies a better 
understanding of the past. 
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Communication Breakdown:
The Eisenhower Administration,        
Anthony Eden, and the Suez Crisis
David Justice
Following the Second World War (WWII), the world believed 
the United States and Great Britain had formed a bond that 
would dominate for decades. Yet not all was golden between 
the U.S. and Great Britain as they moved into 1956. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, attempted to gain influence in the Middle East and 
avoid a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union; while  
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden struggled to keep the 
once great British Empire from completely crumbling in 
his hands. While both nations had interest in new Egyptian 
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and Middle Eastern oil, they had 
opposing ideas on how to handle the situation. Eisenhower, 
Dulles, and Eden tried on three separate occasions to keep 
peace between Britain and Egypt, but all three times the U.S. 
left Britain in a terrible position. These letdowns caused Eden 
to become enraged with the U.S. and drove him into collusion 
with the French and Israelis, who were planning a violent 
attack of Egypt. After learning of British involvement in the 
attacks, Eisenhower felt betrayed by, supposedly, his closest 
ally, and commanded the United Nations-led intervention. 
Miscommunication and bitterness between Eisenhower, Eden, 
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and Dulles unintentionally concluded in the Suez Crisis.
 In order to understand how the Anglo-American 
alliance deteriorated, it is important to look at what both 
leaders wanted before the crisis. President Eisenhower’s 
biggest goal while in office was to keep the U.S. from 
entering another war. After firsthand experience in WWII 
and watching the Korean War play out, Eisenhower wanted 
the U.S. to stay peaceful, and his biggest obstruction in all of 
this was the Soviet Union. Eisenhower feared that the Soviet 
Union would launch nuclear weapons, leading the U.S. 
to launch their own nuclear weapons, and ending in total 
destruction and fallout. After viewing NSC 5602/1, which 
showed what would happen during nuclear fallout between 
the Soviets and America, Eisenhower wrote in his diary:
[T]he United States experienced practically total 
economic collapse, which could not be restored to any 
kind of operative conditions under six months to a 
year. Members of the federal government were wiped 
out and a new government had to be improvised by 
the states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated 
that something on the order of 65 percent of the 
population would require some kind of medical care 
and, in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to 
get it. … While these things were going on, the damage 
inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three 
times greater. The picture of total destruction of the 
areas of lethal fallout, of serious fallout, and of at least 
some damage from fallout, was appalling. Under such 
an attack it would be completely impossible for Russia 
to carry a war on further.1
1  Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: WW 
Norton, 1981), 311-12.
Articles 103 
This led him to try and keep the U.S. from entering any kind 
of nuclear war with the Soviets.2 
 The worst case scenario for Eisenhower and Dulles 
was for the Soviet Union to move into the Middle East and 
influence the Arab nations to join their cause. While the U.S. 
had some diplomacy with the Arab nations, Eisenhower and 
Dulles felt they needed to strengthen their relations. They 
devised one path, at the insistence of Eisenhower’s pastor 
Edward L.R. Elson, which attempted to make a connection 
through religion. From the beginning of his administration, 
Eisenhower “made a deliberate effort to reach out to the 
Islamic world” in case a problem such as this ever arose.3 
Eisenhower’s administration believed the U.S. could 
persuade the Arab nations to connect with them because 
of a shared belief in God, and fight against the Godless 
communists to keep them from spreading their views. Elson 
helped in more ways than just convincing Eisenhower, he 
was highly thought of in the Arab nations.4 He worked in the 
Middle East on several occasions, and Eisenhower felt his 
relationship with him would earn respect amongst the Arab 
nations. With both of these goals, Anthony Eden and British 
interests was nowhere to be found on the American radar.
 While Eisenhower worried about war, the Arab 
nations, and the Soviets, Eden had other issues to worry 
2  Before reading NSC 5602/1, Eisenhower and his administration had no problem 
threatening any country with the use of nuclear weapons. See Documents 1 and 2 of Chapter 
8, “Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, and Nuclear Arms,” in Major Problems in 
American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914, 7th edition.
3  William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 290. 
4  Ibid.
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over. Eden’s popularity was not a high point before the 
crisis, especially with the press who called him a “ditherer;” 
but Eden could only worry about one issue, the crumbling 
British Empire.5 The empire was “disintegrating at an 
accelerated pace” following WWII, and “the process was far 
from over.”6 Eden was born into the “empire when England 
was supreme around the globe,” which was ten days before 
Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, “a high point of the 
British empire.”7 He had only known the greatness of the 
British Empire, and witnessed how two destructive wars 
and a global rise of nationalism were putting the empire in 
jeopardy.8 Eden hoped that if the British Empire did fall apart, 
it would not happen during his tenure as prime minister. 
Yet, there was a definite rise in resentment among the British 
about the sudden ascension of America around the world. As 
British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd said, “The Americans 
were, on the face of it, loyal and dependable allies but 
underneath there was … a pleased smile, only half concealed, 
at seeing us go down.”9
 Regardless of where they stood on the scale of global 
power, both Britain and the U.S. agreed on two issues, but 
disagreed on how to handle these issues. The first was the 
sudden rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. While the 
U.S. attempted to gain influence in the Middle East, Nasser 
5  “Sir A. Eden ‘A Ditherer’” Times (London), 10 October 1955.
6  Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes American into the Middle East (New York: 
Linden Press, 1981), 18.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., 19.
9  Quoted in Ibid.
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rose to power and preached for Arab nations to unite. He 
wanted Egypt “in the forefront of the effort to create a global 
‘third force’ that would be independent of the two Cold War 
blocs.”10 Eisenhower and Dulles felt that in order to continue 
gaining ground in the Middle East; they must support Nasser, 
even if his motives were against theirs. They also attempted 
to persuade Nasser to join their side because of a recent 
weapons deal that had “caught Washington by surprise.”11 
The last thing Eisenhower and Dulles needed was for Nasser 
to fall into the arms of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, 
Eden and Britain wanted to remove Nasser from power. The 
Egyptians already resented the presence of British troops, 
and Nasser led the charge to remove them from the region.12 
Eden’s worst fear was for Nasser to nationalize the Suez 
Canal, which would be detrimental to not only the empire but 
Britain itself.
 Oil security was the second issue the U.S. and Britain 
cared about, but could not come together on how to resolve 
the situation. If Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Eden felt 
Egypt would be prejudice by not allowing British ships to 
use the canal to transport oil.13 Eden could not let this happen 
to British industries, which relied heavily upon oil from the 
Middle East to keep their businesses running.14 He felt he had 
to remove Nasser before any of these events were to transpire. 
10  Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 687.
11  Ibid., 689.
12  Neff, 69.
13  David Carlton, “Suez Crisis (1956)” in Twentieth Century Britain: An Encyclopedia, ed. Fred 
M. Leventhal (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 521-22.
14  Ibid.
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The U.S., on the other hand, was interested in the oil of the 
Middle East, but they were nowhere near as interested as the 
British. While the U.S. was not dependent upon the Middle 
East to supply them with oil, “American oil companies 
already had a substantial and increasing share in the area’s 
oil production.”15 Ultimately, Eisenhower’s main interest in 
Middle Eastern oil revolved around the Soviet Union. If they 
were to become involved, possibly by influence of Nasser 
and his Arab nation following, they would have control 
over oil that was being used to assist in “economic recovery 
of Western Europe,” something Eisenhower attempted to 
avoid.16
 In the midst of discussion of these issues, an 
underlining tension existed between the two nations 
involving decolonization. The U.S. was “staking out its own 
self-interested position in the world, at times unavoidably at 
odds with Britain,” which helped hasten the decolonization 
process.17 On October 1, 1956, John Foster Dulles delivered a 
speech to the press regarding British colonialism, saying that 
the U.S. “cannot be expected to identify itself 100 percent … 
with the colonial powers” involved with the Suez Crisis.18 
Eden knew many Americans, including Eisenhower, shared 
Dulles’s opinions regarding British colonialism. In his 
memoirs, Eden wondered if the U.S. and the Eisenhower 
15  M.A. Fitzsimons, “The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy” in The Review of Politics 
19, No. 4 (October 1957): 429.
16  Ibid.
17  Neff, 19. 
18  Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 
556.
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administration would have acted any differently if the tables 
were turned, and the citizens of Panama led an uprising 
and threatened to nationalize the Panama Canal.19 With 
the tensions between the two nations beginning to rise, it 
only took a few incidents to sour Anglo-American relations. 
The drama involving the Baghdad Pact, the building of the 
Aswan Dam, and the misleading correspondence of the first 
London Conference eventually led Eden to feel exasperated, 
and exclude the Americans from his plans involving the Suez 
Canal.
 In the early months of 1956, the U.S. and Britain were 
on the same page involving a pact to keep the Soviet Union 
from entering the Middle East. Eventually titled the Baghdad 
Pact, this agreement initially involved the U.S., Britain, Iran, 
Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Dulles decided to send the pact 
to Egypt in the hopes of getting Nasser to join their side. 
However, Nasser “balked at joining the pact, which he saw 
as an effort to perpetuate Western colonialism.”20 Once Dulles 
learned of Nasser’s opinion, he removed the U.S. from the 
pact and was “prepared to give it ‘moral support.’”21  This 
left Eden and Britain as the only western power involved 
and made Britain’s already unstable relations with Nasser 
and Egypt even worse. Eden was incensed at Dulles for the 
predicament he had placed Britain in, and for not explaining 
the U.S.’ sudden withdrawal from the pact in a face to face 
meeting. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, “In recent years the 
19  Ibid., 557.
20  Smith, 687.
21  Eden, 374.
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United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind 
its friends in the hope of being popular with their foes. 
The practical consequences of this uncertain diplomacy are 
illustrated by United States treatment of the Baghdad Pact.”22 
What angered Eden even more was how the U.S. portrayed 
their role in the pact to representatives in Cairo, as if they had 
not been involved from the beginning.23
 The dealings of the Aswan Dam began a year before 
the actual Suez Crisis. In September of 1955, “Nasser 
formally announced the acquisition of Soviet arms from 
Czechoslovakia.”24 Following this acquisition, rumors 
circulated that Nasser was negotiating for the Russians to 
fund the building of the Aswan High Dam.25  At this point, 
Eisenhower and Dulles knew that if they wanted to remain 
friendly with the Arab nations and keep the Soviets out of the 
Middle East, they would have to outbid the Soviets in Egypt. 
They approached Britain and the World Bank in order to 
finance the construction of the dam and secretly tried to work 
a deal with “Egypt and Israel to come to terms with each 
other and live in peace.”26 As Eisenhower wrote in his diary, 
Nasser immediately did two things that made him and Dulles 
question the deal:
(1) They sent back to us a whole list of conditions that 
22  Ibid., 374-75.
23  Ibid., 375.
24  Smith, 689.
25  The Aswan High Dam was to be built further up the Nile from the original Aswan Dam. 
This new dam would control floods, provide water for irrigation, and generate electricity for 
Egypt’s rising industrialization.
26  Neff, 123.
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would have to be met before they would go along 
with this plan, and some of these conditions were 
unacceptable. (2) They began to build up their military 
forces by taking over equipment provided by the 
Soviets, and they went to such an extent that we did 
not believe they would have a sufficient balance of 
resources left to do their part in building the dam. We 
lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.27
Unfortunately, Eisenhower and Dulles did not consult Eden 
about ending the deal, misleading him for several weeks. On 
July 19, 1956, Dulles let the Egyptian ambassador know the 
deal was off and the loan from the World Bank expired, which 
was the first Eden heard of this. As Eden wrote, “We were 
sorry that the matter was carried through so abruptly because 
it gave our two countries no chance to concert either timing 
or methods.”28 One week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal in order to finance the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam.
 Anthony Eden’s worst nightmare came true, and 
it arrived, inadvertently, at the hands of Eisenhower and 
Dulles. Members of both British and American governments 
pushed for Eden to approach the Security Council of the 
United Nations to have sanctions brought on Nasser, but he 
felt it would be useless. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, “The 
precedents were discouraging. … The Russians, who were 
the armers and backers of Colonel Nasser, had the power 
of veto in the Council and would not hesitate to use it.”29 
27  Eisenhower, Eisenhower Diaries, 330.
28  Eden, 470.
29  Ibid., 475.
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Almost a month after the nationalization occurred, both 
Eisenhower and Dulles approached Eden to hold a conference 
in London with representatives of country members of the 
1888 Convention to discuss how Nasser had violated the 
treaty.30 The Eisenhower administration was not aware Eden 
was moving towards collusion “born of a marriage between 
[his] anti-Nasser policy and the unwritten anti-Nasser alliance 
of France and Israel.”31 After the nationalization, the U.S. 
questioned their relations with Nasser, and Eden hoped that 
with the conference, they would join his side and together 
remove Nasser. When the conference began in late August 
1956, a solution for international operation of the canal was 
pronounced; and was sent to Nasser, who chose not to attend 
the conference. The committee officially sent Robert Menzies, 
the Prime Minister of Australia, to “put the demand for an 
international authority to Nasser—not to negotiate, simply to 
demand.”32 Throughout the London Conference, Dulles gave 
Eden the impression that Eisenhower and the U.S. would “be 
prepared to use force if all else failed.”33 Eden had very high 
hopes, based on the impressions he got from Dulles, because 
he knew that the Menzies Mission was doomed from the start.
30  The 1888 Convention, also called the Convention of Constantinople, was a treaty 
regarding passage through the Suez Canal. At the time, it guaranteed passage of all ships 
through the canal during wartime and peacetime. It was signed by the royal figures of the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, as well 
as the Emperor of the Ottoman Empire and the President of France. The countries that sent 
representatives to the London Conference consisted of: Australia, Britain, Ceylon, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Persia, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the United States. See Neff, Warriors at Suez, 296. 
31  Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 433.
32  Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: 
MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), 218.
33  Winthrop W. Aldrich, “The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History.” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 
(April 1967): 543.
Articles 111 
 A week after the conference, President Eisenhower 
began a correspondence with Prime Minister Eden to discuss 
the Nasser issue. Unfortunately for Eden, it was not what he 
wanted to hear. As Eisenhower wrote on September 2,
I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our 
views on this situation diverge. As to the use of force 
or the threat of force at this juncture. … Even now 
military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed 
to public view seem to be solidifying support for 
Nasser which has been shaky in many import quarters. 
I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed 
solidly together to the solution of this problem, public 
opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming 
in its support. … I really do not see how a successful 
result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of 
force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of 
jeopardy.34
Eden responded by explaining parallels between Nasser 
and Hitler’s tactics in WWII. Also, Eden hoped to “bring 
the Americans into line by parading the Communist bogy,” 
and detailing Soviet involvement with Egypt.35 He sent the 
following retort on September 6, one day before Menzies 
would be rejected by Nasser:
Similarly the seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are 
convinced, the opening gambit in a planned campaign 
designed by Nasser to expel all Western influence 
and interest from Arab countries. He believes that if 
he can get away with this, and if he can successfully 
defy eighteen nations, his prestige in Arabia will be 
so great that he will be able to mount revolutions of 
34  Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Presidency: The Middle Way, vol, 17 of The Papers of Dwight 
David Eisenhower, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van EE (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University, 1996), 2264.
35  Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 
Inc., 1967),  69.
112 Articles 
young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. 
… These new governments will in effect be Egyptian 
satellites if not Russian ones.36
Eden hoped this would be enough to persuade Eisenhower 
that Nasser would plunge the world into war and back 
whatever Britain’s next plans were. Eisenhower sent a 
response the day after Menzies failed to convert Nasser: 
The use of military force against Egypt under present 
circumstances might have consequences even more 
serious than causing the Arabs to support Nasser. 
It might cause a serious misunderstanding between 
our two countries because I must say frankly that 
there is as yet no public opinion in this country which 
is prepare to support such a move, and the most 
significant public opinion that there is seems to think 
that the United Nations was formed to prevent this 
very thing.37
With the combination of the Baghdad Pact, Aswan Dam, 
the failure of the London Conference, and the subsequent 
correspondence with Eisenhower, Eden felt he had enough 
motives to abandon the U.S. and move into collusion with 
France and Israel.
 The new alliance had already devised a plan to deal 
with Egypt. The strategy involved Israel instigating a fight 
on the Suez Canal, leading Nasser to retaliate, and Britain 
and France entering the fight to protect their assets. With this 
new association, Eden wanted to keep Eisenhower and Dulles 
out of the loop. As Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for 
36  Eden, 519-520.
37  Eisenhower, The Middle Way, 2275.
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Foreign Affairs, articulated Eden took “the most elaborate 
precautions” in order to keep his allies, especially the U.S., 
from learning of his new association.38 As the Crisis exploded 
in late October, the British government was appalled at Eden’s 
decision and asked why the Americans were not involved. 
Eden’s response on October 31 explains why the U.S. had no 
involvement with the Crisis:
It is obvious truth that safety of transit through the 
canal, though clearly of concern to the United States, 
is for them not a matter of survival as it is to us and, 
indeed, to all Europe, and many other lands. … Of 
course that is true. We must all accept it, and we 
should not complain about it, but it is equally true that 
throughout all these months this fact has inevitably 
influenced the attitude of the United States to these 
problems, as compared to that of ourselves and France.
 If anyone says that on account we should have 
held up action until agreement could be reached with 
the United States as to what to do, I can only say 
that this would have been to ignore what everyone 
here and in the United States knows to have been 
different approaches to some of these vital Middle 
East questions. They know it. We know it. Of course, 
we deplore it, but I do not think that it can carry with 
it this corollary, that we must in all circumstances 
secure agreement from our American ally before we 
can act ourselves in what we know to be our own vital 
interests.39
However, what Eden had not thought of nor prepared for was 
the “prompt and thoroughgoing [of] an American effort to 
halt the attack before it had succeeded.”40 
38  Nutting, 110. 
39  Eden, 595-596.
40  Leon D. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1964), 36.
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 While the collusion formed behind their backs, Dulles 
heard rumors regarding British secret action on the Suez 
Canal. These rumors worried the U.S., and forced Dulles to 
call for a second London Conference, where he formed the 
Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). Similar to the first 
London Conference, the SCUA hoped to motivate users of the 
Suez Canal to remove Nasser’s hand and reclaim control of 
the canal. Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet saw 
this new union as a “Trojan Horse:” send a ship through the 
canal, let it be denied by Nasser, charge Egypt with violating 
the 1888 convention, and take violent actions.41 After realizing 
that Eden took his plan and twisted it in a different direction, 
Dulles took to the press to mention that the SCUA would 
not condone any use of force whatsoever.42 After reading the 
transcript of Dulles’ comments, Eden was angered and flung 
the paper at Nutting, who happened to be at 10 Downing 
Street when Eden received the transcript.43 The Americans 
had blocked Eden again from his plans for the Suez Canal.
 On October 29, Israeli forces began the invasion of 
Egypt, and the following day Britain and France issued 
ultimatums to Egypt and Israel to cease fighting at once. 
When the demands were not answered, Britain and France 
began bombing. Eisenhower—who was on the final stretch of 
his reelection campaign and dealing with a revolution against 
the Soviet Union in Hungary—learned of Israel’s invasion 
and knew it was only a matter of time before his closest 
41  Childers, 223-224.
42  Neff, 320.
43  Nutting, 70.
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ally began to impose his will on Nasser. In a conversation 
with Dulles, Eisenhower shouted, “Foster, you tell them, 
Goddamnit, that we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going 
to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there 
is so we can stop this thing.”44 The U.S. officially spearheaded 
the United Nations intervention in Egypt when Dulles 
submitted the cease-fire resolutions on November 1.45 
 The three nations ignored the cease-fire, and 
Eisenhower realized he needed something more and decided 
oil was the proper way to go. On the same day Dulles 
submitted the cease-fire proposal, a Syrian Army destroyed 
pipelines and pumping stations carrying Iraqi oil to the 
Mediterranean.46 Eisenhower understood that Britain would 
be desperate for oil because of this loss, and elected to cut 
them off from American oil. After speaking with Defense 
Mobilization Director Arthur Flemming, he decided that 
“those who began this operation should be left to work out 
their own oil problems—to boil in their own oil.”47 Britain 
was in a bind, as Nutting explained, “In the previous two 
months a run on the pound in the world’s financial markets 
threatened seriously to deplete Britain’s dollar reserves. 
Without credits from the United States, we should therefore 
be unable to buy the oil we needed.”48 Having to begin 
rationing oil for the first time since WWII, Eden accepted the 
cease-fire and removed British troops from Egypt. Once this 
44  Quoted in Smith, 697.
45  Ibid., 698.
46  Ibid.
47  Quoted in Ibid., 697.
48  Nutting, 133. 
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happened, Eisenhower began to sell oil to Britain.49 
 Following the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis, 
Eisenhower and the U.S. capitalized on their aspirations 
for the Middle East from before the crisis. After Britain and 
France removed themselves, they left a power vacuum in 
the region and Eisenhower seized the position.50 Eisenhower 
wrote three measures and ways to appease both Egypt and 
Israel in order to expel Soviet influence from the area:
Measures to be taken under these elements would be: 
(1) rapid restoration of pipeline and canal operation. 
This might have to be done almost wholly by 
American technical groups, but I should think that 
we might also mobilize some people from Germany 
and Italy. This work should begin instantly. (2) Push 
negotiations under the United Nations so as to prevent 
renewed outbreak of difficulty; and (3) provide to the 
area, wherever necessary, surplus foods, and so on, to 
prevent suffering. … We must make certain that every 
weak country understand what can be in store for it 
once it falls under the domination of the Soviets. … For 
example, we can provide Egypt with an agreed upon 
amount of arms—sufficient to maintain internal order 
and a reasonable defense of its borders, in return for 
an agreement that it will never accept any Soviet offer. 
… We could make some kind of arms agreement—
particularly maintenance and training—with Israel of 
exactly the same type we would make with Egypt.51
These measures and ideas gave credence to a doctrine he 
was working on to be presented to the U.S. Congress a 
few months later. The Eisenhower Doctrine stated that any 
country in need of economic or military assistance following 
49  Ibid., 156.
50  Childers, 306.
51  Eisenhower, Eisenhower Diaries, 334.
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the attack from another nation could approach the U.S. for 
help. Eisenhower also kept his desire to connect religiously 
with the Arab nations alive through the doctrine. Months after 
the conception of the doctrine, Eisenhower gave an address 
at the dedication of the new Islamic Center in Washington, 
where he called for “the peaceful progress of all men under 
one God,” essentially saying that regardless of religious 
differences, we can be allies.52
 While Eisenhower turned the Suez Crisis into a success 
for the U.S., Eden took a beating in Britain. Public opinion of 
the Prime Minister was already rocky, and during the Suez 
Crisis opinions plummeted. Many members of Parliament 
and newspapers called for the resignation of Eden.53 They 
received their wish a few months after the crisis; Eden 
announced his resignation suddenly in early January. Eden 
said, in great sorrow, that “the life at Westminster in these 
days is a strenuous one, for which I clearly have not the 
present health.”54 He left in “ill-health aggravated by the 
bitter national controversy and the dissensions in his own 
party arising from the Government’s decision on armed 
intervention in Egypt.”55 Anglo-American relations remained 
strained after the resignation of Eden; however, in February of 
1957, Eisenhower allowed “informal talks” between himself 
and new Secretary of State for Defense, Duncan Sandys, the 
first talks between America and Britain “after the strained 
52  Inboden, 291.
53  “Prime Minister Must Resign” Times (London), 5 November, 1956.
54  “Sir A. Eden to Resign as M.P.” Times (London), 12 January, 1957.
55  “Successor Not Yet Chosen” Times (London), 10 January, 1957.
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atmosphere of the Suez Crisis.”56 
 The underlying theme of Anglo-American relations 
during the Suez Crisis was betrayal, and the supposed 
indestructible bond between the U.S. and Britain was 
strained. Both leaders had different desires for how to handle 
the growing issues in the Middle East, which led them to 
misrepresent and miscommunicate their goals. President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles had distorted their 
interests to Prime Minister Eden on more than one occasion, 
which led Eden to keep the collusion with France and Israel 
a secret from the U.S. Both leaders felt the other had betrayed 
their trust by false representation of their true intentions with 
the Middle East. The Suez Crisis was inadvertently born and 
grew out of miscommunication and resentment between 
Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden.




The American Response to the 
Death of Joseph Stalin
John Clinton Harris
At 6:30 PM, March 1, 1953, Joseph Stalin suffered a cerebral 
hemorrhage in his Kuntsevo Dacha. The night before, he had 
been awake with his inner circle, drinking until four in the 
morning, an awesome figure at the pinnacle of his power; 
twelve hours later, he was lying prostrate on his floor, unable 
to move or communicate. So terrified were the guards of the 
“Man of Steel” that they waited over four hours before they 
discovered his helpless condition. Five hours passed after 
the guards called two of Stalin’s most powerful advisers, 
Lavrenti Beria and Georgi Malenkov, before they finally 
arrived. After appraising Stalin’s condition, Beria told the 
guards, “The Boss is obviously sleeping peacefully. … Don’t 
bother us, don’t cause a panic, and don’t disturb Comrade 
Stalin!”1 The actions of Beria and Malenkov, as well as their 
colleagues Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, over the 
next few hours are lost to history, but Simon Sebag Montefiore 
speculates that “the Four had those hours to divide power. 
The decision to do nothing suited everyone. Beria and 
Malenkov … were legally in charge until a full meeting of 
the Politburo and then of the Central Committee. If Stalin 
1  Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 2000), 640.
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were dying, they needed time to tie up power. Possibly for 
the same reasons, it was in the interests of Khrushchev and 
Bulganin to delay medical help until they had protected 
their position.”2 Fear and power would prove to be the chief 
motivations of the men closest to Stalin as he lay dying; only 
after they were reasonably certain that he would not survive 
did they allow him medical attention.3
 By the time Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the 
four men had largely determined how the succession of 
power would take place—although this was by no means 
an arrangement satisfactory to all involved. From the start, 
Beria and Malenkov controlled the process, though Beria was 
unsuitable to assume Stalin’s position due to his Georgian 
nationality as well as his reputation for atrocity as the head 
of Stalin’s secret police. The evidence suggests that Beria and 
Malenkov had probably already come to an understanding 
that Beria would reconsolidate his power over the police 
forces if he backed Malenkov as head of state; before the Red 
Czar was even gone, the plan was already moving into action. 
Montefiore describes the scene: 
An official meeting of the whole regime, three hundred 
senior officials, was set for that evening. Now the 
magnates gathered informally … to form the new 
government. Beria and his ‘billygoat’ Malenkov had 
prearranged the ‘collective leadership,’ taking turns 
proposing the appointments. … Khrushchev remained 
one of the senior Secretaries but he was excluded from 
the government. Beria was dominant, reuniting the 
MVD and MGB while remaining First Deputy Premier. 
2  Ibid.
3  Ibid., 636-640.
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Malenkov succeeded to both Stalin’s posts of Premier 
and Secretary.4 
Such is the legacy of an inhuman dictator; there would be 
few eulogies for Comrade Stalin from those who knew 
him, inside or outside of the Soviet Union. In the United 
States, there were certainly very few tears shed for the man 
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had affectionately 
nicknamed “Uncle Joe;” both the new President, Dwight D. 
Eisehower, and the media scrambled for scant information, 
struggling to make sense of the new era of leadership in the 
Soviet Union and how a new Soviet government would affect 
the American people. 
 The newly elected Eisenhower had been in office fewer 
than fifty days, had no rapport with Stalin in a presidential 
capacity, and his prior experiences with him had certainly not 
borne any affectionate nicknames. Eisenhower’s 1945 visit to 
the Soviet Union had not left him with a positive impression 
of Stalin, whom he described anecdotally in his memoirs:
We watched a Soviet picture on the capture of Berlin, 
featuring my old friend Marshal Zhukov with ranks 
of medals glittering on his best dress uniform. At 
the movie Stalin sat between Zhukov and me. At 
one point, I leaned over and said to our interpreter, 
who was seated directly behind Stalin, “Tell Marshal 
Zhukov that if he ever loses his job in the Soviet Union 
he can, on the evidence of this picture, surely get one 
in Hollywood.” Stalin listened to the translation in 
silence. “Marshal Zhukov,” he informed me in a flat 
tone, “will never be without a job in the Soviet Union.” 
Now, more than seven years later, I doubted whether 
much that was productive could come out of a meeting 
4 Ibid, 647.
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with such a man.5
Before President Eisenhower was informed of Stalin’s 
likely imminent demise, he had—despite his personal 
reservations regarding the likelihood of success—responded 
to a journalist’s question as to whether or not he would 
meet accept Stalin’s overtures for a meeting. The President 
responded that he would “meet anybody, anywhere, where 
I thought there was the slightest chance of doing any good, 
as long as it was in keeping with what the American people 
expect of their Chief Executive.”6 Clearly, Eisenhower did 
not like the idea of interacting with Stalin, but was willing to 
accept it as a necessary evil. 
 A week after his public statement about a meeting with 
Stalin, the dictator fell mortally ill. An awkward vigil now 
surrounded the expiring dictator. Eisenhower’s first remark 
to his staff after learning of Stalin’s condition was not one 
of sympathy for the Red Czar, but a simple inquiry as to the 
most practical political response to his likely death. With the 
aid of C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President and 
chief adviser on psychological strategy, the following press 
statement was released before lunchtime:
At this moment in history when multitudes of 
Russians are anxiously concerned because of the illness 
of the Soviet ruler the thoughts of all the American 
people go out to all the people of the U.S.S.R.—the 
men and women, the boys and girls—in the villages, 
5  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years 1953-1956 (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., 1963), 143.
6  Ibid.
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cities, farms, and factories of their homeland.
 They are the children of the same God who 
is the Father of all peoples everywhere. And like all 
peoples, Russia’s millions share our longing for a 
friendly and peaceful world.
 Regardless of the identity of government 
personalities the prayer of us Americans continues 
to be that the Almighty will watch over the people 
of that vast country and bring them, in His wisdom, 
opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men 
and women dwell in peace and companionship.7
According to Robert J. Donovan, “The statement, in effect, 
was an appeal to the new rulers of Russia, whoever they 
might be, to keep the peace.”8 More noteworthy however, 
was the explicit lack of sympathy for the Soviet ruler himself. 
After learning of Stalin’s death, Eisenhower issued a message 
directly to those government personalities, “The Government 
of the United States tenders its official condolences to the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the death of Generalissimo Josef Stalin, Prime Minister of 
the Soviet Union.”9 Again, Eisenhower’s remarks were 
directed at the living; he had purposefully omitted any 
formal declaration of sympathy to Stalin. The following day, 
the President discussed the new situation with his cabinet. 
Secretary Lodge asserted that the Soviet Union’s United 
Nations officials were uneasy, and advised a careful approach 
on the part of the United States. The President also took 
the opportunity to chastise the State Department for what 





appeared to be no cohesive plan for what to do in the event 
of Stalin’s death. Stalin’s legend had loomed so large for so 
long that even his greatest ideological foe had not been able to 
imagine a world without him.10
 For many opponents of communism, including the 
President, the death of Stalin was seen as fortuitous. In a letter 
dated March 10, 1953 to financier Bernard Mannes Baruch, 
Eisenhower advanced the idea that with Stalin no longer 
standing in the way of allowing independent inspectors into 
the Soviet Union, a legitimate nuclear disarmament program 
might be possible, “An opportune moment not only by reason 
of Stalin’s death, but because we here have been earnestly 
seeking for a dramatic approach to this whole question of 
peace and disarmament.”11 In Cable 6047 written on March 11, 
1953 to Winston Churchill, Eisenhower replied to a question 
from the English Prime Minister over how the West should 
approach this new Soviet government. Like his public press 
releases, there is no mention of sympathy for Stalin, or even 
condolences to Churchill, who had known the Generalissimo 
throughout the tumultuous World War II years. Eisenhower’s 
purposeful lack of sympathy in his communique to the 
Russian people, and their government, was not merely careful 
diplomacy; the President obviously felt that a deceased Stalin 
was no great loss.12
 Eisenhower was correct in his alarm at the lack of 
10 Ibid, 41-42.
11 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Presidency: The Middle Way, vol. 14 of  The Papers Of Dwight 
David Eisenhower, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van EE (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University, 1996), 90.
12  Ibid, 90-93.
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information within the State Department for interaction 
with a post-Stalinist Soviet Union; in effect, this lack of hard 
intelligence and strategic planning resulted in executive 
paralysis. Without being able to examine probable outcomes, 
the President had few viable options. It is not surprising that 
the Eisenhower administration’s attempts to take advantage 
of the situation, without the benefit of professional predictive 
insights—either from the State Department or within the 
White House itself—produced few useful results.  Avoiding 
action based on vague predictions and adopting a “wait 
and see” posture was perhaps the wiser course as President 
Eisenhower could not afford to be wrong, as could the myriad 
predictive voices in the press.
 One of the first national periodicals to cover the death 
of Stalin was the New York Times.  On March 6, 1953, the 
headline screamed “STALIN DIES AFTER 29-YEAR RULE; 
HIS SUCCESSOR NOT ANNOUNCED; U.S. WATCHFUL, 
EISENHOWER SAYS.”13 Harry Schwartz began his article 
with a dire forecast for the Soviet government, “Premier 
Stalin’s death may result in an explosive resolution of 
the major tensions now repressed in the Soviet Union.”14 
Schwartz based that assessment on the wording of 
propaganda found in Pravda, the state run Soviet newspaper, 
in particular the phrases “monolithic unity,” “vigilance,” 
and “unity;” Schwartz believed these phrases indicated 
weakness in the legitimacy of the new Soviet government 
13  “Stalin Dies After 29-Year Rule,” New York Times, March 6, 1953.
14  Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Fear of an Eruption Discerned in Call for Unity,” New York 
Times, March 6, 1953.
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and that such terms were being bandied about in order to 
shore up the succession.15 The following day, the Times posted 
an equally loud headline announcing the official successor, 
Georgi Malenkov.16 The front page article by Harrison E. 
Salisbury differs greatly from the previous day’s prediction 
by Schwartz, and may indicate that the Times was already 
revising its predictions as more information came out of the 
U.S.S.R.. Thus, Salisbury described Malenkov and his newly 
formed inner circle:
Standing beside him [Malenkov] in the chief and 
most responsible posts of Government and party in 
this reorganized structure are four veteran Soviet 
leaders and co-workers of Stalin- Lavrenti P. Beria, 
Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Nikolai A. Bulganin and 
Lazar M. Kaganovich. Those four became the First 
Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and 
with Mr. Malenkov constitute its Presidium…. The 
chief impression given by the Government both in 
tonight’s announcement and in the proclamation of 
Stalin’s death was one of firmness and the highest 
political vigilance, a sense of rallying together of party 
and government forces to withstand any threats from 
within or without. The Government was acting with 
the greatest resolution and with marked vigor. Mr. 
Malenkov lost no time in demonstrating his will and 
determination to prove a worthy custodian of the 
policies of monolithic unity and steel resolution that 
marked the leadership of Stalin.17 
Although much of his report contained terms used by the new 
Soviet Government, such as “monolithic unity,” Salisbury 
clearly felt that the issue of succession was settled, which 
15  Ibid.
16  “Malenkov is named new Soviet Premier,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
17  “Four to Help Rule,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
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would therefore make further predictions on the internal 
Soviet turmoil unnecessary as well as incorrect. However, 
many of his fellow newspapermen, like Harry Schwartz, did 
not share that view. 
 On the same day as Salisbury’s article, the New York 
Times printed the editorial reaction from many of the nation’s 
leading newspapers, which ranged from venerate eulogy 
to tasteless gloating, especially among politically oriented 
publications. The Daily Worker announced, “Humanity has 
lost the greatest man of our time. … As humanity bids him 
farewell, his vision of peace, democracy, socialism and finally 
communism will grow brighter with generations.”18 On the 
opposite side of the political spectrum, The Chicago Tribune 
trumpeted, “For a dozen years and more, Stalin’s death 
has been eagerly awaited by all decent men everywhere, 
including Russia. Now that it has happened, rejoicing will be 
tempered only by the thought that Malenkov, his successor, 
will prove to be another such brute, possibly even worse 
degraded.”19
 There were also predictive responses among the 
editorials, ranging from the hopeful to the pessimistic. The 
Chattanooga Times was sanguine, “However violent the 
aftermath of Stalin’s passing may be in Russia and however 
bloody the period of transition may be, Russia may have 
leaders who can understand the Western mentality. With such 
18  “Greatest Man of Our Time,” Daily Worker, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. 
Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
19  “Rejoicing is Tempered,” Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. 
Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
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people we might eventually deal.”20 The Seattle Times was far 
more negative, “It would be the sheerest wishful thinking 
to believe that Stalin’s departure from the scene will halt the 
Red design to communize the world.”21  The Hartford Courant 
issued a moderate assessment of the future for post-Stalin 
U.S.-Soviet relations, “The interregnum in Moscow that has 
already begun may grant us temporary relaxation in the cold 
war. But we know that the great struggle of the twentieth 
century still goes on, and will go on, as relentlessly as ever.”22 
Media opinion varied in terms of both subjectivity and 
intensity, from Hartford Courant’s careful moderation to the 
Seattle Times’s hyperbole. 
 The national news magazines did not publish Stalin’s 
death until March 16, in concert with their weekly news cycle; 
their reactions were uniformly unsympathetic. Time, in its 
cover story within the National Affairs column remarked, 
“Joseph Stalin was liquidated last week by the common fate 
of all men. The event was so big that only the simplest words 
could form his epitaph: he was the most powerful man of his 
time—the most feared and hated.”23  Newsweek commented, 
“The Russian people somehow found it in their hearts to pray 
for Stalin, to pray in dim, neglected churches for a soul the 
great man had been quite sure he did not possess.”24 Edward 
20  “An Optimistic View,” Chattanooga Times, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. 
Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
21  “Warns on Wishful Thinking,” Seattle Times, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. 
Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
22  “Cold War Unaffected,” Hartford Courant, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. 
Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” New York Times, March 7, 1953.
23  “National Affairs,” Time, March 16, 1953, 29.
24  “World Watching for First Move by New Red Chiefs,” Newsweek, March 16, 1953, 21.
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Crankshaw, contributing to Life, observed, “Stalin lay dying 
in the palace of the czars, prostrate and unconscious, the real 
and also the symbolic center of a fantastic web of plots and 
counterplots reaching out from the anterooms of the Kremlin 
to the remotest corners of his empire. … This was in the 
Russian tradition of the harsh and arbitrary despotism which 
fears the light of day.”25 Perhaps due to a larger readership 
aggregate with more diverse opinion, as well as the greater 
amount of time the newsmagazines had to appraise the 
ramifications of Stalin’s death, the opinions of Time, Newsweek, 
and Life are far more in concert than those published by the 
dailies almost a week earlier, in terms of both politics and 
intensity.
 Americans were far more concerned with the outcome 
of the Red succession than with the pomp and grandiosity of 
Stalin’s state funeral. Even before the New York Times knew 
that Stalin had finally died, the paper printed an Associated 
Press article with predictions from two former Ambassadors 
to Moscow, General Walter Bedell Smith and William C. 
Bullitt. General Smith predicted a triumvirate arrangement, 
with power divided between Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria. 
Bullitt, whose opinion was taken to augment Gen. Smith’s 
assessment, believed that a triumvirate arrangement was 
possible, but would be a temporary arrangement at best, and 
that the U.S.S.R. would “tread softly” during this uncertainty; 
Bullitt did, however, agree with Gen. Smith on who would 
25  Edward Crankshaw, “False God Dies, Crisis is Born,” Life, March 16, 1953, 20.
130 Articles 
constitute such a triumvirate.26 The following day, in a front 
page article of the New York Times predicting the rise of 
Malenkov to Stalin’s position, Schwartz observed that “the 
fact that Moscow has announced that Nikita S. Khrushchev 
will head the committee preparing Stalin’s funeral also seems 
significant. Mr. Khrushchev’s rise to a central leading position 
in recent years has coincided with the similar and greater rise 
of Mr. Malenkov’s fortunes in the same period.”27 Schwartz’s 
article is unique in that it not only named Khrushchev, a 
figure who did not rate mention in the vast majority of post-
Stalin forecasts, but does not reference any other Soviet 
political figure other than Malenkov.28
 Writing for Newsweek in a column entitled, “Human 
Nature, Rex,” Raymond Moley asserted that the U.S.S.R. 
would almost certainly become a victim of its own size; 
without a Stalin, it would spin apart like a broken centrifuge. 
For Moley, the worry was not what the new leaders will do 
next, or even who they will be; he saw the imminent breakup 
of the Soviet Union, writing, “Surely we must not count on 
a more peaceful world. The convulsions of this sick giant 
will be extremely perilous. But it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that we are witnessing the beginning of the end.”29 
Moley, unlike many of his colleagues, underestimated the 
strength of the totalitarian system Stalin had spent his life 
perfecting. There were other prognostications to be found in 
26  “3-Man Rule Predicted By Smith,” New York Times, March 5, 1953.
27  “Soviet Fear of an Eruption Discerned in Call for Unity,” New York Times, March 6, 1953.
28  Ibid. 
29  Raymond Moley, “Human Nature, Rex,” Newsweek, March 16, 1953, 108.
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Newsweek, the most important of which may have been the 
admonition, “Watch the Soviet Army. Watch Marshal Georgi 
Zhukov.” This warning came from an interview with Marshal 
Tito, Communist boss of Yugoslavia, who was quoted as 
saying, “Malenkov can never rally the Communist Party or 
the Soviet people. He has no bark. Molotov has no backing. 
Beria is a simple thug. Watch for Marshal Zhukov and the 
army to lead a struggle against the politicians.”30 Despite this 
potential coup forecast from someone who knew the Soviet 
government intimately through bitter experience, Newsweek 
would in the same article suggest that no internal political 
power struggle appeared imminent and that President 
Eisenhower should invite Malenkov to the same meeting that 
Stalin had tried to initiate.31
 An opposite fear, held by Time, was that the new 
dictator might inadvertently create World War III by trying 
to consolidate his power at home through hard line policies 
towards the West. According to the article, Malenkov would 
“until he establishes himself in divinity … feel compelled 
to act with such rigidity as to get himself into disastrous 
situations.”32 Time did not believe that a political power 
scramble was imminent, despite the acknowledgement of 
its possibility; however, Marshal Zhukov and the Red Army 
were recognized as a potentially destabilizing force. In a 
prediction that contained more American flavor than Russian, 
Time summarized the possibility of a political endgame in the 
30  “Signifcance: Zhukov, Red Army Gain in Influence,” Newsweek, March 16, 1953, 23.
31  Ibid.
32  “Death In The Kremlin,” Time, March 16, 1953, 35.
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Soviet Union circumspectly, “Russia’s top leaders probably 
now have the feeling that they must hang together lest they 
hang separately. That feeling could last for months or years.”33 
It would only be months before Time’s predicted era of good 
feelings would dissipate into coup d’état led by a man who had 
almost completely escaped the notice of the American press in 
the wake of Stalin’s death.
 Within the same year of Stalin’s departure, the little 
known Khrushchev, with the help and muscle of Marshal 
Zhukov, began his climb to the pinnacle of Soviet power. His 
chief rival, despite Malenkov’s position, was undoubtedly 
the very dangerous Beria, a man who undoubtedly had his 
own bloody designs on power. Kruschev struck first, and had 
Beria arrested in a dramatic move supported by the rest of 
the Presidium, including Beria’s former ally Malenkov. The 
ambitious spymaster was taken completely by surprise, and 
exclaimed, “What’s going on, Nikita? Why are you searching 
for fleas in my trousers?”34 It was at this point that Malenkov 
gave the signal to Zhukov, who had dismissed all of Beria’s 
internal security guards and replaced them with Red Army 
soldiers, to arrest the secret policeman. Beria was taken into 
custody, tried, and executed six months later; his executioners 
had him stripped, tied to a wall, and, finally, gagged, to quiet 
the racket he made as he begged for his life. It was a fitting 
end for Stalin’s butcher.35
 After destroying Beria, Khrushchev quickly became the 
33  Ibid.
34  Montefiore, 652.
35  Ibid, 650-52.
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most powerful member of the Presidium, although it would 
take him some time to fully consolidate his power. Malenkov 
was replaced as Premier by Bulganin, Minister of War and 
Marshal Zhukov’s boss, as a reward for the army’s role in 
the destruction of Beria. However, in 1957, the remaining 
four of the original post-Stalin inner circle, Malenkov, 
Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin, attempted to overthrow 
Khrushchev. In response, Khrushchev appealed to the entire 
Central Committee, whom he had flown in on Zhukov’s 
planes, and won the day; he successfully accused his would-
be accusers, again with the help of Zhukov, and the original 
four were politically exiled to politically meaningless jobs 
for the rest of their careers. Khrushchev was now, like Stalin, 
Premier and First Secretary; but still he did not feel secure. 
Despite having rewarded Marshal Zhukov with the Defense 
Ministry for his crucial support, Khrushchev feared his power 
and popularity, exactly as Stalin had. Marshal Zhukov, Soviet 
war hero and the last major rival for power from the Stalin 
era, was unceremoniously fired for “Bonapartism.”36
 As Khrushchev took power, Eisenhower was little 
more than a bystander, even from the vantage point of the 
White House. Newsweek summed up the paralysis created 
by the information void in the Eisenhower administration 
rather well, “The men in the White House were just as 
bewildered as the man in the street…. Over and over again, 
proposals ran head-on into the same brick wall- lack of 
36  Ibid, 652-53.
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knowledge about the political situation inside Russia.”37  The 
lack of information, state department plans, or significant 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union made it very 
difficult for the President to influence the outcome of the 
Soviet succession in any meaningful way. It is not surprising 
that President Eisenhower called for better planning within 
the State Department after learning of this rather incredible 
shortcoming; after all, reporters for the New York Times and 
Newsweek had enough information to at least print the names 
of the two men who would prove to be the most crucial 
to determining the outcome of the succession question, 
Khrushchev and Zhukov. 
 The visceral American reaction, as demonstrated 
by the major printed media, to the death of Joseph Stalin 
was predictable. Not only had Stalin been a barbaric 
monster, he was also the leading purveyor of an ideology 
essentially opposed to the American way of life; for that 
reason he rightfully earned the distrust, fear, and hatred 
of the American people. But Stalin was also reclusive and 
shadowy micromanager of the flow of information within 
his empire, despite the larger than life cultish image he had 
created of himself. For a man who had murdered millions, 
Stalin was quite enigmatic; not only to his own people, but 
to Americans as well. This mysterious nature, a trait his 
followers cultivated, perhaps served well at home within 
the vicious political system that Stalin had created, but 
37  “Cold War, Ike, and Malenkov: ‘Watch and Wait’ Is the Key,” Newsweek, March 16, 1953, 
34.
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resulted in a dangerously tension in Western perceptions 
and actions in the face of Soviet political uncertainty. Many 
Americans, including Eisenhower himself, were every bit as 
wary of the devil they did not know as they devil that they 
had known. This unknowable nature of the immediate post-
Stalin government not only prevented positive diplomatic 
steps towards peace, but created the potential for disaster 
through miscalculation. It is a credit to the leadership of the 
relatively novice President Eisenhower that, in the absence of 
reliable information and planning, he took the cautious path, 
choosing neither serious diplomacy nor active exploitation 
until the fog surrounding the Kremlin dissipated on its own 
accord. 
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Religion in the African American 
Community of the Shoals:
A Speech Delivered at the           




Webster’s dictionary provides this definition of religion: “the 
service and worship of God or the supernatural; commitment 
or devotion to religious faith or observance; a personal set 
or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, 
and practices; a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to 
with ardor and faith.”1 Religion can mean a variety of things 
to different people. But, what did it mean to the African 
American community during the late 1950s and 1960s? For 
many of them, religion meant relying on God, having faith, 
and using the church as a meeting place. It was also a place 
where they could be encouraged and uplifted. The roots of 
what many in the community believed stretch all the way 
back to the beginnings of slavery in the Deep South. It was 
from these very roots that African Americans from all over 
Alabama drew strength so that they could fight against 
segregation in order to win back their dignity and honor. 
During the fall semester of last year, my classmates and I had 
the honor and privilege to conduct oral history interviews 
1  Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “Religion.”
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with Reverend Otis Smith, Huston Cobb, Reverend B.J. 
Bonner and others who provided us with detailed accounts 
of their lives, their educational background, what it was like 
to live through segregation, and how religion played a major 
factor in their lives. Those who challenged inequality and 
segregation often looked above for answers and help, seeking 
the faith they desperately needed to help them through their 
many struggles. 
 To understand the influence of religion on the Civil 
Rights movement and in the lives of the African American 
community in northwest Alabama, we need to understand 
how religion aided the slave communities in the South during 
much of the 1800s. We all know that during the 1800s, slavery 
was widespread throughout this region and cotton was king. 
In order to reap the profits, having enough slaves to work 
the fields and make the planter classes’ lives as comfortable 
as possible was a must. In order to deal with the abuse and 
degradation, slaves needed a place to turn and needed 
someone to lean on who understood how they were feeling 
and to whom they could go during their distress. Religion 
was a way for some early slaves to cope with their position 
within the “peculiar institution.” By looking to God and 
placing their faith in him, they had hope that while they may 
never find peace on earth they were sure to find it in heaven 
as a reward for their toils on earth. 
 While white slave owners and ministers were 
explaining to their families and congregations how the 
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scriptures upheld their livelihood, blacks were using it for 
an entirely different purpose. White southerners pulled 
scriptures from the Bible out of context in order to justify 
slavery. Many held firmly to the belief that while the Bible 
said that every soul was equal according to God, that belief 
was only applicable to the spiritual realm and not the social 
realm. Most white southerners believed churches should be in 
the business of saving sinners, not involving themselves with 
the world outside of it—meaning the institution of slavery. 
White southerners also took charge of teaching their slaves 
as well as restricting what was taught to them by outside 
black ministers. Many made their slaves attend church with 
white ministers while black ministers often had to operate 
underground as they were often viewed as threatening. White 
masters imposed these restrictions in order to ensure that 
their slaves were only being taught things that solidified the 
institution of slavery. Any teaching that contradicted this 
idea threatened the entire institution of slavery. In his article, 
“Black American Religion-From Slavery to Segregation,” Dr. 
Kenneth Johnson provides some insight into the religious 
doctrine taught to slaves by their white owners: “The 
religious doctrines taught the slaves and the church practices 
were controlled by whites; the doctrine and church practices 
were never anti-slavery in tone and never suggested that the 
slaves should be free.”2 To make things a bit more peculiar 
within this strange institution, white churches in northwest 
2   Kenneth Johnson, “Black American Religion-From Slavery to Segregation,” in The Journal 
of Muscle Shoals History 6 (1978), 49.
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Alabama did welcome slaves into their churches, but as Dr. 
Johnson makes clear, blacks had to sit in special sections away 
from whites.3 Some churches, such as the Presbyterian Church 
in Tuscumbia, admitted slaves into their membership as early 
as the 1840s.4
 Despite all the restrictions and the twisted way the 
scriptures were presented to them, slaves held firmly to 
their belief that their God would indeed save them and help 
them out of their seemingly endless torture. God was their 
deliverer, and just as he delivered Moses and his people out 
of Egypt and in turn guided them to the Promised Land, he 
would also lift them out of their bondage and set aside the 
greatest reward possible. Though they may have to toil here 
in despair and agony for a while longer, the reward, they 
believed, would be worth it in the end. 
 It was this belief that brought African American slaves 
together for worship and was also the reason they held so 
tightly to scripture. What I have always found intriguing 
and inspiring was how the cruel institution of slavery 
managed to bring a group of people closer together instead 
of ripping them apart. Religion was a common thread shared 
by all. Despite their terrible circumstances, many in slave 
communities had a seemingly unwavering faith in God and 
the scriptures. They carried the hopes founded upon religion 
into the fields, into the big house, and after emancipation into 
schools. Several of the oral history interviews conducted by 
3   Ibid.
4   Ibid.
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the University of North Alabama’s Public History program 
mention how churches in the area had schools in or near 
the church building so that black children denied adequate 
schooling due to segregation could go to school and get a 
proper education. After the Civil War and emancipation, 
creating churches and schools became more and more 
common. Dr. Johnson credits the Civil War and emancipation 
with laying “the foundation for a new order.”5 He states that 
in this new order “blacks continued to accept the Christian 
doctrine and continued affiliation with the same churches or 
organized new churches similar to those they had known as 
slaves. Blacks did reject white control of their religious life.”6 
By creating their own churches after emancipation as well 
as their own schools and belief system, African Americans 
pulled themselves together and created their own world—one 
that no one could compete with. The churches they formed 
after the war would come to serve as the very foundation 
for the movement that would occur almost one hundred 
years later—a movement that changed the lives of African 
Americans forever. 
  Their faith and devotion to God was one of the most 
important lessons that former slaves passed down to their 
children and grandchildren. Religion and the concept of 
church was a lasting legacy. This legacy trickled down to the 
generation living during the 1950s and 1960s when the Civil 
Rights Movement and the push for desegregation began. 
5   Ibid., 51.
6   Ibid., 54.
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As in the years before, a common strife brought the African 
American community together where yet again religion was 
found to be right in the middle of it all. Wayne Flynt gives 
a splendid explanation about why African Americans clung 
to religion so tightly in his book Alabama in the Twentieth 
Century. Religion, he says, “preserved the dignity of countless 
Alabama blacks and allowed them to make sense of their 
cosmic predicament during the reign of Jim Crow. And such 
religion would ultimately become a powerful weapon for 
physical as well as for spiritual liberation.”7 Religion was 
something trustworthy, unchanging, and reliable thus making 
it a crucial element that was at the very core of their fight for 
freedom and human rights. 
 I believe Dr. Flynt does the best job describing the 
importance of the church to the African American community 
during their struggle with segregation: “Religion represented 
another critical aspect of black identity. Despite class 
differences between individual congregations, the black 
church was a central community institution, providing 
affirmation of blackness, alternative forms of worship, 
leadership opportunities for women, political and economic 
leadership for the black community, and essentially defining 
life for most African Americans.”8  This statement was 
proven time and time again in most of our oral history 
interviews. Those of us who interviewed African Americans 
for the project found that most of them mentioned church 
7   Wayne Flynt, Alabama in the Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 2004), 332.
8   Ibid., 331.
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or religion in some shape, form, or fashion. Religion and the 
church in particular, did define their lives. Religion was a 
part of their childhood and was a concept their parents had 
instilled in them. One of my classmates had the opportunity 
to interview a gentleman by the name of Huston Cobb. 
During the interview, Mr. Cobb was asked to tell when he 
first learned about Pearl Harbor:  “Well it was a Sunday. We 
had a radio but we didn’t have it on Sunday because we had 
to go to church. That’s a must, you had to go to church.”9 His 
answer gives us insight into how religion was a central part 
of his childhood and what Sunday mornings were generally 
like in his childhood home. I had the honor of interviewing 
Reverend Otis Smith who preaches at the First Baptist Church 
in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Throughout the interview, Reverend 
Smith described his childhood, his years in military service, 
how he was called into the ministry, and the road to becoming 
a preacher.10 When he described his childhood education, he 
explained to me that his parents always knew his teachers.11 
They socialized with them and went to church with them.12 
Everyone knew everyone and church was the common 
meeting ground. Coming together and worshiping God in 
church was one way to, as Reverend Smith stated early on in 
the interview, bond with one another and face the challenges 
that lay ahead.13 
   For some, going to church was the only way to stay 
9   Huston Cobb, interview by Jonathon Watts, Leighton, AL., November 16, 2012.
10   Reverend Otis Smith, interview by author, Tuscumbia, AL., November 1, 2012. 
11   Ibid.
12   Ibid.
13   Ibid.
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abreast with the latest news concerning the Civil Rights 
Movement. Some rural congregations had no access to 
newspapers or black radio stations. As Dr. Flynt points out 
“churches became strategic communication networks and the 
key to organizing a mass movement.”14 It was in the churches 
that black preachers could reach the African American 
community and fill them in on what was happening in the 
world around them. It was here in one location that the 
word could be spread concerning marches or sit-ins that 
would be taking place within the days to come while also 
encouraging their members to not give up even if the present 
times seemed unbearable. Ministers more than likely taught 
their parishioners to meet discrimination with love, to always 
be peaceable, and imitate Jesus in all that they did. It is also 
likely that ministers and preachers asked their members to 
be patient just as Moses and his people were. There is no 
doubt that leaders of the movement saw how united they 
were on this particular front and in turn utilized that strength 
to their advantage. Churches were indeed the best places to 
coordinate. Ministers like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Fred 
Shuttlesworth, and those whose names we do not know were 
imperative to the movement and kept it going. These were the 
very men who helped mobilize the people and encouraged 
them, assuring them that no matter what kind of horrible 
treatment they may be face in their day to day walks of life, 
they had a place to turn and that God was indeed on their 
side. 
14   Flynt, 349.
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 If I asked you to describe in one word what helped 
black churches and their members most during their struggle 
to win their rights and freedoms during the 1960s, what 
do you think you would say? Think about it for a moment. 
Some of you might say that they had hope, drive, passion, or 
courage. I propose that not only did they have those things 
but that they also had zeal. Their zeal for their faith, for 
Christ, for eventual liberation helped them to overcome so 
many of the obstacles and roadblocks that were set before 
them. What else beside a zeal for their cause could help 
them endure police brutality, dog attacks, fire hoses, and 
verbal abuse? The very roots of that zeal were religion-based. 
Churches were attacked and bombed by the Ku Klux Klan 
and other radical members of the white race because they 
knew that at the heart of so many African Americans during 
the Civil Rights Movement was the concept of religion. How 
else can one explain the deliberate attack on churches and the 
horrific tragedies like that experienced on September 15, 1963 
at the 16th Street Baptist Church? Imagine being the parent of 
one of those four young girls killed inside a church because 
of racial hatred. The only way to explain how a community 
made it through tragedies such as this is that they had faith 
and conviction; things taught to them since their childhood 
that helped ease the pain and allowed them to move forward 
no matter what difficulties they faced.
 Today, many people of that particular generation recall 
what it was like to live in a time marked with tension and 
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hatred. The oral history interviews my classmates and I did 
only scratch the surface. It was wonderful to see how some 
of the people who lived through that time remained faithful 
and are continuing to pass on their faith to their children and 
grandchildren. Some, like Reverend Smith and Reverend 
B.J. Bonner, heeded the call to become ministers and are 
sharing their zeal for God with others. In an interview with 
Mr. Arthur Graves, one of my classmates was privileged to 
hear him tell how when he first enlisted in the service his 
mother gave him a small copy of the Bible or Testament.15 He 
states that “in that Testament she marked the 91st number of 
Songs”.16 Part of that Psalm reads as follows: “He who dwells 
in the shelter of the Most High will abide in the shadow of the 
Almighty. I will say to the Lord, ‘My refuge and my fortress, 
my God , in whom I trust!’ For it is He who delivers you from 
the snare of the trapper and from the deadly pestilence. He 
will cover you with his pinions, and under his wings you may 
seek refuge; his faithfulness is a shield and bulwark.”17 In Mr. 
Graves’ case, religion came in the form of this Testament from 
his mother as a way of saying keep the faith, stay strong in 
God, come what may. She had no doubt already learned that 
lesson. 
 Religion lived at the very heart of the African 
American community during slavery, during the Civil Rights 
Movement, and it still lives on today. Religion, for them, was 
a daily walk with God. During the Civil Rights Movement 
15   Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012.
16   Ibid.
17   Ps. 91 (New American Standard Version).
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it meant carrying God wherever they went and taking it 
one day at a time. Religion meant giving it all over to God 
who was their Savior and deliverer. The zeal many of their 
ancestors had in the 1800s lives on today though such figures 
as Reverend Smith, Arthur Graves, and Reverend Bonner. In 
so many black congregations there is still a strong, powerful 
zeal for God and for their belief system. They will not soon 
forget how religion played such a critical role in helping 
them overcome. God did indeed deliver the grandmothers 
and grandfathers and the mothers and fathers of today’s 
generation. I leave you with this quote from one of our 
interviews with Reverend Bonner who I believe does a better 
job than I ever could describing God’s role in the African 
American community both past and present. When asked 
what the word Missionary Baptist meant, he responded: 
“Well the word missionary pretty much defines us, because 
we are a body who believes in going, not just going for the 
sake of mission but also carrying the message of Jesus Christ. 
You see that’s our core belief.”18
18   Reverend B.J. Bonner, interview by Kevin Bailey, Russellville, AL, November 5, 2012.
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Work in the Lives of the African 
American Community of the Shoals
Wesley Garmon
The Oral History Project that was completed by University 
of North Alabama students as part of the Public History 
program yielded many interesting stories about the daily 
work lives of North Alabamians. Of particular interest were 
the stories of African Americans in the area who overcame 
the obstacles of racism and segregation to create successful 
and fulfilling careers. These individuals worked diligently to 
create more opportunities for themselves and their families 
by becoming skilled tradesmen, educators, and military 
personnel. This progress is exemplified in the personal 
recollections of Louise Hyler, Otis Smith, Arthur Graves, 
and Huston Cobb Jr. Their memories will be used to paint a 
picture of what it was like to live and work in North Alabama 
during the era of desegregation. 
 For years after Reconstruction, many African American 
families in the South provided for their families by working 
the land. However, the experiences of families in North 
Alabama were not limited to the conventional sharecropping 
experience. In fact, several families owned many acres of 
land. Huston Cobb Jr., born in 1925, stated that his maternal 
grandfather owned fifty-two acres of land near Leighton, 
Alabama. His paternal grandfather owned forty-two acres 
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and rented forty-six additional acres nearby. When asked if 
the farming on his family land followed the sharecropping 
method, Mr. Cobb responded by saying, “We didn’t do that. 
It was for folks that didn’t have their own. If you didn’t 
own your own land you did that. I didn’t even know how 
sharecropping worked until after I came out of the service.”1 
Louise Hyler’s father was also able to avoid sharecropping. 
After having served and been disabled in World War I, he 
returned to farming in the Barton area of Colbert County. 
Due to his injuries, he would rent land that his family owned 
and hire out workers to tend the crops. In contrast to African 
Americans in southern Alabama, who were predominantly 
restricted to sharecropping, these families illustrate that many 
African Americans in North Alabama were able to earn a 
livelihood by working and owning their own land. Since 
these families owned their own land, they were able to avoid 
the vicious cycle of debt that afflicted sharecropping families. 
Though these families were not rich, they were better able to 
provide for their families’ material and educational needs. 
 Not only were they able to provide for their own 
families, but people like Louise Hyler’s family also provided 
employment opportunities for others. During the cotton 
harvest, Hyler kept the records while workers came from 
Tuscumbia to work on the farms harvesting crops. All the 
farm work was done by horse and hand. It was difficult, but 
Hyler indicated that she enjoyed it by stating, 
1  Huston Cobb Jr., interview by Jonathan Watts, November 16, 2012.
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Twelve hundred pounds was the amount he would 
take the cotton to the gin [in Tuscumbia] for a bale of 
cotton. Now during the corn time I did help a little bit 
with that, but with sugar cane, they had boards they 
make for the purpose and you go up and down the 
rows, strip all the leaves off first, and then the people 
come behind you and cut it down, then they’d pile it 
up in piles, and they would take it to the mill where 
they made the syrup. And that was a lot of fun.2
These families grew many types of crops such as cotton, corn, 
and sweet potatoes alongside other garden crops. Also, many 
raised animals such as cows, goats, and hogs. While many 
African Americans remained in agricultural jobs for their 
entire lives, opportunities soon arose for their children and 
families to work in places beyond the farm. 
 Many African Americans were able to obtain jobs in 
several different professions besides farming, despite facing 
oppressive discrimination in the workplace. Arthur Graves’s 
father was a fireman on the Southern Railroad. Since there 
was no possibility of becoming a conductor or engineer, this 
was considered to be a good job for an African American. 
Despite this blatant inequality in job opportunities, Arthur 
Graves remembered his father’s experience fondly by 
recalling that,
We would be riding in the car and he’d be sitting on 
the back seat and he’d tell you how fast you were going 
within two or three miles. And we used to laugh about 
it; I said daddy, how you do that. And he just smiled, 
but he finally explained to us how it was done. You see, 
on the old railroads, the lines of communication were 
landlines, telephone poles. But you drive down the 
2  Louise Hyler, interview by Hannah Goode-Garmon, November 5, 2012.
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road; all those poles were the same distance apart. And 
he would count in his mind, “One, two, three, four.” 
As you passed this pole, he’d start counting and see 
where he was when you passed the second pole. And 
he would convert time and distance to miles per hour 
by how fast you were going from one pole to the next. 
But being a fireman on the railroad, they had to figure 
their time and distance on how fast they were going 
from one pole to the next.3
Men with such obvious intelligence and skill were routinely 
overlooked in their professions simply because of the color of 
their skin. 
 Perhaps no other organization in North Alabama 
created more employment opportunities for African 
Americans away from the farm as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA). Despite discriminatory policies elsewhere, 
ninety percent of all African Americans who were hired by 
TVA worked at Wilson Dam, Joe Wheeler Dam, or Pickwick 
Landing Dam. The black population in the Muscle Shoals–
Wheeler Dam area was approximately twenty-five percent at 
the time of TVA’s takeover of the project. Black employment 
ranged from between 16.2 to 20.1 percent with an average 
of 18.2 percent at these sites.4 Many activists argued that 
the percentages should have been higher and that black 
employees were still discriminated against. However, this still 
amounted to a large number of employed African Americans 
who would have otherwise have been limited to agricultural 
or other menial labor jobs.
3  Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012.
4  Nancy L. Grant, TVA and Black Americans: Planning for the Status Quo (Temple University 
Press: Philadelphia, 1990), 49.
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 While TVA did hire and employee many African 
Americans, it must be said that they also sought to conform 
to the social patterns of a racially segregated society. These 
practices are illustrated in the fact that African Americans 
were entirely prevented from working on many TVA 
projects, such as the Norris Dam in eastern Tennessee, 
because many white residents did not want to live and work 
alongside African Americans. The actions of the middle 
level officials and line supervisors, who were responsible for 
hiring, ensured that TVA employment practices remained 
consistently discriminatory.5
 Huston Cobb Sr. went to work in 1934 for the 
Tennessee Valley Authority building Wheeler Dam. He 
worked at TVA for over thirty years. Initially, Cobb Sr. ran jack 
hammers, then as a bricklayer, before finally moving to the 
general work force. After seeing how hard his father worked, 
Huston Cobb Jr. had little desire to work for TVA. However, 
after exiting the military at the conclusion of World War II 
and marrying in 1947, he eventually applied. He explained 
that veterans were given preference in hiring and that this 
helped him to gain employment. He began by working 
on the railroads for eight to ten months. Later he moved 
to the furnish building where they made phosphorus. He 
would stay in this position for twenty-five years, eventually 
becoming a foreman. Unfortunately, the phosphorus 
operation was shut down and Cobb was moved to the 
ammonia branch and received a pay cut. Cobb explained the 
5  Ibid.
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difficulties that this caused, stating, “They shut down the 
phosphorus area and transferred all of us to the ammonia 
branch. And then I got cut back $8,000. You got to learn how 
to live all over again. In the foreman business I’m making 
$10,000 more than my peers, more than my operators. So 
I lived one year like a white man. Only time I had enough 
money to go on vacations and do whatever I wanted to do. 
But they shut that down and moved me down there where I 
had never been and with other folks and people above me.”6 
Cobb would not allow himself to be deterred by this setback. 
 Huston Cobb Jr. was determined to learn all that he 
could about a new forty-six million dollar coal gasification 
plant that was being built in Houston, Texas. He and other 
workers were given the opportunity to go work in the new 
plant but Cobb stated that he was not going to go as an 
operator. He was determined to be a foreman again. Cobb 
attended classes given by TVA and Brown & Rooks engineers 
in order to learn how to operate the plant and its components. 
Due to his hard work and determination, he earned his way 
back to the foreman position. He was one of four foremen 
who worked at the site and the only African American of the 
four. He later became a supervisor with four foremen and fifty 
workers under his authority. He stayed in this position until 
retirement.  
 Although he was able to move up the ladder at TVA, 
Cobb remembered that it was not always an equal workplace. 
While speaking about segregation at TVA, Cobb stated that, 
6  Cobb, interview.
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“They just made two bathrooms, two water fountains, and if 
they had just one water fountain they had two spigots. This 
one over here was for us with a sign on it. One day I made a 
mistake and drank from the white one. The guard looks at me 
and I just said I was sorry. But we had a place that we ate in … 
you went in there and ordered and then went to a hole about 
like a fireplace and she had your stuff. Then we integrated, we 
went around there and I have never been so surprised in all of 
my life. There was a steam table, for the white workers, which 
we had never seen. I didn’t know anything about a steam 
table or anything like that working out TVA all those years 
until they integrated.”7  Huston Cobb Jr. and many other 
African Americans would have to endure these segregated 
conditions until 1962 when TVA fully integrated. 
 The military also offered an opportunity for many 
African American men to expand their career options. The 
Reverend Otis Smith, Arthur Graves, Huston Cobb Jr., and 
many other African American men were called on to serve 
their country at a time when they were treated as second 
class citizens. However, according to the recollections of 
many of the subjects in this project, the military offered 
greater equality than the civilian job market. Smith—who 
served in the Army—stated that, “Basically, when I was in, 
you did your job, you got your rank. The ones who were the 
hardest on me were my own black superiors. I was planning 
on making a career of the military at that time and I had 
platoons under me. But from the segregated standpoint, you 
7  Ibid.
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just didn’t feel that.”8 Both Cobb Jr. and Graves, who served 
in the Navy and the Air Force respectively, shared a similar 
account of their time in the military.  Graves, who reached the 
rank of Second Lieutenant, admitted that it was difficult at 
times because, “You had two things against you, performance 
and color, so it wasn’t easy, but you know some people made 
it on time. I did not experience that as such, because I was 
promoted right on time every time.”9 Most importantly, the 
military gave these young men the opportunity to earn skills 
and experience that they could not receive in other areas. 
Even though they were often drafted into these positions, 
they were able to rise farther in the military than they could 
have in the civilian world. Graves explained this phenomenon 
by saying, “Well in the circumstances, the military was the 
best thing for me at that particular time because there were no 
black policemen, there were no black lawyers; employment, 
other than in the post office, was very limited for blacks, so 
the military at that particular time was the best thing for me, 
and that’s why I chose to stay with it.”10 
 Military service enabled these young men—and 
many more African Americans in the region—to discover 
the large cities of the North, other parts of the country, and 
the world. Many encountered unimagined experiences for 
the first time that broadened their horizons. Some of these 
soldiers made the decision to never return to the farm. Instead 
many attended college or moved up North.  Several former 
8  Reverend Otis Smith, interview by Kristen Tippett Briggs, November 1, 2012.
9  Graves, interview.
10  Ibid.
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soldiers in other oral history projects have stated that what 
changed the most for them during their military service was 
that they learned that a black man could aspire to more than 
plowing a field or harvesting crops. Unfortunately, these men 
often returned to communities that were still in the grips of 
Jim Crow. However, after having experienced so much they 
would never be able to accept the status quo. It would be this 
generation, often led by former servicemen that would stand 
up and fight for their Civil Rights.
 The participants in this oral history project exemplify 
the hard work and perseverance of so many African 
Americans who sought to be treated equally and judged 
not by the color of their skin but by the quality of their 
hard work. North Alabama may not have witnessed the 
outbursts of violence that marred the Civil Rights Movement 
in other areas, but these stories are stark reminders that the 
area was not free of racism. The systematic segregation and 
discrimination of the Shoals area may have been quieter, but 
it was no less degrading, no less unequal, and no less wrong.  
These names may not be may not be some of the most famous 
names of the Civil Rights Movement, but their stories are 
just as important as any others and deserve to be told and 
appreciated.
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Education in the Lives of the        
African American Community of 
the Shoals
Hannah Goode-Garmon
Education is a fundamental right. It is as important as food, 
shelter, and safety. However, in the past it was not offered 
to all children equally. The educational system in the Shoals 
before and during the era of desegregation failed to offer 
children of color the same opportunities that whites enjoyed. 
Instead, the black community had to rely on churches, 
unequal training schools, and black only institutions for 
learning.  The stories of Huston Cobb Jr., Arthur Graves, and 
Louise Hyler illustrate the obstacles that had to be overcome 
in order to gain an education during this time. Their stories 
offer hope and an example of how a determination to learn 
can overcome the most trying of circumstances. 
 A black student in the state of Alabama had very 
limited options as to where they could attend school. They 
might be part of the segregated school system of Alabama 
and attend schools like Cherokee High School or G.W. 
Trenholm High School in Tuscumbia, Alabama. According to 
Vivian and Curtis Morris, “African American communities 
provided a good education for their children long before 
the 1954 Brown decision and school desegregation. African 
American citizens in Tuscumbia established the Osborne 
Academy in 1877. It was renamed Trenholm High School in 
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1921 and closed in 1969. Trenholm High was one of the valued 
segregated schools that provided a good education for African 
American children both before and after Brown.”1 These 
children might also be part of a community that had a school 
that was connected to a church like in Russellville, Alabama. 
Or the most likely answer was that they would attend at 
some point in their educational career a Rosenwald School. 
In 1912, Booker T. Washington approached philanthropist 
Julius Rosenwald about his concept to build rural schools 
desperately needed for African American children across 
the segregated south. That partnership sparked an initiative 
that eventually created more than 5,300 schools, vocational 
shops and teacher’s homes across fifteen states in the South 
and Southwest from 1912-1932. This type of education was 
prevalent all over the South, especially in rural areas like 
Colbert and parts of Lauderdale counties.2
 The subjects of the oral history project conducted 
by University of North Alabama (UNA) students paint a 
clear picture of the education that the African American 
community of the Shoals faced. Arthur Graves, who was born 
in Tuscumbia, Alabama, experienced the era of desegregation 
in North Alabama firsthand. G.W. Trenholm in Tuscumbia 
and other valued segregated African American schools often 
lacked two important factors: an adequate physical plant and 
1  Vivian Gunn Morris and Curtis Morris, “Before Brown, After Brown: What Has Changed 
for African-American Children?” in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy 16, no. 
2, (August 2005), 224.




adequate supplies and equipment. Mr. Graves remembers 
vividly what it was like to be treated differently because of 
the color of his skin and attending segregated schools where 
students were forced to use hand-me-down books, desks, 
and chairs from white schools. The school that he attended 
did not have use of a library, any laboratories, or counselors. 
The only heat that his segregated school had come from a 
small heater in the middle of the class room. The football 
equipment that he and his teammates used was from the also 
white high school and was so worn out that his pants split.3 
 Houston Cobb Jr. shared a similar experience at his 
segregated school in Leighton, Alabama. His school was 
set up as a training school so that they could receive state 
funding. He stated that being in a “training school” meant 
that “you get all the hand-me-down buses and things. I’ve 
never ridden in a bus with seats in it. It just had a bench up 
and down the sides and one in middle.”4 Despite all of these 
harsh conditions, these men were determined to learn. Mr. 
Graves later joined the Air Force in 1945 and was trained as a 
pilot. He served overseas in France and, after the conclusion 
of his service, returned to the U.S. Upon his retirement from 
the Air Force, Graves accepted an academic position at the 
University of North Alabama. After retiring from UNA, Mr. 
Graves purchased the oldest African American-owned-and-
operated funeral home in Northwest Alabama. Mr. Graves 
saved this business from bankruptcy and is currently the 
3  Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012. 
4  Huston Cobb Jr., interview by Jonathan Watts, November 16, 2012. 
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funeral home’s director.  Huston Cobb Jr. served in the Navy 
and later was a foreman for TVA. He also went on to serve 
on the Board of Trustees at UNA for over a decade.5 The 
stories communicated by these men illustrate that no matter 
how difficult an individual’s educational background may 
be, a person’s desire to learn and achieve can overcome any 
obstacles. 
 These men not only faced segregation at school, they 
also faced it in their everyday lives. Arthur Graves stated that 
he had to “sit in the balcony at the theater, there weren’t any 
cafes that you could go to, most of the cafes had a window in 
the front of it and you’d go there and knock on the window 
and they’d come and serve you through the window, but my 
parents wouldn’t allow us to do that.”6 Mr. Cobb remembers 
having “two bathrooms and two water fountains and if they 
had just one water fountain they had two spigots.”7 The 
inequality witnessed in the education system permeated all 
aspects of life. 
 Due to the fact that many black schools faced 
substandard conditions, much of the education came from 
the home or church. Mr. Graves’ parents made sure that his 
education continued outside of the classroom. According 
to Mr. Graves, his father was not illiterate, but he could not 
read or write. His home received two daily newspapers, the 
Commercial Appeal that was delivered in the morning and 
the Times Daily—which at that time it was called the Tri Cities 
5  Ibid. 
6  Graves, interview.
7  Cobb, interview. 
Articles 161 
Daily—in the evening. His family also had subscriptions 
to at least four magazines: Time, Life, the Saturday Evening 
Post, and McCall’s. The high school did not give Mr. Graves 
access encyclopedias and dictionaries, but he was able to reap 
the reward of having these materials at home. Yet, he was 
exposed to reference books, newspapers, and magazines all 
because his father wanted his children to have more of an 
education then he had.  Graves was later hired by UNA as the 
director of student teaching for the College of Education. In 
this position, he coordinated all student-teaching assignments 
for the university. He later became Assistant to the President 
and finished his time at UNA coaching golf as well as 
teaching politics, administration, and health.8 His educational 
experience shines a light on the non-traditional routes in the 
black school system. 
 Traditional schools were not the only way that some 
black students learned. The Missionary Baptist Church in 
Russellville, Alabama had a school that was connected to the 
church.  Church based education played a very important 
role in the black community because it was often the best 
education available to them. The North Alabama Baptist 
Academy was founded in 1896 to primarily educate incoming 
preachers, but the teaching was confined mainly to academic 
subjects. The North Alabama Baptist Association solely 
carried the cost of this endeavor. Many young black men 
and women graduated from this high school department.  
Education varied from every community and one particularly 
8  Graves, interview.
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interesting story is that of Louise Hyler.
 Mrs. Hyler was born in Colbert County in the town 
of Barton in 1925. Hyler attended a Rosenwald school from 
grades one through eight. There was no high school in the 
Barton community at that time which meant that children 
had to go to school in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Many of them 
boarded with a white family and worked in the home to 
earn their keep. Due to these obstacles many black students 
struggled to attend school after the eighth grade. This burden 
was eased after Cherokee High School was founded. The 
now Cherokee Middle School was originally Cherokee 
High School and designated the segregated school for black 
children. It was an original Rosenwald School. At that time 
the segregated school for white children was named Cherokee 
Vocational High School. 
 Hyler would graduate from the new high school in 
April of 1944. After high school, Hyler attended Alabama 
State. She could not attend any other state university because 
they were still segregated. The University of Alabama and 
Auburn University would not become integrated until nearly 
twenty years later. Unfortunately during her time at Alabama 
State University, Louise’s father became very ill. Due to this, 
she was unable to return for what would have been her third 
year. One of her teachers suggested that she attend the annual 
Colbert County Board of Education meeting at the beginning 
of the school year in order to find out whether there might be 
a job available. The superintendent stood and asked if there 
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was anybody in attendance who needed a job. According to 
Louise “they didn’t worry about how you were qualified, 
I put my hand up and I got hired in Colbert County that’s 
where I got my first job and I taught there for five years.”9 She 
continued summer school at Alabama State where she earned 
a degree in Early Childhood Education.  
 The first certificate that Hyler received was a “D” 
certificate, and by her third year she received her “C” 
certificate. Each time she received a different certificate 
she was able to earn a little bit more money. In 1953, she 
got married and went back to school for an entire year and 
finally graduated with her college degree. At this time, the 
NAACP had already begun the fight in the Supreme Court 
to desegregate elementary and secondary schools, under 
the familiar name of Brown v. the Board of Education. With the 
prospect of integrated schools looming large, Louise, still 
desiring to teach, felt that in order to be competitive, she 
needed to further her education and obtain an MA degree. 
Her opportunities to obtain her degree in the south were very 
limited and so she wrote to New York University (NYU) and 
also to Columbia University. Columbia would have required 
her to make take six to eight more credit hours before they 
would accept her. NYU did not require her make up classes, 
and so she decided to attend NYU for a year and earned a 
master’s degree in Later Childhood Education. 
 When she came back home, a small number of 
superintendents did not like the fact that she went to New 
9  Louise Hyler, interview by author, November 5, 2012. 
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York to attend to school, despite the fact that she only did 
it because she could not attend the University of Alabama 
due to legal segregation. Despite the stigma of attending a 
northern university, she was generally more qualified than 
many of her white colleagues. She stated that most of the 
teachers “didn’t need to have much [education]; some of 
them had never even had a course in how to teach reading.”10 
At this time, Hyler finally got a job teaching in Tuscumbia. 
After the desegregation of Alabama’s public school system, 
Hyler was asked to teach at R.E. Thompson, which had been a 
white’s only school. She had never been around white people 
like some the girls that worked in white homes, because her 
father had not allowed her to do that. She stated that she “had 
never thought of people being that different,” so in 1966 she 
began teaching at an integrated school.11
 Unlike some black teachers that went into the white 
schools, she never wanted to quit, she stated that “I wouldn’t 
have quit anyways. Because I wouldn’t have let something 
like that stop me from the career I wanted to do.”12 She did 
not have a difficult time at R.E. Thompson, even though some 
of the parents were initially afraid. She understood that if 
parents were afraid of people of color, then that was all the 
children understood. She stated that “you know we learn 
what we live and that’s all they had lived all those years.”13 




13  Ibid. 
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“it was my responsibility to change the picture. And some of 
them were really sad and didn’t want their child to come to 
my room.”14 Some parents were very unhappy, but most of 
them did not show it. Hyler believed that it was because most 
parents thought that if they did not act right that she might 
take it out on their child; the parents did not realize that she 
would have never done that. It was a learning process for 
both Hyler and the parents of the children she taught. This 
process is displayed in one of Hyler’s recollections,
One lady, her child came—they put the list on the door 
when it got time, she saw her child’s name on my door 
she went to the office, the principle came and told me 
about it later, but he wouldn’t move any kid because if 
you start doing that you’ve got a whole big mess. And 
so the next year, this was a little girl, the next year she 
had a little boy and she went to the office and asked 
Mr. Chapel if he would put him in my room, he did 
put him in there and she was one of my best parents. 
And then I had this other lady she acted real nice, but 
she was scared to death. By the end of the year—we 
had an individualized program at the time and she- on 
her the state test that they give them in the fifth grade 
class; her child scored the highest grade possible. The 
mother came to thank me and she just cried and cried. 
I think because she was so afraid that her child was 
going to go backwards, so you see, that’s what I had to 
break down.15
Mrs. Hyler faced enormous challenges and had to break 
down the barriers between the two races. This was not easily 
done, but by treating people with respect and dignity she was 





 Arthur Graves, Huston Cobb Jr., and Louise Hyler 
are just a few examples of what men and women faced 
in breaking down the racial barriers before and during 
desegregation. They may not have had new books, 
equipment, or transportation, but they made the best of what 
they had. We can all learn a valuable lesson about our own 
education from these individuals. We see that no matter what 
is thrown our way, no matter what odds may be against us, 
an education is one of the most important things in life. We 
must all strive to overcome the obstacles that are set before us 
and to never let anything deter us for our paths. The stories 
of Graves, Cobb, and Hyler should never be and will never be 
forgotten because they will live on through the process of this 
oral history project. 
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Baxell, Richard. Unlikely Warriors: The British in the Spanish Civil War and 
the Struggle against Fascism. London: Aurum Press, 2012.
Richard Baxell’s monograph, Unlikely Warriors: The British in the Spanish 
Civil War and the Struggle against Fascism, utilizes an abundance of oral 
history and personal testimony to tell the story of British involvement in 
the Spanish Civil War, from its foundation in the poverty and depression 
experience by the working classes during the 1930s through the end of 
the Second World War. The aim of Baxell’s study is “to place the Spanish 
Civil War within the context of the volunteers’ lives, rather than the other 
way round” (9). However, because the book is dominated by the War, 
Baxell falls short of his goal; and the War, rather than the volunteers’ 
lives, remains the focus. Nevertheless, this study contributes greatly 
to the limited research on the British fighters in the Spanish Civil War 
and also includes information on medical volunteers, reporters, and the 
involvement of British political parties.
 Baxell’s work follows typical British volunteers from their 
hunger marches in Britain through their journey to France and nighttime 
passage through the Pyrenees into Catalonia. Baxell attempts to place the 
volunteers’ wartime experience in context by beginning his examination 
with their lives in Britain during the 1930s, including the overwhelming 
unemployment that allowed the working classes time to read Communist 
political pamphlets and solidify their own positions. Unemployment 
also allowed many workers the time to participate in political protests 
in Britain, and while defending Jews in the East End of London from the 
Fascists, these workers began using slogans taken from Republican Spain, 
highlight the first direct influence of Spanish events on their lives. Baxell 
initially generalizes this progression to almost every volunteer, although 
he later specifies that other parties, such as the Independent Labour 
Party, also sent volunteers and including a chapter dedicated to the small 
minority of soldiers who volunteered on the Nationalist side.
 Baxell excels in the compilation of primary sources that offer 
insight into the soldiers’ lives once they arrive in Spain. He uses 
interviews and memoirs to illustrate key battles, such as the Battle of 
Jarama, the Battle of Brunete, the Aragon offensive, and the Battle of the 
Ebro; and he includes details typically excluded from military studies, 
such as the writing of letters of condolence to families of soldiers who 
died in battle. Furthermore, Baxell does not shy away from negative 
stories about the British Battalion. He mentions British soldiers who 
desert the army and British soldiers who volunteered as spies for the 
Communist party against the POUM during the May Days in Barcelona. 
His treatment of George Orwell is decidedly fair, stating that Orwell’s 
Homage to Catalonia is significant but that it also jaded opinions of Britons 
who only read Orwell’s account. Rather than the traditional hero-
worship, Baxell includes unfavorable opinions of Orwell by his comrades. 
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Beyond Republican volunteers, his chapter on Nationalist volunteers 
shows similarities between the experiences of both sides, including lack 
of training, inexperience with weapons, and dislike of the Spanish diet, 
pointing out only that the Nationalist forces were more brutal than the 
Republicans when it came to intensity of training and discipline.
 Beyond soldiers, Baxell also includes chapters on medical 
volunteers and reporters. The majority of medical volunteers served 
Republican Spain, and only one nurse and zero doctors helped the 
Nationalist forces, although Baxell includes the Scottish Ambulance 
Unit on the side of the Republicans even while denouncing them for 
helping Nationalist sympathizers escape Republican zones and British 
deserters escape Spain. The main focus on the chapter, however, is the 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee: a loose organization of approximately 
150 doctors and nurses and 82 ambulances. Doctors who volunteered 
in the SMAC were often novices who came to Spain to gain experience 
quickly while nurses typically arrived with humanitarian aims rather than 
political agendas. Baxell follows the British Medical Unit, a subset of the 
SMAC, as they assisted the British Battalion, travelling from Barcelona to 
Madrid, tending the wounded at Jarama, Brunete, Aragon, and finally, the 
Ebro offensive. As with his coverage of soldiers and medical volunteers, 
Baxell includes information on reporters writing on both sides of the 
conflict. Reporters on the Nationalist side who failed to write about 
the justice behind the Nationalist cause were quickly removed, aiding 
the interpretation that newspaper reports were more propaganda than 
objective information. This opinion carried over to the other side as well 
with the Nationalists decrying the Republican news coverage of the 
Guernica bombing as propaganda while they simultaneously maintained 
that the Germans did not bomb Guernica.
 Baxell concludes his monograph with the return of the volunteers 
to Britain, highlighting their heroes’ welcome juxtaposed with their 
inability to find work and the resentment of many families who felt 
abandoned by these soldiers. Many soldiers who went to Spain as 
Communists returned disillusioned, and others quickly joined them when 
Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. Despite the widespread 
desire to continue their fight against fascism in the Second World War, the 
British policy restricting admission of International Brigadiers into the 
armed forces due to the fear that they had been subjected to Communist 
indoctrination during the Spanish Civil War prevented this desire from 
reaching fruition for many veterans. Baxell’s view of the Second World 
War as an extension of the Spanish Civil War, as well as the worldwide 
conflict that the Republican soldiers fought in Spain to prevent, further 
highlights his failure to set the War in the context of the lives of the 
volunteers rather than merely focusing on the volunteers’ lives while 
fighting in the Spanish Civil War.
 Overall, Baxell’s use of extensive oral history woven into an 
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eloquent narrative creates a compelling story about the British Battalion 
of the International Brigades, but, as a historical account, aging soldiers’ 
faded memories can lead to problems of vagueness or exaggeration 
and even fabrication when relied on as historical fact. Even the chapter 
on prisoners-of-war held by Nationalist forces is biased as it only 
incorporates accounts from soldiers who survived. Perhaps the value 
of Baxell’s book lies more in the emerging field of history and memory 
than as a reliable account of the events surrounded the Spanish Civil War. 
Taken in this manner, Unlikely Warriors becomes a symbol of how soldiers 
and volunteers perceived the Spanish Civil War during the 1930s as well 
as a lasting testimony to how it has been remembered ever since.
Kerrie Holloway
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Symonds, Craig L. The Civil War at Sea. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012.
Craig L. Symonds is a retired professor of American history and currently 
resides as the Chairman of the history department of the United States 
Naval Academy. He was educated at the University of California at Los 
Angeles and the University of Florida. He is the author of eight books on 
the Civil War and is highly qualified to write on the subject matter. The 
author’s background enhances his credibility as a scholar.1 Symonds’s 
The Civil War at Sea examines the development of warships in the Civil 
War. Northern and Southern navies alike designed ironclads and steam-
powered ships for combat. Symonds focuses on the advantages and 
disadvantages of each side’s ability to create warships, illustrates specific 
battles and charts the Northern blockade.
 In the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, a transportation and 
communication revolution invaded America and boosted railroad 
production, canal construction, and the U.S. Navy’s ship building 
capabilities. In 1843, the USS Princeton, the world’s first propeller-driven 
steam warship was constructed by the U.S. Navy. However, this did not 
necessarily advance the U.S. Navy’s merit. They were still inferior to 
the power of Great Britain (4-5). Symonds nevertheless believes the U.S. 
Navy was more prepared for war in 1861 because of the construction 
of twenty-four propeller-driven steamers armed with advanced naval 
ordinance (8). Lawrence Lee Hewitt concurs that the abundance of 
northern resources served as a catalyst to fight a naval war and eventually 
cut off Confederate supply routes.2 The Confederacy sought to fight the 
war on land and feared that “extensive naval preparations in time to 
meet the dangers that threaten us are impracticable.” Those U.S. Navy 
members who committed themselves to the Confederacy following 
secession implied the best defense was constructing small flotillas that 
would “serve as auxiliaries to forts” (16). The South took advantage of the 
Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia and the Bellona Gun Foundry 
on the James River. The Bellona Gun Foundry produced over a thousand 
heavy guns for the Confederacy. The Naval Gun Foundry at Selma, 
Alabama became another source for naval guns as well (18). The North’s 
naval efforts are better organized, better funded and more successful 
because the North receives heavy support from congress (33).  Symonds 
uses the battle of the Monitor and Merrimack to show the advancement of 
the U.S. Navy. Despite immense damage, the Union’s Monitor prevailed, 
allowing their Navy to remain in control of Hampton Roads, Virginia 
(32). Symonds provides a persuasive argument regarding how the North 
1  Antigoni Ladd, “The Smithsonian Associates,” Civil War Studies, civilwarstudies.org/
articles/Vol_4/ten-at-gettysburg.shtm.
2  Lawrence Lee Hewitt, “Review of The Civil War at Sea,” America’s Civil War 25, no. 6 
(2013), 69.
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was better prepared for such a naval war, not only from this example, 
but how the Union obeyed Lincoln’s plan for a southern blockade, as 
discussed below.
 According to Symonds, the Union’s strategy was to seal off 
the entire southern coast to trade and prevent the entrance and exit of 
vessels (42). Therefore, the South was not able to import the supplies 
the Confederacy desperately needed. Due to the Union blockade, the 
profit of southern cotton exports fell 90 percent (70). Perhaps the most 
destructive product of the blockade was the collapse of the southern 
railroad system. Raimando Luraghi claims that this was “The most 
deadly cause of the dearth that starved soldiers on the front line” (69). 
A slow asphyxiation of cotton sales and railroad destruction led to 
the Union occupation of southern ports and the eventual surrender of 
Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (72).  
 For the latter half of the work, Symonds discusses the 
importance of the capture of rivers and harbors for both North and 
South. During the war, rivers were important because they allowed for 
the movement of troops and supplies. Union gunboats, which were 
faster and better equipped vessels than the Confederate counterparts, 
guarded transport ships and controlled much of the Mississippi River 
(109-110).  This was not an easy task, according to Symonds, and the 
Confederacy, despite limitations, was able to produce two gunboats to 
attempt the defense of Charleston Harbor at Fort Sumter and Mobile 
(153).  On August 17, 1863, Union naval forces began a bombardment 
of Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter. The Confederate Navy was not 
able to defend itself, which allowed the Union to take control of the 
forts. The only challenge they would face was the H. L. Hunley, a 
Confederate submarine.  Symonds delves into only one battle between 
the H. L. Hunley and the USS Housatanic, in which the Hunley sank 
the Housatanic outside of Charleston Harbor (176).  Symonds does 
not illustrate fully the importance of the H. L. Hunley’s role in the 
Confederate Navy. With the coming Union occupation of Mobile 
Bay in 1864, the Confederacy’s river war efforts are stifled and focus 
transferred back to ground battles in the western theater (192). 
The work struggles to convey its place in Civil War historiography. 
Symond’s creates a chronological synopsis of water wars with no clear 
relation to the Civil War as a whole. As historian Stephen W. Sears 
points out, Symond’s description of Confederate commerce raiders 
such as the CSS Florida, Alabama, and the Shenandoah, fails to prove 
their effect on the war.3 However, the book is friendly to those without 
knowledge of the Civil War.
 
Tess Evans
3  Stephen W. Sears, “Review of The Civil War at Sea,” Naval History 24, no. 1 (2010), 68.
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Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii, 
855pp.
As the subtitle suggests, Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God 
Wrought is a work that examines the rapid transformation of the 
United States of America from 1815 to 1848. At 855 pages, it is a 
comprehensive narrative that encompasses virtually every facet of 
history imaginable: political, legal, diplomatic, military, technological, 
economic, social, and cultural. Though Howe asserts that his narrative 
has no thesis, the book contains at the very least an interpretive 
framework in which people, events, and places are threaded together 
by an overarching theme (849). The author rejects the notion advanced 
by other historians—most notably Charles G. Sellers—that this time 
period is defined by a “market revolution” by referencing more recent 
scholarship that counters that a market economy had already been 
in existence since the colonial era. Rather, Howe argues that it was a 
“communications revolution”—often coupled with the transportation 
revolution—that distinguished the period under examination from 
any other in American history. This premise of a communications 
revolution thus provides the overarching theme present throughout 
the work.
 The very dates 1815 and 1848—the conclusions of the War of 
1812 and the Mexican-American War respectively—are specifically 
chosen to emphasize the dizzying evolution that communications 
underwent over the course of three decades. In early 1815, the Battle 
of New Orleans was needlessly fought because the participants on 
this side of the Atlantic were oblivious of the fact that diplomats 
representing the United States and Great Britain had already 
signed the Treaty of Ghent, thus bringing the war to an end in the 
twilight of 1814. Howe contrasts this chronic dilemma against his 
dramatic narration of the first message sent via electric telegraph 
by Professor Samuel F. B. Morse in Washington D.C. to his associate 
in Baltimore in 1844. Acutely aware that his invention was going to 
revolutionize not only the speed of communications but even divorce 
communications from the necessity of transportation, Morse sent 
his profoundly metaphysical statement, “What Hath God Wrought” 
(1). In illuminating just how momentous this event truly was, Howe 
observed that “Neither Alexander the Great nor Benjamin Franklin … 
two thousand years later knew anything faster than a galloping horse. 
Now, instant long-distance communication became a practical reality” 
(1). Indeed, the author asserts that the establishment and operation of 
the early telegraph lines kept the Polk administration and American 
public informed of developments once war broke out against Mexico 
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(2).
 While the electric telegraph was arguably the most advanced 
development in the communications revolution, it was by no means the 
only significant one. Howe is at his finest when examining the expansion 
of the nation’s postal service with all its far-reaching consequences. 
The expansion of the postal system provides a unique example of the 
complementary nature of the transportation and communications 
revolutions. Howe observes: 
Not only did improved transportation benefit communication, 
but the communication system helped improve transportation. 
Even without a central plan, the post office pushed for 
improvements in transportation facilities and patronized them 
financially when they came. The same stagecoaches that carried 
passengers along the turnpikes also carried the mail, and the 
postmaster general constantly pressed the stages to improve their 
service (226).
While the newspaper boom of the era was in some measure the product 
of recent modernization in printing and papermaking—yet another 
factor of the communications revolution that Howe examines—it was 
the burgeoning postal system that facilitated the spread of information 
by delivering newspapers throughout the nation. Nor was this limited 
to newspapers alone. Magazines, books, and other printed material 
were delivered by the postal service, allowing readers to become more 
knowledgeable about the world in which they lived.
 Howe convincingly demonstrates throughout his work that 
the communications revolution truly did transform society. The 
proliferation of political newspapers and periodicals both informed 
the voters and promoted their involvement. This is especially evident 
in Howe’s examination of America’s second party system. Faster 
communications revolutionized the world of trade and commerce 
as well. Perhaps most notable is the boost that reform movements 
received from the communications revolution. Howe argues that it is no 
coincidence that the antislavery movement became more prominent in 
the 1830s. Supporters of this movement were also taking advantage of 
the new printing technology to get the word out. Howe even astutely 
notes a global consequence of the communications revolution that 
undoubtedly benefited the abolitionist movement: “In a world where 
people communicated and traveled, the continued existence of slavery 
in the United States when many other countries had abolished it came to 
seem anomalous and embarrassing” (647). These are but a few examples 
of the transformation of American society facilitated by improved 
communications.
 Despite its great insight, What Hath God Wrought is not without 
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its flaws. Regrettably, the most notable shortcoming of this book is the 
lack of any adequate examination of the advantage in communications 
that the United States held over Mexico during the Mexican-American 
War or how such a cutting edge influenced the outcome of the 
conflict. While the chapter pertaining to this war addresses how the 
technological superiority of the U.S. military and the chronic political 
instability of the Mexican government proved to be decisive factors in 
America’s favor, little is said about the disparity between each nation’s 
communications system. Given Howe’s assertion that the telegraph 
kept America well informed during the war (as previously noted) 
along with his statement that Mexico’s inefficient communication 
system left its northern territories vulnerable to an ever expanding 
United States, it is not unreasonable for the reader to expect a detailed 
discussion on the specific role of the telegraph and its influence on 
the course of events (21). However, little is said on the subject. Howe 
merely states that the war served as a catalyst for extending the 
telegraph system to facilitate the federal government’s need for the 
latest news from the front (748).
 Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought is a superb 
work of scholarship on the early national period, despite minor flaws, 
and is highly recommended for several reasons. Undoubtedly, his 
novel interpretation of a communications revolution as the main force 
behind the transformation of the early American republic is welcome 
because it will continue to spark healthy debate among historians. 
Such debates often sharpen the intellectual tools of the trade, 
thus making better historians out of the discipline’s professionals. 
However, the scholar is by no means the only one who stands to 
benefit from reading Howe’s work. Because of its eloquent narrative 
prose, any general reader unfamiliar with the time period now has 
access to a comprehensive wealth of information contained in a single 
volume. Howe is to be applauded for attempting to educate not only 
the scholar but also the general public. His refreshingly balanced 
opinion that, “History is made both from the bottom up and from the 
top down, and historians must take account of both in telling their 
stories,” serves as a reminder that all areas of history are valuable 
and must be examined in relation to each other for a more complete 
understanding of the past (843). In light of all these considerations, it 
is only fitting that Howe’s What Hath God Wrought belongs in the same 
series as James McPherson’s renowned Battle Cry of Freedom.    
A. Blake Denton
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Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil 
Rights, 1938-1965. By Keith M. Finley. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2008. Pp. ix-340. Acknowledgments, introduction, 
note on sources, bibliography, index. $40.00. 
 
The Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth century is a critical period 
in American history and a significant amount of historical assessment 
has been published on this monumental struggle. Scholastic 
contributions usually focus on the African American community’s 
fight for equality and the leaders who were responsible for the 
achievements of legal and political equality. Other histories analyze 
specific events, places, or people connected to the conflict. There are 
very few detailed historic studies devoted to white opposition to 
civil rights. Keith Finley’s Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and 
the Fight against Civil Rights, 1938-1965, winner of the D.B. Hardeman 
Prize, is an impressive contribution. Finely adds a fresh perspective to 
the ever expanding literature on this socially and politically important 
era in history.
 Finley argues that white southern senators, instead of 
employing outright obstruction, strategically delayed the struggle for 
racial equality for nearly three decades. Finley begins in 1938 when 
southern senators sought to block an anti-lynching bill. He continues 
tracing the ingenious tactics utilized by these senators to delay civil 
rights legislations, and the study ends with the inevitable legal defeat 
of Jim Crow, signified by the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
 As the author explores the southern senators delaying efforts, 
an evolving pattern of deliberate obstruction emerges. Finley states 
that their “long-term tactical objective thus shifted from preventing 
to postponing the assault against segregation” (7). These men 
realized they would ultimately fail at preserving their southern way 
of life. Southern senators based their arguments against equality 
on constitutional interpretation rather than racism, while using 
northern senators’ seeming disinterest in southern civil rights to their 
advantage. Before World War II, they were victorious in preventing 
certain measures such as the anti-lynching bill and the anti-poll tax 
bill. Finley illustrates that when southern senators were faced with 
bills that began to directly threaten segregation they “realized that 
defeat represented the only possible outcome of their resistance,” so 
they began planning for covert strategic tactics. (7). 
 These senators limited the use of overt racism and appealed 
to their northern colleagues as public support for civil rights grew. 
Such approaches included the constitutional defense of segregation, 
the perpetuation of the myth that a peaceful existence was alive in 
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the Jim Crow South, and the distribution of the idea that both blacks 
and whites celebrated segregation. Dixie’s senators succeeded with 
strategic delay at the federal level, but failed at controlling local racial 
agitators and racial tensions. Thirty years of filibustering led to the 
rise of an impactful and influential grassroots protest movement in 
the southern region, while attracting more northern support. After a 
series of white violent responses to peaceful black protest in the 1950s 
and 1960s, northern legislators, as Finley states, “could no longer 
accept southern claims of the racial tranquility created by Jim Crow” 
(14). Finley explores the change in attitudes among southern senators 
towards the end of the fight. A few sought compromises, while many 
fought for their precious southern way of life to the very end.
 A book this thoroughly detailed could run the risk of 
becoming dry, but Finley does a superb job at keeping readers 
engaged. This is done by the addition of concise biographies and 
lively anecdotes of each southern senator as he introduces them. 
Finley exposes Richard Russell’s racism when the senator “unveiled 
a program to evenly distribute the nation’s black population, then 
so heavily concentrated in the South, throughout the country” (130). 
Russell believed that “Northerners should pass judgment on the 
South only after they had experienced the difficulties of living with 
a sizable black population” (130). Another character analysis Finley 
illuminates is that of Lyndon B. Johnson. The author states that the 
“man who became an outspoken civil rights supporter as president 
began his Senate career espousing a diametrically opposed position” 
(111). These descriptions are relevant in order to fully understand the 
voting patterns, ideologies, and personalities of each man.
 Delaying the Dream presents a well-researched and convincing 
argument. Finley illuminates the ideology of white opposition to civil 
rights legislation, their extreme methods and tactics, and the racial 
attitudes of white southerners during the mid-twentieth century 
by drawing from senators’ papers, the Congressional Record, and a 
wealth of secondary sources. In the conclusion, Finley expands his 
study by reflecting on how northern opinion turned against the 
black community once black violence crossed the Mason-Dixon 
Line, just as southern senators had predicted. In a closing argument, 
Finley states that as a result of continued racial unrest, Richard 
Nixon won the presidential election with the message of law, order, 
and constitutionalism pursued by southerners in their three decade 
opposition against civil rights. Thus, the southern view of politics had 
ironically become the American view. Finley’s work is a must read 
for serious scholars of political history and those interested in social 
movements in the American South during the twentieth century. 
Ashley Freeman
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Meringolo, Denise D. Museums, Monuments and National Parks: Toward a 
New Genealogy of Public History. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2012. 207 pp. 
Many mark the 1970s as the decade of the birth of the field of public 
history. The term “public history” was coined by Robert Kelley in 1975. 
The next year Kelley and others at UC Santa Barbara launched the first 
public history program in the country. The program helped historians 
apply the skills they learned in graduate school to a variety of fields 
outside academia, which was suffering from a severe job crisis in the 
1970s. This “new” field quickly became problematic as those already 
working within the areas that fell under the new label of public history 
(historic preservation, archival and museum administration, collections 
management, etc.) found themselves and their work questioned and 
marginalized as they lacked formal training in the new academic field. 
However, this simplified explanation of the birth of public history does 
not satisfy most public historians. Meringolo, in a well-executed work, 
argues that the field was in fact born much earlier than the 1970s, in 
part in the offices of historians employed by the federal government, 
with additional roots in the work of early Smithsonian scientists and 
archeologists at the early National Parks and Monuments. Meringolo’s 
belief that public history is not just a branch of traditional academic 
history, but a field its own right shapes the rich and complicated history 
of the field beginning in the mid nineteenth century and leading up 
to WWII as “federal workers began to conceptualize the protection of 
landscapes and artifacts as valuable public work.” (xxix). 
 In Part I, Meringolo begins by looking at the slow process by 
which the federal government began to sponsor research in the pre-Civil 
War era. The Federal government, reluctant to over-extend its authority in 
states or to build up a scientific and educational bureaucracy, funded few 
projects. Those they did fund   were scientific in nature and were seen as 
aiding economic growth and development, such as geological surveys to 
determine the safest locations for railroad lines in the West. During and 
after the Civil War, the government increased its involvement in funding 
research and education. As a result of the Morrill Act of 1862, American 
education began to undergo an important shift increasingly towards to 
a research-based curriculum. The number of scientific expeditions began 
to increase as well as government funds available to researchers. One 
such expedition led to the creation of the first national park, Yellowstone, 
in 1872. Recognized for its unique landscape and its value to science, 
Yellowstone became the model for other national parks. 
 In Part II, Meringolo examines how the federal government 
became increasingly interested in preserving archeological resources, 
which lead to the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the creation of the Park 
Service in 1916. While problematic in many ways, the Antiquities Act 
Institutional Contributions 179
helped to usher in a new era where prehistoric and historic resources 
began to enjoy federal protection, at least in theory. In practice, controlling 
access to sites was difficult and it took trained archeologists/Park 
Service rangers like Jesse Nusbam at Mesa Verde to protect sites and 
artifacts from looters and to develop interpretive programs that helped 
to educate visitors.  By the 1920s a new problem emerged for the Park 
Service. While the numbers of visitors to National Parks continued to 
grow yearly, leading to increased demand for staff and infrastructure, 
the Park Service’s goal of managing a “truly national landscape” was 
going unfulfilled (85). In 1925, Arcadia National Park in Maine was the 
only National Park east of the Mississippi, and justifying the creation of 
eastern parks was difficult. Meringolo argues that during the nineteenth 
century western parks were created based in their “scenic but otherwise 
useless landscapes” and their potential for scientific research (87). To 
create eastern parks, the Park Service turned away from science and 
looked to history as a justification, which became a “tool of development” 
and allowed the Park Service to transform “vernacular landscapes and 
local traditions into components of national heritage”(86).  During 
the Depression, such a focus on history and interpretation in the 
parks increased, as historians took jobs working with the CCC on site 
development projects and the development of new museum programs. 
They also joined the ranks of national monument superintendents and 
rangers in greater numbers. 
 By Part III of Meringolo’s work, which examines audience, 
authority and offers her concluding thoughts, the debts the field of public 
history has to science, to the federal government’s role in protecting 
historic sites, to the Park Service and to the expanded role of the federal 
government during the Depression, are quite clear. As Meringolo argues, 
public history clearly has an evolution and a story of its own and is truly 
different from traditional academic history. It has its own issues, its own 
responsibilities to the public and to itself. A valuable book for practicing 
public historians and students alike, Museums, Monuments and National 
Parks, helps to ground public history’s methodologies and rich history in 
a much more realistic and complex narrative than is traditionally told.  
Dr. Carolyn Barske
University of North Alabama
Florence, AL
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Blood on the Hills: A History of Violence in Appalachia. Edited by Bruce E. 
Stewart (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2012. Pp. 412. 
Illustrations, index. Cloth. $55.00.)
From Guy Rivers, William Gilmore Simms’s 1834 novel, to the FX 
television series Justified, Appalachia has been portrayed as a region 
uniquely prone to violence and disorder. Over the years, various 
explanations have been proffered—most of them trite and lazy nods to 
genetic factors or cultural determinism. Blood on the Hills brings together 
thirteen essays by established scholars and talented young historians 
alike, almost all of which do an excellent job of at once depicting 
specific violent episodes and exposing the superficiality of outmoded 
explanations. 
 As is to be expected in collections of this sort, not all the 
contributions are outstanding. Katherine Ledford’s examination of 
eyewitness accounts of Appalachian life quickly goes off the rails by 
rejecting the veracity of eight separate travelers without producing a 
shred of evidence that such “reports” (scare quotes hers) are suspect. 
Likewise, T.R.C. Hutton’s “Assassins and Feudists” is a rambling attempt 
to link the 1900 William Goebel assassination to violence in eastern 
Kentucky, all in order to argue what anyone with a passing knowledge 
of the event already knows—that politics played a crucial role in 
Appalachian violence.
 Yet these two are the exceptions in an otherwise remarkable 
collection of essays. Among the highlights is Mary Ella Engel’s 
extraordinarily well-rendered account of an 1879 murder of a Mormon 
missionary in northern Georgia that places the killing within the context 
not of religious prejudice per se but of the Mormons’ disruption of 
Appalachian kinship networks. Likewise, Durwood Dunn renders a 
superb and harrowing account of an eastern Tennessee minister run out of 
his pulpit for protesting the torture of two slaves at the hands of a couple 
of “respectable” elites. 
 The essays range back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, a time before the stereotypes of a violent Appalachia became 
commonplace. Kevin Barksdale offers a concise and informative account 
of the short-lived State of Franklin and the “near-perpetual violence” 
(46) of its four-year pseudo-existence. Kathryn Shively Meier examines 
Pennsylvania’s Wyoming Valley in the late eighteenth century and finds 
the violence there to be a result of both political quarrels and interracial 
conflict born of land encroachment. In southern Appalachia, unruly 
and violent young Cherokee warriors, Tyler Boulware argues, were 
a chronic problem for tribal leaders, but one they skillfully used as a 
lever in negotiations with European-Americans. John Inscoe examines 
lawlessness in the early nineteenth century boomtowns of the north 
Georgia goldfields by analyzing one of the very first popular depictions of 
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Appalachian violence, Simms’s Guy Rivers. 
 Bruce Stewart charts the creation of the moonshiner myth in late 
nineteenth century periodicals, revealing that the stereotype was peddled 
in the service of rationalizing Victorian era efforts to forcibly drag uncouth 
mountaineers into the modern world—an effort that necessarily entailed 
the acceptance of an exploitative industrial order. Richard Starnes vividly 
depicts the 1933 murder of Thomas Price, a wealthy and well-connected 
railroad man, and the subsequent efforts of mountain people themselves 
to counter the violent stereotype of their region. Paul Rakes and Kenneth 
Bailey, meanwhile, skillfully catalog the extraordinary violence of West 
Virginian coal towns. The harrowing racial dimensions of  mountain 
violence are dissected by separate and outstanding essays by Rand 
Dotson—who renders an account of the Roanoke, Virginia riot of  1893—
and Kevin Young, who examines racial lynching of Broadus Mitchell  in 
western North Carolina in the 1920s.
 So what, in the aggregate, are we to make of these essays? Bruce 
Stewart, in his introduction to the collection, argues that they “debunk the 
myth of violent Appalachia” (18)—by which the reader must assume he 
means a uniquely violent Appalachia, for if the collection does anything, it 
quite clearly demonstrates that violence was fairly endemic to mountain 
life: a North Georgian gang shoots a Mormon missionary two dozen 
times in the head and neck; a respected member of an east Tennessee 
community whips an elderly slave 300 times with a carpenter’s handsaw; 
dozens upon dozens of mountaineers are shot in cold blood, many 
without any discernable reason. 
 But were such levels of violence atypical of America as a whole? 
Here, this admirable collection falls short, for the case that “violence in 
Appalachia was not exceptional” (6) remains not so much unproven, but 
essentially unargued; little context or comparative evidence is presented 
that would enable such a claim to be evaluated. 
 In large part, the problem is one of historiographical context—or, 
more accurately, the lack of one. Seldom mentioned in the collection are 
the important studies of Richard Maxwell Brown, Richard Hofstadter, 
Richard Slotkin, David Courtwright, Randolph Roth, and Carroll 
Smith-Rosenberg, all of which argue that, although American levels of 
violence were—and are—exceptionally high, the rate of violence has 
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not been uniform through space or time.1 Two crucial determinants 
identified by these scholars are concentrations of young, single men 
and the government’s ability to exert and extend its authority.  The first 
explanation, best elaborated by Courtwright, receives support from Paul 
Rakes and Kenneth Bailey, who find far greater levels of violence in the 
coal camps of West Virginia—known for their “abundance of liquor and 
testosterone” (319)—than elsewhere in the state. But given that the gender 
imbalance of the West Virginia coal towns was not typical of Appalachia 
as a whole, a second, Weberian explanation may be more appropriate: 
the crucial variable in the ebb and flow of violence in America’s history 
has hinged upon the ability of the nation-state to secure a “monopoly 
on violence”—and thereby restrict or punish non-sanctioned violence. 
Richard Hofstadter gave voice to such a position decades ago: 
The story of our diminished violence . . . has been in good part 
the story of the submergence and defeat of arbitrary, bigoted, self-
satisfied local forces by the advancing cosmopolitan sentiment 
of a larger, somewhat more neutrally minded state, or, better, 
national public. It has been marked by the replacement of 
small-town vigilantes by state authorities or national troops . . 
. the supremacy of national laws and standards over state and 
municipal laws and practices.2
Similarly, Randolph Roth has recently maintained that the two most 
important factors influencing American murder rates are levels of trust 
in government and a belief in the honesty of elected officials. As he 
elaborates, “if no government can establish uncontested authority and 
impose law and order, if political elites are deeply divided and there is 
no continuity of power or orderly succession, men can . . . take up arms 
on behalf of particular political factions or racial groups and kill without 
1 Richard M. Brown’s works include The South Carolina Regulators: The Story of the First 
American Vigilante Movement (Cambridge, Harvard University Press), 1963; Strain of Violence: 
Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); 
and No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). Richard Hofstadter views are summarized in his introduction to 
Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, American Violence: A Documentary History (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1970).  Richard Slotkin has produced a remarkably influential trilogy of 
works on the mythology of American violence: Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology 
of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Wesleyan University Press, 1973); The Fatal Environment: 
The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890 (New York: Atheneum, 
1985); Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: 
Atheneum, 1992). David Courtwright, Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from 
the Frontier to the Inner City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) Randolph Roth, 
American Homicide (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 
This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2010). 
2 Hofstadter, American Vipolence, 28.
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restraint.”3 This, it seems, could serve as a fairly accurate summary of the 
book at hand. 
 Given the sheer physical challenge presented by the Appalachian 
mountain range, one doesn’t have to be Fernand Braudel to wonder 
how this geographic reality both impeded the ability of state and federal 
authorities to assert their power in the region and gave marauders 
opportunity to prey on the civilian populations—people who in turn were 
forced to defend themselves by violent means. 
 None of this should be read as an argument against Stewart’s 
contention that Appalachia was—and is—“a society very much 
American,” (6) or a dissent from the laudable and necessary desire of 
the essayists to correct the still-lingering notion that the region is a land 
inhabited by a not-quite-American “Other.” Yet, like recent trends in the 
writing of Southern history, the effort to minimize the differences between 
nation and section may obscure as much as it clarifies. What does it 
really tell us to assert: Appalachia is violent; America is violent; therefore 
Appalachia is just America writ small? Indeed, if regional peculiarities are 
myths, why is there a distinct field to begin with? At which point do we 
strip place of any explanatory power? 
 Such questions are not meant to impugn the overall quality of 
the essays—on the contrary, their excellence is a testament to the wealth 
of young talent in the field, as well as the continuing relevance of more 
established scholars. But although the canvases are skillfully executed, 
perhaps we should reconsider the manner in which they are framed. 
Dr. Matthew Schoenbachler 
University of North Alabama
Florence, AL
3 Roth, American Homicide, 17, 28-29.
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